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Abstract 
 The paper draws lessons from the experience of the past year for the conduct of 
central banks in the pursuit of macroeconomic and financial stability.  Macroeconomic 
stability is defined as either price stability or as price stability and sustainable output or 
employment growth.  Financial stability refers to (1) the absence of asset price bubbles, (2) 
the prevention or mitigation of systemically significant funding illiquidity and market 
illiquidity and (3) the prevention of insolvency of systemically important financial 
institutions.  The performance of the Fed, the ECB and the Bank of England is evaluated in 
terms of these criteria.  The Fed is judged to have done worst both as regards macroeconomic 
stability and as regards one of the two time dimensions of financial stability: minimizing the 
likelihood and severity of future financial crises.  As regards ‘putting out fires’ (dealing with 
the immediate crisis), the Bank of England gets the wooden spoon for its early failure to 
perform the lender of last resort and market maker of last resort roles.  
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Introduction 
 In this paper I draw lessons from the experience of the past year for the conduct of 
central banks in the pursuit of macroeconomic and financial stability.  Modern central banks 
have three main tasks: (1) the pursuit of macroeconomic stability; (2) maintaining financial 
stability and (3) ensuring the proper functioning of the ‘plumbing’ of a monetary economy, 
that is, the payment, clearing and settlement systems. I focus on the first two of these, and on 
the degree to which they can be separated and compartmentalised, conceptually and 
institutionally.  My thesis is that both monetary theory and the practice of central banking 
have failed to keep up with key developments in the financial systems of advanced market 
economies, and that as a result of this, many central banks were to varying degrees ill-
prepared for the financial crisis that erupted on August 9, 2007.   
The empirical illustrations will mainly be drawn mainly from the experience of three 
central banks, the Federal Reserve System (Fed), the Eurosystem (ECB) and the Bank of 
England (BoE), with occasional digressions into the experience of other central banks.  
Discussion of mainly Fed-related issues will account for well over one third of the paper, 
partly in deference to the location of the Jackson Hole Symposium, but mainly because I 
consider the performance of the Fed to have been by some significant margin the worst of the 
three central banks, as regards both macroeconomic stability and financial stability. 
In many ways, August 2008 is far too early for a post-mortem.  Both the financial 
crisis and dysfunctional macroeconomic performance are still with us and are likely to remain 
with us well into 2009: inflation and inflation expectations are above-target and rising (see 
Chart 1 and Charts 2a,b), output is falling further below potential (see Charts 3a,b) and there 
is a material risk of recession in the US, the UK and the euro area.12 Nevertheless, I believe 
                                                 
1
 The official inflation targets are 2.0 percent per annum for the BoE and just below 2.0 percent for the ECB, 
both for the CPI.  I assume the Fed’s unofficial centre for its PCE deflator inflation comfort zone to be 1.5 
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that, although a final verdict may have to wait another couple of generations, there are some 
lessons that can and should be learnt right now, because they are highly relevant to policy 
choices the monetary authorities will face in the months and years immediately ahead.  Such, 
in any case, have been the justifications for even earlier crisis post-mortems written by 
myself and others (see e.g. Buiter (2007f, 2008b) and Cecchetti (2008)). 
Possibly because truly systemic financial crises have been few and far between in the 
advanced industrial countries since the Great Depression (the Nordic financial crisis of 
1992/1993 is a notable exception (see Ingves and Lind (1996) and Bäckström (1997)), most 
central banks in the north Atlantic region - the region where the crisis started and has done 
the most damage - were not prepared for the storm that hit them.  It is therefore not surprising 
that mistakes were made.  The incidence and severity of the mistakes was not the same, 
however, for the three central banks.  I find that the Fed performed worst as regards 
macroeconomic stability and as regards one of the two time dimensions of financial stability 
– minimising the likelihood and severity of future financial crises.  As regards the other time 
dimension of financial stability, dealing with the immediate crisis, the Bank of England gets 
the wooden spoon, because of its failure to act appropriately in the early days of the crisis.  
I argue that three factors contribute to Fed’s underachievement as regards 
macroeconomic stability.  The first is institutional: the Fed is the least independent of the 
three central banks and, unlike the ECB and the BoE, has a regulatory and supervisory role; 
fear of political encroachment on what limited independence it has and cognitive regulatory 
                                                                                                                                                        
percent.  Given the recent historical wedge between US PCE and CPI inflation, this translates into an informal 
Fed CPI inflation target of just below 2.0 percent.   
2
 The long-term inflation expectations data for the euro area should be taken with a pinch of salt.  The reported 
euro area survey-based inflation expectations are the predictions of professional forecasters rather than those of 
a wider cross-section of the public, as is the case for the US and UK data (see European Central Bank (2008)).  
The euro area professional forecasters are either very trusting/gullible or know much more than the rest of us, as 
their 5-years ahead forecast flat-lines at the official target throughout the sample, despite a systematic 
overshooting of the target in the sample.  Using market-based estimates of inflation expectations, either break-
even inflation rates from nominal and index-linked public debt or inflation expectations extracted from inflation 
swaps, would not be informative during periods of illiquid and disorderly financial markets.  Even if the markets 
for these instruments themselves remain liquid, the yields on these instruments will be distorted by illiquidity 
elsewhere in the system. 
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capture by the financial sector make the Fed prone to over-react to signs of weakness in the 
real economy and to financial sector concerns.   
The second is a sextet of technical and analytical errors: (1) misapplication of the 
‘Precautionary Principle’; (2) overestimation of the effect of house prices on economic 
activity; (3) mistaken focus on ‘core’ inflation; (4) failure to appreciate the magnitude of the 
macroeconomic and financial correction/adjustment required to achieve a sustainable external 
equilibrium and adequate national saving rate in the US following past excesses; (5) 
overestimation of the likely impact on the real economy of deleveraging in the financial 
sector; and (6) too little attention paid (especially during the asset market and credit boom 
that preceded the current crisis) to the behaviour of broad monetary and credit aggregates. 
All three central banks have been too eager to blame repeated and persistent upwards 
inflation surprises on ‘external factors beyond their control’, specifically food, fuel and other 
commodity prices.   
The third cause of the Fed’s macroeconomic underachievement has been its proclivity 
to use the main macroeconomic stability instrument, the Federal Funds target rate, to address 
financial stability problems.  This was an error both because the official policy rate is a rather 
ineffective tool for addressing liquidity and insolvency issues and because more effective 
tools were available, or ought to have been. The ECB, and to some extent the BoE, have 
assigned the official policy rate to their respective price stability objectives and have 
addressed the financial crisis with the liquidity management tools available to the lender of 
last resort and market maker of last resort. 
The Bank of England made the worst job of handling the immediate financial crisis 
during the early months (until about November 2007).  The ECB, partly as the result of an 
accident of history, did best as regards putting out fires.   
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The most difficult part of financial stability management is to handle the inherent 
tension between the two key dimensions of financial stability: the urgent short-term task of 
‘putting out fires’, that is, managing the immediate crisis, and the vital long-run task of 
minimizing the likelihood and severity of future financial crises. Through their pricing of 
illiquid collateral, all three central banks may have engaged in behaviour that created 
unnecessary moral hazard, thus laying the foundations for future reckless lending and 
borrowing. In the case of the Fed this is all but certain, in the case of the ECB quite likely and 
in the case of the Bank of England merely possible.  
As regards the Fed, the nature of the arrangements for pricing illiquid collateral 
offered by primary dealers invites abuse. In the case of the BoE and the ECB, the secrecy 
surrounding their pricing methodology and models, and their unwillingness to provide 
information about the pricing of specific types and items of illiquid collateral make one 
suspect the worst.  These distorted arrangements (in the case of the Fed) and lack of 
transparency as regards actual pricing (for all three central banks) continue.  The reason the 
Fed did worst in this area also, is probably again due to the fact that, unlike the ECB and the 
BoE, the Fed is a financial regulator and supervisor for the banking sector.  Cognitive 
regulatory capture of the Fed by Wall Street resulted in excess sensitivity of the Fed not just 
to asset prices (the ‘Greenspan-Bernanke put’) but also to the concerns and fears of Wall 
Street more generally.   
All three central banks have gone well beyond the provision of emergency liquidity to 
solvent but temporarily illiquid banks. All three have allowed themselves to be used in 
varying degrees as quasi-fiscal agents of the state, either by providing implicit subsidies to 
banks and other highly leveraged institutions, and/or by assisting in the recapitalisation of 
insolvent institutions, while keeping the resulting contingent exposure off the budget and 
balance sheet of the fiscal authorities.  Such subservience to the fiscal authorities undermines 
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the independence of the central banks even in the area of monetary policy.  The unwillingness 
of the three central banks to reveal their valuation models for and actual valuations of illiquid 
collateral and, more generally, their unwillingness to provide the information required to 
calculate the magnitude of all their quasi-fiscal interventions, make a mockery of their 
accountability for the use of public resources. 
In Section I, I discuss the principles of macroeconomic stability and in Section II the 
principles of financial stability.  Section III reviews the records of the three central banks 
during the past year, first as regards macroeconomic stability and then as regards financial 
stability.  Section IV concludes. 
I. Macroeconomic stability 
I.1 Objectives 
The macroeconomic stability objectives of the three central banks are not the same.  
Both the ECB and the BoE have a lexicographic or hierarchical preference ordering with 
price stability in pole position.  Only subject to the price stability objective being met (for the 
BoE) or without prejudice to the price stability objective (for the ECB) can these central 
banks pursue other objectives, including growth and employment.  In the UK, the 
operationalization of the price stability objective is the responsibility of the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer.  It takes the form of a 2 percent annual target inflation rate for the headline 
consumer price index or CPI.  The ECB sets its own operational inflation target, an annual 
rate of inflation for the CPI that is below but close to 2 percent in the medium term. 
The Federal Reserve System (Fed) formally has a triple mandate: maximum 
employment, stable prices and moderate long-term interest rates.3  The third of these is 
                                                 
3
 The Federal Reserve Act, Section 2a. Monetary Policy Objectives, states: “The Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System and the Federal Open Market Committee shall maintain long run growth of the 
monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with the economy's long run potential to increase production, so 
as to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest 
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habitually ignored, leaving the Fed in practice with a dual mandate: maximum employment 
and stable prices. Unlike the lexicographic ordering of ECB and BoE objectives, the Fed’s 
objective function can be interpreted as symmetric between price stability and real economic 
activity, in the sense that, in the central bank’s objective function, the one can be traded off 
for the other.  This is captured well by the traditional flexible inflation targeting loss function 
Λ shown in equations (1) and (2).  Here tE  is the conditional expectation operator at time t, 
pi
 is the rate of inflation, *pi  the (constant) target rate of inflation, y  real GDP (or minus the 
unemployment rate) and *y  the target level of output, which could be potential output (or 
minus the natural rate of unemployment) or, where this differs from potential output, the 
efficient level of output (the efficient rate of unemployment). 
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With a lexicographic ordering, the central bank can be viewed as first minimizing the 
loss function in (1) and (2) with the weight on the squared output gap, ω , set equal to zero.  
If there is a unique policy rule that solves this problem, this is the optimal policy rule.  If 
there is more than one solution, the policy authority chooses among these the one that 
minimizes something like ( )2*
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‘Maximum employment’ is not a well-defined concept.  Recent Fed chairmen have 
interpreted it as something close to the natural rate of unemployment or the NAIRU (the non-
accelerating inflation rate of unemployment).  In employment space this translates into the 
                                                                                                                                                        
rates.” [12 USC 225a. As added by act of November 16, 1977 (91 Stat. 1387) and amended by acts of October 
27, 1978 (92 Stat. 1897); Aug. 23, 1988 (102 Stat. 1375); and Dec. 27, 2000 (114 Stat. 3028)]. 
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maximum sustainable level or rate of employment.  In output space it becomes the maximum 
sustainable output gap (excess of actual over potential GDP) or the maximum sustainable 
growth rate of GDP.   
Price stability has not been given explicit numerical content by the Fed, the US 
Congress or any other authority.  Since the Greenspan years, the Fed appears to have targeted 
a stable, low rate of inflation for the core personal consumption expenditure (PCE) deflator 
index.  It has not always been clear whether the Fed actually targets core inflation or whether 
it targets headline inflation in the medium term and treats core inflation as the best predictor 
of medium-term headline inflation.  As late as March 2005, the current Chairman of the Fed 
admitted to a ‘comfort zone’ for the core PCE deflator of 1 to 2 percent (Bernanke (2005)).  
This is also consistent with the FOMC members’ inflation forecasts at a three-year horizon.  
In what follows, I will treat the Fed’s implicit inflation target as 1.5 percent for the headline 
PCE deflator or just below 2.0 percent for the headline CPI, given the usual wedge between 
PCE and CPI inflation rates. 
The recent performance of the CPI inflation rates, of survey-based measures of 1-year 
and long-term inflation expectations and of real GDP growth rates for the US, the euro area 
and the UK are shown in Charts 1, 2a,b and 3a,b. 
Chart 1 here 
Chart 2a here 
Chart 2b here 
Chart 3a here 
Chart 3b here 
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I.2 Instruments 
 The key instrument of monetary policy for macroeconomic stabilisation policy is the 
short risk-free nominal rate of interest on non-monetary financial instruments, henceforth the 
official policy rate, denoted i .  This is the Federal Funds target rate in the US, the inelegantly 
named Main Refinancing Operations Minimum Bid Rate of the ECB and Bank Rate in the 
UK.  In principle, the nominal exchange rate (either a bilateral exchange rate or a multilateral 
index) could be used as the instrument of monetary policy instead of the official policy rate.  
In practice, all three countries have market-determined exchange rates.4  I don’t consider 
sterilised foreign exchange market intervention (unilateral or internationally co-ordinated) to 
be a significant additional instrument of policy, unless foreign exchange markets were to 
become disorderly and illiquid - something that hasn’t happened yet.   
 Reserve requirements on eligible deposits, when they are unremunerated, are best 
thought of as a quasi-fiscal tax.  When remunerated, they can be viewed as part of a set of 
capital and liquidity requirements that can be used as financial stability instruments (see 
Section II below), but not as significant macroeconomic stabilisation instruments.  
 The non-negativity constraint on the official policy rate has not been an issue so far in 
the current crisis.  With the Federal Funds target rate at 2.00 percent, it is by no means 
inconceivable that 0i ≥  could become a binding constraint on the Fed’s interest rate policy 
before this crisis and cyclical downturn are over.5   
                                                 
4
 I can therefore avoid addressing the anomaly (putting it politely) of the exchange rate, foreign exchange 
reserves and foreign exchange market intervention being under Treasury authority in the US (with the Fed 
acting as agent for the Treasury), or of the Council of Ministers of the EU (or perhaps of the euro area?) being 
able to give ‘exchange rate orientations’ to the ECB.  Clearly, in a world with unrestricted international mobility 
of financial capital, setting the exchange rate now and in the future effectively determines the domestic short 
risk-free nominal interest rate as a function of the foreign short risk-free nominal interest rate (there will be an 
exchange rate risk premium or discount unless the path of current and future exchange rates is deterministic).  If 
the US Treasury were really determined to manage the exchange rate, the Fed would only have an interest rate-
setting role left to the extent that the US economy is large enough to influence the world short risk-free nominal 
interest rate.   
5
 The non-negativity constraint on the nominal yield of non-monetary securities is the result of (a) the arbitrage 
requirement that the yield on non-monetary instruments, i , cannot be less than the yield on monetary securities, 
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 In what follows, the official policy rate will be the only macroeconomic stabilisation 
instrument of the central bank I consider in detail. 
 Because economic behaviour (consumption, portfolio demand, investment, 
employment, production, price setting) is strongly influenced by expectations of the future, 
both directly and through the effect of these expectations on long-duration asset prices, it is 
not just past and current realisations of the official policy rate that drive outcomes, but the 
entire distribution of the contingent future sequence of official policy rates.  The effect of a 
change in the current official policy rate is therefore the sum of the direct effect (holding 
constant expectations of future rates) and the indirect effect of a change in the current official 
policy rate on the distribution of the sequence of future contingent official policy rates.  This 
leveraging of future expectations effectively permits future interest rates to be used as 
instruments multiple times (provided announcements are credible): once at the date the actual 
official policy rate is set, 1( )i t , say, and through announcements or expectations of that 
official policy rate at dates before 1t . By abuse of certainty equivalence, I will summarise this 
announcement effect as ( ){ }1 1 ; 1t j tA i j− ≥ , where ( )1 1t j tA i−  is the announcement of the period 
                                                                                                                                                        
Mi , that is, Mi i≥  and (b) the practical problems of paying any interest at all on currency, that is, 0Mi ≈ .  
This is because currency is a negotiable bearer bond.  Paying interest, positive or negative, on negotiable bearer 
securities, while not impossible, is administratively awkward and costly.  This problem does not occur in 
connection with the payment of interest, positive or negative, on the other component of the monetary base, 
bank reserves held with the central bank. Reserves held with the central bank are ‘registered’ financial 
instruments.  The issuer knows the identity of the holder.  Paying interest, at a positive or negative rate, on 
reserves held with the central bank is trivially simple and administratively costless.  Charging a negative 
nominal interest rate on borrowing from the central bank (secured or unsecured, at the discount window or 
through open market operations) is also no more complicated than paying a positive nominal interest rate.  If the 
practical reality that paying (negative) interest on currency is not feasible or too costly sets a zero floor under the 
official policy rate, this would, in my view be a good argument for doing away with currency altogether (see 
Buiter and Panigirtzoglou (2003)).  
Various forms of E-money provide near-perfect substitutes for currency, even for low income 
households.  The existence of currency is, because of the anonymity it provides, a boon mainly to the grey and 
black economy and to the outright criminal fraternity, including those engaged in tax evasion, money laundering 
and terrorist financing.  The Fed has reduced its subsidisation of such illegality and criminality by restricting its 
largest denomination currency note to $100.  The ECB practices no such restraint and competes aggressively for 
the criminal currency market with €200 and €500 denomination notes.  When challenged on this, the ECB 
informs one that this is because in Spain people like to make housing transactions in cash.  I am sure they do.  
With the collapse of the Spanish housing market, this argument for issuing euro notes in denominations larger 
than €20 at most, may now have lost whatever merit it had before. 
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1t  policy rate in period 1t j− .  ‘Announcement’ should be interpreted broadly to include all 
the hints, nudges, winks and other forms of verbal and non-verbal communication engaged in 
by the authorities. 
This means that an opportunistic policy authority (one incapable of credible 
commitment to a specific contingent future policy rule) will be tempted, if it has any 
credibility at all, to use announcements of future policy rates as independent instruments of 
policy, unconstrained by the commitment or consistency constraint that the announcement of 
the future official policy rate, or of the future rule for setting the official policy rate, be equal 
to the best available current guess about what the authorities will actually do at that future 
date, which can be expressed as ( ) ( )1 1 1 1t j t t j tA i E i− −= . 
II. Financial stability 
 I adopt a narrow view of financial stability.  Sometimes financial instability is defined 
so broadly that it encompasses any inefficiency or imbalance in the financial system.  In what 
follows, financial stability means (1) the absence of asset price bubbles; (2) the absence of 
illiquidity of financial institutions and financial markets that may threaten systemic stability; 
and (3) the absence of insolvency of financial institutions that may threaten systemic stability. 
I deal with the three in turn. 
II.1 Should central banks use the official policy rate to try to 
influence asset price bubbles? 
 
 The original Greenspan-Bernanke position that the official policy rate should not be 
used to tackle asset booms/bubbles is convincing (Greenspan (2002), Bernanke (2002), 
Bernanke and Gertler (2001)). To the extent that asset booms influence or help predict the 
distribution of future outcomes for the macroeconomic stability objectives (price stability or 
price stability and sustainable economic growth), they will, of course, already have been 
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allowed for under the existing approaches to maintaining macroeconomic stability in the US, 
the euro area and the UK. 
But the official policy rate should not be used to ‘lean against the wind' of asset 
booms and bubbles beyond addressing their effect on or informational content about the 
objectives of macroeconomic stabilisation policy, that is, asset prices should not be targeted 
with the official policy rate ‘in their own right’.  First, this would ‘overburden’ the official 
policy rate, which is already fully engaged in the pursuit of price stability and, in the case of 
the US, in the pursuit of price stability and sustainable growth.  Second, asset price bubbles 
are, by definition, driven by non-fundamental factors.  Going after an asset bubble with the 
official policy rate – a fundamental determinant of asset prices – may well turn out to be like 
going after a rogue elephant with a pea shooter.  It could require a very large peashooter (a 
very large increase in the official policy rate) to have a material effect on an asset price 
bubble.   
The collateral damage to the macroeconomic stability objectives caused by interest 
rate increases capable of subduing asset price bubbles would make hunting bubbles with the 
official policy rate an unattractive policy choice.  Mundell's principle of effective market 
classification (Mundell (1962)) suggests that the official policy rate not be assigned to asset 
bubbles in their own right. 
That, however, leaves a major asymmetry in the macroeconomic policy and financial 
stability framework. This asymmetry is not that the official policy rate responds more sharply 
to asset market price declines than to asset market price increases. Even if there were no 
‘Greenspan-Bernanke put', such asymmetry should be expected because asset price booms 
and busts are not symmetric. Asset price busts are sudden and involve sharp, extremely rapid 
asset price falls. Even the most extravagant asset price boom tends to be gradual in 
comparison. So an asymmetric response to an asymmetric phenomenon is justified. This does 
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not mean that there has been no evidence of a ‘Greenspan-Bernanke' put during the current 
crisis.   I believe that phenomenon - excess sensitivity of the Federal Funds target rate to 
sudden declines in asset prices, and especially US stock prices - to be real, and will address 
the issue in Section III.2a below. 
Operationally, the asymmetry is that there exists a panoply of liquidity-enhancing, 
credit-enhancing and capital-enhancing measures that can be activated during an asset market 
bust or a credit crunch, to enhance the availability of credit and capital and to lower its cost, 
but no corresponding liquidity- and credit-restraining and capital-diminishing instruments 
during a boom. When financial markets are disorderly, illiquid or have seized up completely, 
the lender of last resort and market maker of last resort (discussed in Section II.3) can spring 
into action.  
Examples abound.  Sensible proposals from the SEC in the US that require putting a 
range of off-balance sheet vehicles back on the balance sheets of commercial banks are 
waived or postponed for the duration of the financial crisis because implementation now 
would further squeeze the available capital of the banks.  Given where we are, this makes 
sense, but where was the matching regulatory insistence on increasing capital and liquidity 
ratios during the good times? 
We even have proposals now that mark-to-market accounting rules be suspended 
during periods of market illiquidity (see e.g. IIF (2008)). The argument is that illiquid asset 
markets undervalue assets compared to their fundamental value in orderly markets, and that 
because of this fair value accounting and reporting rules are procyclical.  The observation that 
mark-to-market behaviour is procyclical is correct, but suspending mark-to-market when 
markets are disorderly would introduce a further asymmetry, because orderly and technically 
efficient asset markets can produce valuations that depart from the fundamental valuation 
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because of the presence of a bubble. There have been no calls for mark-to-market accounting 
and reporting standards to be suspended during asset price booms and bubbles. 
Fundamentally, what drives this operational asymmetry is the fact that the authorities 
are unable or unwilling to let large highly leveraged financial institutions collapse. There is 
no matching inclination to expropriate, to subject to windfall taxes, to penalise financially or 
to restrain in other ways extraordinarily profitable financial institutions. This asymmetry 
creates incentives for excessive risk taking by the financial institutions concerned and has 
undesirable distributional consequences.  It needs to be corrected. I believe a regulatory 
response is the only sensible one.   
II.2 Regulatory measures for restraining asset booms 
I propose that any large and highly leveraged financial institution (commercial bank, 
investment bank, hedge fund, private equity fund, SIV, conduit, other SPV or off-balance 
sheet entity, currently in existence or yet to be created - whatever it calls itself, whatever it 
does and whatever its legal form - be regulated according to the same set of principles aimed 
at restraining excessive credit growth and leverage during financial booms.  Again, this 
regulation should apply to all institutions deemed too systemically important (too large or too 
interconnected) to fail. 
Therefore, while I agree with the traditional Greenspan-Bernanke view that the 
official policy rate not be used to target asset market bubbles, or even to lean against the wind 
of asset booms, I do not agree that the best that can be done is for the authorities to clean up 
the mess after the bubble bursts. 
II.2a Leverage is the key 
The asymmetries have to be corrected through regulatory measures, effectively by 
across-the board credit (growth) controls, probably in the form of enhanced capital and 
liquidity requirements. Every asset and credit boom in history has been characterised by 
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rising, and ultimately excessive leverage, and by rising and ultimately excessive mismatch.  
Mismatch here means asset-liability mismatch or resources-exposure mismatch as regards 
maturity, liquidity, currency denomination, credit risk and other risk characteristics. The 
crisis we are now suffering the consequences of is no exception. Because mismatch only 
becomes a systemic issue if there is excessive leverage, and because increased leverage is 
largely motivated by the desire of the leveraged entity for increased mismatch, I will focus on 
leverage in what follows.  
Leverage is a simple concept which may be very difficult to measure, as those 
struggling to quantify the concept of embedded leverage will know. In the words of the 
Counterparty Risk Management Group II (2005), "...leverage exists whenever an entity is 
exposed to changes in the value of an asset over time without having first disbursed cash 
equal to the value of that asset at the beginning of the period." And: "...the impact of leverage 
can only be understood by relating the underlying risk in a portfolio to the economic and 
funding structure of the portfolio as a whole." 
Traditional sources of leverage include borrowing, initial margin (some money up 
front - used in futures contracts) and no initial margin (no money up front - when exposure is 
achieved through derivatives). 
I propose using simple measures of leverage, say a measure of gross exposure to book 
equity, as a metric for constraining capital insolvency risk (liabilities exceeding assets) of all 
large, highly leveraged institutions. Common risk-adjusted Basel II-type capital adequacy 
requirements and reporting requirements would be imposed on all large institutions whose 
leverage, according to this simple metric, exceeds a given value. These capital adequacy 
requirements would be varied (or vary automatically) in countercyclical fashion. 
To address the second way financial entities can fail, what the CRMG calls liquidity 
insolvency (meaning they cannot meet their obligations as they become due because they run 
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out of cash and are unable to raise new funds), I propose that minimal funding liquidity and 
market or asset liquidity requirements be imposed on, respectively, the liability side and the 
asset side of the balance sheets of all large highly leveraged financial institutions. These 
liquidity requirements would also be tightened and loosened in countercyclical fashion. 
The regular Basel II capital requirements would provide a floor for the capital 
requirements imposed on all highly leveraged financial institutions above a certain threshold 
size.  It is possible that Basel II will be revised soon to include minimum funding liquidity 
and asset liquidity requirements for banks and other highly leveraged financial institutions.  If 
not, national regulators should impose such minimum funding liquidity and asset liquidity 
requirements on all highly leveraged financial institutions above a threshold size. 
Countercyclical variations in capital and liquidity requirements could either be 
imposed in a discretionary manner by the central bank or be built into the rule defining the 
capital or liquidity requirement itself.  An example of such an automatic financial stabiliser 
is the proposal by Charles Goodhart and Avinash Persaud (Goodhart and Persaud (2008a,b)), 
to make the supplementary capital requirement for any given institution (over and above the 
Basel II requirement, which would set a common floor) an increasing function of the growth 
rate of that institution’s balance sheet.   
My wrinkle on this proposal (which Goodhart and Persaud propose for banks only) is 
that the same formula would apply to all highly leveraged financial institution above a given 
threshold size. The Goodhart-Persaud proposal makes the supplementary-capital-
requirement-defining growth rate a weighted average (with declining weights) of the growth 
rate of the institution’s assets over the past three years.  The details don’t matter much, 
however, as long as the criterion is easily monitored and penalises rapid expansion of balance 
sheets.  A similar Goodhart-Persaud approach could be taken to liquidity requirements for 
highly-leveraged institutions.  If the assets whose growth rate is taxed or penalised under this 
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proposal are valued at their fair value (that is, marked-to-market where possible), its 
stabilising properties would be enhanced. 
Finally, I would propose that all large leveraged institutions that are deemed too large, 
too interconnected, or simply too well-connected to fail, be made subject to a Special 
Resolution Regime along the lines that exist today for federally insured deposit-taking 
institutions through the FDIC. A concept of regulatory insolvency, which could bite before 
either capital insolvency or liquidity insolvency kick in, must be developed that allows an 
official administrator to take control of any large, leveraged financial institution and/or to 
engage in Prompt Corrective Action. The intervention of the administrator would be expected 
to impose serious penalties on existing shareholders, incumbent board and management and 
possibly on the creditors as well. The intervention should aim to save the institution, not its 
owners, managers or board, nor should it aim to ‘make whole’, that is, compensate in full, its 
creditors. 
II.3 Liquidity management: from lender of last resort to market 
maker of last resort 
 
 Liquidity management is central to the financial stability role of the central bank.  
Liquidity can be a property of economic agents and institutions or of financial instruments.  
Funding liquidity is the capacity of an economic agent or institution to attract external finance 
at short notice, subject to low transaction costs and at a financial cost that reflects the 
fundamental solvency of the agent or institution.  It concerns the liability side of the balance 
sheet.  Market liquidity is the capacity to sell a financial instrument at short notice, subject to 
low transaction costs and at a price close to its fundamental value.  It concerns the asset side 
of the balance sheet.  Both funding liquidity and market liquidity are continuous rather than 
binary concepts, that is, there can be varying degrees of liquidity.   
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Funding liquidity (a property of institutions) and market liquidity (a property of 
financial instruments or the markets they are traded in) are distinct but interdependent.  This 
is immediately apparent when one recognises that access to external funds often requires 
collateral (secured lending); the cost of external funds certainly depends on the availability 
and quality of the collateral offered.  The value of the assets offered as collateral depends on 
the market liquidity of the assets.   
The central bank is unique because it can never encounter domestic-currency liquidity 
problems (domestic-currency funding illiquidity).  This is because the monetary liabilities it 
issues, as agent of the state – the sovereign - provide unquestioned, ultimate domestic-
currency liquidity.  Often this finds legal expression through legal tender status for the central 
bank’s monetary liabilities. Central banks can, of course, encounter foreign-currency liquidity 
problems.  The recent experience of Iceland is an example.   
There is no such thing as a perfectly liquid private financial instrument or a private 
entity with perfect funding liquidity, since the liquidity of private entities and instruments is 
ultimately dependent on confidence and trust.  Liquidity, both funding liquidity and market 
liquidity, is very much a fair weather friend: it is there when you don’t need it, absent when 
you urgently need it.  Although private agents may also lose confidence in the real value of 
the financial obligations of the state, including those of the central bank, the state is in the 
unique position of having the legitimate use of force at its disposal to back up its promises.  
The power to declare certain of your liabilities to be legal tender, the power to tax and the 
power to regulate (that is, to prescribe and proscribe behaviour) are unique to the state and its 
agents.  The quality of private sector liquidity therefore cannot exceed that of central bank 
liquidity. 
Funding illiquidity and market illiquidity interact in ways that can create a vicious 
downward spiral, well described in Adrian and Shin (2007a,b) and Spaventa (2008).  Faced 
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with the disappearance of normal sources of funding, banks or other financial institutions sell 
assets to raise liquidity to meet their maturing obligations.  With illiquid asset markets, these 
assets sales can trigger a sharp decline in asset prices.  Mark-to-market valuation, accounting 
and reporting requirements can cause capital ratios to fall below critical levels in other 
institutions, or may prompt margin calls.  This prompts further asset sales that can turn the 
asset price decline into a collapse.  Although these vicious circles can occur even in the 
absence of mark-to-market or fair value accounting and reporting, the adoption of such rules 
undoubtedly exacerbates the problem.  The procyclicality of the Basel requirements (and 
especially of Basel II) (which began to be introduced just around the time the crisis erupted) 
had, of course, been noted before (see e.g. Borio, Furfine and Lowe (2001), Goodhart (2004), 
Kashyap and Stein (2004) and Gordy and Howells (2004)). 
II.3a Funding liquidity, the relationships-oriented model of intermediation 
and the lender of last resort 
 
 Funding liquidity is central to the traditional ‘relationships-oriented’ model of 
financial capitalism (ROM) and the traditional lender of last resort (LLR) role of the central 
bank.  In the traditional banking model, banks fund themselves through deposits (fixed 
market value claims withdrawable on demand and subject to a sequential service constraint - 
first come, first served).  On the asset side of the balance sheet the traditional bank holds a 
small amount of liquid reserves, but mainly illiquid assets – loans to households or to 
businesses, partly secured (mortgages) partly unsecured.  In the ideal-type ROM bank, loans 
are held to maturity (e.g. the ‘originate to hold model’ of mortgage finance).  Even when 
loans mature, the borrowers tend to stay with the same bank for their future financial needs.  
Although deposits can be withdrawn on demand, depositors too tend to stick with the same 
bank, with which they often have a variety of other financial relations.  The long-term 
relationships mitigate asymmetric information problems and permit the parties to invest in 
reputations and to build on trust.  It inhibits risk-trading and makes entry difficult. 
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 This combination of very short-maturity liabilities and long-maturity, illiquid assets is 
vulnerable to speculative attacks – bank runs.  Such runs can occur, and be individually 
rational, even though the bank is solvent, in the sense that the value of the assets, if held to 
maturity, would be sufficient to pay off the depositors (and any other creditors). If the assets 
have to be liquidated prior to maturity, they would, however, be worthless (in milder versions 
the assets would be sold at a hefty discount on their fair value) and not all depositors would 
be made whole.  This has been known since deposit-taking banks were first created.  It has 
been formalised for instance in Diamond and Dybvig’s famous paper (Diamond and Dybvig 
(1983), see also Diamond (2007)).   
There are typically two equilibria.  One equilibrium has no run on the bank. No 
depositor withdraws his deposits; this is because he believes that total withdrawals will not 
exceed the liquid reserves of the banks. This is confirmed in equilibrium.  The other 
equilibrium has a run on the bank.  Each depositor tries to withdraw his deposit because he 
believes that the withdrawals by other depositors will exceed the bank’s liquid reserves.  The 
bank fails. 
 Solutions to this problem take the form of deposit insurance, standstills (mandatory 
bank holidays until the run subsides) and lender of last resort (LLR) intervention.  All three 
require state intervention.  Private deposit insurance can only cope with runs on individual 
banks or on a subset of the banks. It cannot handle a run on all banks.  A creditor (depositor) 
standstill - making it impossible to withdraw deposits - could be part of the deposit contract, 
to be invoked at the discretion of the bank.  This would, however, create rather serious moral 
hazard and adverse selection problems, so a bank regulator/supervisor would be a more 
plausible party to which to delegate the authority to suspend the right to withdraw deposits.  
Lending to a single troubled bank can be and has been provided by other banks.  Again this 
cannot work if a sufficiently large number of banks are faced with a run. 
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 Individually rational bank runs don’t require that the bank’s liabilities be deposits.  
They are possible whenever funding sources are short-term and assets are of longer maturity 
and illiquid.  When creditors to a bank refuse to renew maturing loans or credit lines, this is 
economically equivalent to a withdrawal of deposits.  This applies to credit obtained in the 
interbank market or funds obtained by issuing debt instruments in the capital markets. 
 Lending to a solvent but illiquid bank to prevent a socially costly bank failure should 
satisfy Bagehot’s dictum, which can be paraphrased as: lend freely, against collateral that will 
be good in the long run (even if it is not good today), and at a penalty rate (Bagehot (1873)).  
Taking collateral and charging a penalty rate is part of the LLR rule book to avoid skewing 
incentives towards future excessive risk taking in lending and funding by the banks, that is, to 
avoid moral hazard. 
 The discount window is an example of a LLR facility (in the case of the Fed I will 
mean by this the primary discount window, in the case of the ECB the marginal lending 
facility and in the case of the BoE the standing lending facility). 
 The effective operation of LLR facility requires that the central bank determine all of 
the following: 
1. The maturities of the loans and the total quantity of liquidity to be made available at 
each maturity. 
2. The nature of the liquidity provided (e.g. central bank reserves or Treasury Bills). 
3. The interest rates charged on the loans and the other financial terms of the loan 
contract. 
4. The set of eligible counterparties (who has access to the LLR facility?). 
5. The regulatory requirements imposed on the eligible counterparties. 
6. Whether the loan is collateralised or unsecured. 
7. The set of financial instruments eligible as collateral. 
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8. The valuation of the collateral when there is no appropriate market price (when the 
collateral is illiquid). 
9. Any further haircut (discount) applied to the valuation of the collateral and any other 
fees or financial charges imposed on the collateral. 
Items (3), (5), (8) and (9) jointly determine the cost to the borrower of access to the 
LLR facility, and thus the moral hazard created by the arrangement. 
In the case of the discount window (which can be described as an LLR facility ‘lite’), 
once points (1) to (9) have been determined, access to the facility is at the discretion of the 
borrower, that is, discount window borrowing is demand-driven.  Strangely, and rather 
unfortunately, use of discount window facilities has become stigmatised in both the US and 
the UK.  I assume the same applies to use of the discount window facilities of the 
Eurosystem, but I have less directly relevant information for this case.  This stigmatisation of 
the use of the discount window may be individually rational, because a would-be discount 
window borrower could reasonably fear that future access to private sources of funding might 
be compromised if use of the discount window were seen as a signal that the borrower is in 
trouble.  While this would be an unfortunate equilibrium, it is unlikely to be a fatal problem 
for a fearful discount window borrower: as long as the illiquid institution has a sufficient 
quantity of good collateral to be able to survive by using discount window funding (or 
through access to market-maker-of-last resort-facilities, discussed below in Section II.3b), 
discount window stigmatisation should not be a matter of corporate life or death. 
LLR facilities other than the discount window tend not to be ‘on demand’.  They often 
involve borrowers whose solvency the central bank is not fully confident of. Such ad-hoc 
LLR facilities typically accept a wider range of collateral than the discount window, and the 
use of the facility is subject to bilateral negotiation between the would-be borrower(s) and the 
central bank.  The Treasury and the regulator, if this is not the central bank, may also be 
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involved (this was the case with the LLR facility arranged by the BoE for Northern Rock in 
September 2007- the Liquidity Support Facility).  Such ad-hoc LLR arrangements are often 
arranged in secret and kept confidential as long as possible.  Even after the fact, when 
commercial confidentiality concerns no longer apply, the information needed to determine 
whether the LLR (and the Treasury) made proper use of public funds in rescue operations are 
often not made public.  The terms on which deposit insurance was made available to 
Northern Rock by the UK Treasury and the terms on which Northern Rock could access the 
Liquidity Support Facility created by the BoE are still not in the public domain.  There is no 
justification for such secrecy. 
The LLR facilities (including the discount window) are only there to address liquidity 
issues, not solvency problems.  Of course, future solvency is a probabilistic concept, not a 
binary one.  When continued solvency is in question (discussed below in Section II.6), the 
central bank may be a party to a public-sector rescue and recapitalisation.  The arrangement 
through which public resources are made available may well look like an LLR facility ‘on 
steroids’.  The key difference with the regular LLR facility is that the resources made 
available through a normal LLR facility are not meant to be provided on terms that involve a 
subsidy to the borrower, its owners or its creditors.  The risk-adjusted rate of return to the 
central bank on its LLR loans should cover its funding cost, essentially the interest rate on 
sovereign debt instruments of the relevant maturity.  In a funding liquidity crisis, there is 
likely to be a wedge between the risk-adjusted cost of funds to the central bank and the 
(prohibitive) cost of obtaining funding from private sources.  Under these conditions the 
central bank can provide liquidity to a borrower on terms that make it both subsidy-free (or 
even profitable ex-ante for the central bank) and cheaper than what the liquidity-constrained 
borrower could obtain elsewhere.  Such actions correct a market failure.  
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In the case of the UK, the discount window (the standing lending facility) is highly 
restrictive in the maturity of its loans (overnight only) and in the collateral it accepts (only 
sovereign and supranational securities, issued by an issuer rated Aa3 (on Moody's scale) or 
higher by two or more of the ratings agencies (Moody's, Standard and Poor's, and Fitch)).6  
The UK discount window therefore does not provide liquidity in any meaningful sense.  It 
provides overnight liquidity in exchange for longer-term liquidity.  It is of use only to banks 
that are caught short at the end of the trading day because of some technical glitch.   
Because the Bank of England has no discount window in the normal sense of the 
word, it had to create one when Northern Rock, a private commercial bank engaged mainly in 
home lending, found itself faced with both market liquidity and funding liquidity problems in 
September 2007.  The resulting construct, the Liquidity Support Facility, is just what a 
normal discount window ought to have been, and is in the US and the euro area. 
Most central banks make, under special circumstances, unsecured loans to eligible 
counterparties as part of their LLR role, but these tend to be separate from the discount 
window.  Also, as regards (2), discount window loans tend to be in exchange for central bank 
liquidity (reserves) rather than some other highly liquid instrument like Treasury Bills.  With 
the longer-maturity (up to 3 months) discount window loans that are now available in the US 
(for eligible deposit-taking banks), there is, in principle, no reason why the Fed should not 
make TBs or Federal Reserve Bills (non-monetary liabilities of the Fed) available at the 
discount window.  It certainly could make such non-reserve liquidity available at LLR 
facilities other than the discount window. 
                                                 
6
 The complete list includes gilts (including gilt strips), sterling Treasury bills, Bank of England securities, HM 
Government non-sterling marketable debt, sterling-denominated securities issued by European Economic Area 
central governments and major international institutions, euro-denominated securities (including strips) issued 
by EEA central governments and central banks and major international institutions where they are eligible for 
use in Eurosystem credit operations, all domestic currency bonds issued by other sovereigns eligible for sale to 
the Bank. These sovereign and supranational securities are subject to the requirement that they are issued by an 
issuer rated Aa3 (on Moody's scale) or higher by two or more of the ratings agencies (Moody's, Standard and 
Poor's, and Fitch). 
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 If a central bank engages in LLR loans to a solvent but illiquid bank, the central bank 
should expect to end up making a profit.  It can extract this rent because the central bank is 
the only entity that is never illiquid (as regards domestic-currency obligations).  It can always 
afford to hold good but illiquid assets till maturity.  If the collateral offered is risky 
(specifically, subject to credit or default risk), the central bank can ex-post make a loss even if 
it ex-ante prices risky assets to properly reflect the risk of both the borrowing bank defaulting 
and the issuer of the collateral defaulting.  I believe it is essential for a clear division of 
responsibilities between the central bank and the Treasury, and for proper public 
accountability for the use of public funds (to Congress/Parliament and to the electorate), that 
any such losses be made good immediately by the Treasury.  Ideally, all collateral offered to 
the central bank other than sovereign instruments should be exchanged immediately with the 
Treasury for sovereign debt instruments, at the valuation put on that collateral in the LLR 
transaction.  This removes the risk that the central bank is (ab)used as a quasi-fiscal agent of 
the government. 
 To avoid regulatory arbitrage, any institutions eligible to access the discount window 
or any of the other LLR facilities of the central bank should be subject to a uniform 
regulatory regime.  A special and key feature of such a common regulatory regime ought to 
be that access to LLR facilities only be granted to financial institutions for which there is a 
Special Resolution Regime which provides for Prompt Corrective Action and which 
establishes criteria under which the central bank, or a public agency working closely with the 
central bank like the FDIC, can declare a financial institution to be regulatorily insolvent 
before balance sheet insolvency or funding/liquidity insolvency can be established.   
The SRR managed by the FDIC for federally insured deposit-taking banks is a model.  
The SRR would allow a public administrator to be appointed who can take over the 
management of the institution, dismiss the board and the management, suspend the voting 
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rights of the shareholders, place the shareholders at the back of the queue of claimants to the 
value that can be realised by the administrator, transfer (part of) its assets or liabilities to 
other parties etc.  Outright nationalisation would also have to be an option. 
 The need for such an SRR for all institutions eligible to access LLR facilities follows 
from the fact that it is impossible for the central bank to determine whether a would-be user 
of the LLR facility is merely illiquid or both illiquid and insolvent.  Without the SRR, the 
existence of the LLR facility would encourage quasi-fiscal abuse of the central bank and 
would become a source of adverse selection and moral hazard. 
 
II.3b Market liquidity, the transactions-oriented model of intermediation 
and the market maker of last resort 
 
 The defining feature of the financial crisis that started on August 9, 2007 was not runs 
on banks or other financial institutions.  A few of these did occur.  Ignoring smaller regional 
and local banks, a classic depositors’ bank run brought down Northern Rock in the UK (a 
mortgage lending bank that funded itself 75 percent in the wholesale markets), and non-
deposit creditor runs were instrumental in killing off Bearn Stearns, a US investment bank 
and primary dealer, and IndyMac, a large US mortgage lending bank.  These, however, were 
exceptional events.   
The new and defining feature of the crisis was the sudden and comprehensive closure 
of a whole range of financial wholesale markets, including the asset-backed commercial 
paper (ABCP) markets, the auction-rate securities (ARS) market, other asset- backed 
securities (ABS) markets, including the markets for residential mortgage-backed securities 
(RMBS), and many other collateralised debt obligations (CDO) and collateralised loan 
obligations (CLO) markets (see Buiter (2007b, 2008b)).  The unsecured inter-bank market 
became illiquid to the point that Libor now is the rate at which banks won’t engage in 
unsecured lending to each other.  The sudden increase in Libor rates at the beginning of 
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August 2007 and the continuation of spreads over the overnight indexed swap (OIS) rate is 
shown for 3-month Libor, historically an important benchmark, in Chart 4.7   
Chart 4 here 
 The fact that the Libor-OIS spreads look rather similar for the three monetary 
authorities (with the obvious exception of a few idiosyncratic early spikes upwards in the 
sterling spread, reflecting the BoE’s late and belated conversion to the market-maker-of-last-
resort cause) does not mean that all three did equally well in addressing the liquidity crunch 
in their jurisdiction.  First, the magnitude of the challenge faced by each of the three may not 
have been the same.  Second, the spreads are rather less interesting than the volumes of 
lending and borrowing that actually take place at these spreads.  A 90-basis points spread 
with an active market is much less of a problem than a 90-basis points spread at which no-
one transacts.  Unfortunately, turnover data for the interbank markets are not in the public 
domain.   
Third and most important, international financial integration ensures that liquidity can 
leak on a large scale between the jurisdictions of the national central banks, as long as the 
foreign exchange markets remain liquid, as they did for the major currencies.  Unlike foreign 
branches, foreign subsidiaries of internationally active banks tend to have full access to the 
discount windows of their host central banks and they often also are eligible counterparties in 
the repos and other open market operations of their host central banks.   
Subsidiaries of UK banks made use of Eurosystem and Fed liquidity facilities.  Indeed 
UK parents used their euro area subsidiaries to obtain liquidity for themselves.  At least one 
subsidiary of a Swiss bank accessed the Fed’s discount window.  Icelandic banks used their 
euro area subsidiaries to obtain euro liquidity etc..  In August 2008, Nationwide, a UK 
                                                 
7
 The 3-months OIS rate is the fixed leg of a 3-month swap whose variable leg is the overnight secured lending 
rate.  This can be interpreted (ignoring inflation risk premia) as the market’s expectation of the official policy 
rate over a 3-month horizon. 
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mortgage lender, announced it was setting up an Irish subsidiary.  Gaining access to 
Eurosystem liquidity, both at the discount window and as a counterparty in repos, was a key 
motivating factor in this decision. 
The de-facto closure of many systemically important wholesale markets continues 
even now, a year since the start of the crisis.  Over-the counter credit default swap (CDS) 
markets and exchange-traded CDS derivatives markets became disorderly, with spreads far 
exceeding any reasonable estimate of default risk; key players in the insurance of credit risk, 
the so-called Monolines, lost their triple-A ratings and became irrelevant to the functioning of 
these markets.  The rating agencies, which had moved aggressively from rating sovereigns 
and large corporates into the much more lucrative business of rating complex structured 
products (as well as advising on the design of such instruments), lost all credibility in these 
new product lines.  This underlines the fact that the minimum shared understanding and 
information required for organised markets to function no longer existed for many structured 
products.  One example: in the year since August 2007 there have been just two new issues of 
RMBS in the UK (one by HBOS for £500m in May 2008, one by Alliance & Leicester for 
£400m in August 2008).8 
Central banks (outside the UK), in principle had the tools to address failing 
systemically important institutions – the LLR facilities.  They did not have the tools to 
address failing, disorderly and illiquid markets.  Central banks had developed and honed their 
skills during the era of traditional relationships-oriented financial intermediation centred on 
deposit-taking banks.  Most were not prepared, institutionally and in mindset, to deal with the 
increasingly transactions-oriented financial intermediation that characterises modern financial 
sectors, especially in the US and the UK. 
                                                 
8
 Most of the RMBS issue by Alliance & Leicester was bought by a single Continental European bank.  It is 
therefore akin to a private sale rather than a sale to market sale to non-bank investors . 
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Fortunately, all that was required to meet the new reality were a number of extensions 
to and developments of existing open market operations, specifically in relation to the sale 
and repurchase operations (repos) used by central banks to engage in collateralised lending.  
The main extensions were: larger transactions volumes, longer maturities, a broader range of 
counterparties and a wider set of eligible collateral, including illiquid private securities.  
Increased scale and scope for outright purchases of securities by central banks, which could 
have been part of the new model, have not (yet) been used.   
Central banks learnt fast to increase the scale and scope of their market-supporting 
operations.  Unfortunately, the Fed did not sufficiently heed Bagehot‘s admonition to provide 
liquidity only at a penalty rate.  The ECB is also likely to have created, through its acceptance 
of illiquid collateral at excessively generous valuations, adverse incentives for excessive 
future risk-taking.  The ECB has not provided the information required to confirm or deny the 
suspicions about its collateral facilities.  The Bank of England, on the basis of the limited 
available information, is the least likely of the three central banks to have over-priced the 
illiquid collateral it has been offered.  Even here, however, the hard information required for 
proper accountability has not been provided.  
Not designing the financial incentives faced by their counterparties in these new 
facilities to minimize moral hazard has turned out to be the central banks’ Achilles heel in the 
current crisis.  It will come back to haunt us in the next crisis. 
Modern financial systems tend to be a convex combination of the tradition ROM and 
the transactions-oriented model of financial capitalism (TOM).  The TOM (also called arms-
length model or capital markets model) commoditises financial interactions and relationships 
and trades the resulting financial instruments in OTC markets or in organised exchanges.  
Securitisation of mortgages is an example.  This makes the illiquid liquid and the non-
tradable tradable.  Scope for risk-trading is greatly enhanced.  This is, potentially, good news. 
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It also destroys information.  In the ‘originate-and-hold-model’, the originator of the 
illiquid individual loan works for the Principal; he works an Agent of the Principal in the 
‘originate-to-distribute’ model.  This reduces the incentive to collect information on the 
creditworthiness of the ultimate borrower and to monitor the performance of the borrower 
over the life of the loan.  Securitisation and resale then misplace whatever information is 
collected: after a couple of transactions in RMBS, neither the buyer nor the seller has any 
idea about the creditworthiness of the underlying assets.  This is the bad news.  Inappropriate 
securitisation permitted, indeed encouraged, the subversion of ordinary bank lending 
standards that was an essential input in the subprime disaster in the US. 
The TOM affects banks in two ways.  First, it provides competition for banks as 
intermediaries, since non-financial corporates can issue securities in the capital markets 
instead of borrowing from the banks, thus potentially bypassing banks completely.  Savers 
can buy these securities as alternatives to deposits or other forms of credit to banks.  Second, 
banks turn their illiquid assets into liquid assets which they either sell on (to special purpose 
vehicles (SPVs) set up to warehouse RMBS, or to investors) or hold on their balance sheet in 
the expectation that they can be sold at short notice and at a predictable price close to fair 
value, i.e. that they are liquid. 
It may seem that this commoditisation and marketisation of financial relationships 
that are the essence of the TOM would solve the banks’ liquidity problem and would make 
even bank runs non-threatening.  If the bank’s assets can be sold in liquid markets, the cost of 
a deposit run or a ‘strike’ by other creditors need not be a fatal blow.  Unfortunately, the 
liquidity of markets is not a deep, structural characteristic, but the endogenous outcome of the 
interaction of many partially and poorly informed would-be buyers and sellers.  Market 
liquidity can vanish at short notice, just like funding liquidity. 
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Bank runs have their analogue in the TOM world in the form of a market freeze, run, 
strike, seizure or paralysis (the terminology is not settled yet).  A potential buyer of a security 
who has liquid resources available today, may refuse to buy the security (or accept it as 
collateral), even though he believes that the security has been issued by a solvent entity and 
will earn an appropriate risk-adjusted rate of return if held to maturity.  This socially 
excessive hoarding of scarce liquid assets can be individually rational because the potential 
buyer believes that he may be illiquid in the next trading period (and may therefore have to 
sell the security next period), and that other potential buyers of the security may likewise be 
illiquid in the future or may strategically refuse to buy the security, to gain a competitive 
advantage or even to put him out of business.  If the transaction is a repo, he would have to 
believe also that the party trying to sell the security to him today, may be illiquid in the future 
and unable to make good on his commitment.   
It remains an open question whether this approach to market and funding illiquidity 
today as a result of fear of market and funding illiquidity tomorrow either needs to be iterated 
ad infinitum or requires a fear of insolvency at some future date to support a full-fledged 
individually rational but socially inefficient equilibrium.  Charles Goodhart (2002) believes 
that without the threat of insolvency there can be no illiquidity (see also the excellent 
collection of readings in Goodhart and Illing (2002)).  Strategic behaviour, Knightian 
uncertainty, bounded rationality and other behavioural economics approaches to modelling 
the transactions flows in financial markets, including the rules-of-thumb that lead to 
information cascades and herding behaviour, may offer a better chance of understanding, 
predicting and correcting the market pathologies that lead to socially destructive hoarding of 
liquidity than relentlessly optimising models.  The jury is still out on this one.9 
                                                 
9
 Macroeconomic theory, unfortunately, has as yet very little to contribute to the key policy issue of liquidity 
management.  The popularity of complete contingents markets models in much of contemporary 
macroeconomics, both New Classical (e.g. Lucas (1975))), Lucas and Stokey (1989) and New Keynesian, (e.g. 
Woodford (2003)) means that in many (most?) of the most popular analytical and calibrated (I won’t’ call them 
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Market illiquidity addresses the phenomenon that a financial instrument that is traded 
abundantly one day suddenly finds no buyers the next day at any price, or only at a price that 
represents a massive discount relative to its fundamental or fair value.  That is, illiquidity is 
an endogenous outcome, a dysfunctional equilibrium in a market or game for which 
alternative liquid equilibria also exist, but have not materialised (or have not been 
coordinated on). 
Market illiquidity is a form of market failure.  Liquidity can be provided privately, by 
banks and other economic agents holding large amounts of inherently liquid assets (like 
central bank reserves or TBs).  That would, however, be socially and privately inefficient.  
Maturity transformation and liquidity transformation are essential functions of financial 
intermediaries.  A private financial entity should hold (or have access to, through credit lines, 
swaps etc.) enough liquidity to manage its business during normal times, that is, when 
markets are liquid and orderly.  It should not be expected to hoard enough liquid assets (or 
arrange liquid stand-by funding) during normal times to be able to survive on its own during 
abnormal times, when markets are disorderly and illiquid.  That is what central banks are for. 
                                                                                                                                                        
empirical) macroeconomic dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models, the concept of liquidity makes no 
sense.  Everything is perfectly liquid.  Indeed, with complete contingent markets there is never any default in 
equilibrium, because every agent always satisfies his intertemporal budget constraint.  All contracts are 
costlessly and instantaneously enforced.  Ad-hoc cash-in-advance constraints on household purchases of 
commodities or on household purchases of commodities and securities don’t create behaviour/outcomes that 
could be identified with liquidity constraints. 
The legal constraint that labour is free (slavery and indentured labour are illegal) means that future 
labour income makes for very poor collateral, and that workers cannot credibly commit themselves not to leave 
an employer, should a more attractive employment opportunity come along. This can perhaps be characterised 
as a form of illiquidity, but it is a permanent, exogenous illiquidity, almost technological in nature.  Much of the 
theoretical (partial equilibrium) work on illiquidity likewise deals with the consequences of different forms of 
exogenous illiquidity rather than with the endogenous illiquidity problem that suddenly paralysed many asset-
backed securities markets starting in the summer of 2007. The profession entered the crisis equipped with a set 
of models that did not even permit questions about market liquidity to be asked, let alone answered. 
Much of macroeconomic theorising of the past thirty years now looks like a self-indulgent working and 
re-working to death of an uninteresting and practically unimportant special case.  Instead of starting from the 
premise that markets are complete unless there are strong reasons for assuming otherwise, it would have been 
better to start from the position that markets don’t exist unless very special institutional and informational 
conditions are satisfied.  We would have a different, and quite possibly more relevant, economics if we had 
started from markets as the exception rather than the rule, and had paid equal attention to alternative formal and 
informal mechanisms for organising and coordinating economic activity. My personal view is that over the past 
30 years, we have had rather too much Merton (1990) and rather too little Minsky (1982) in our thinking about 
the roles of money and finance in the business cycle. 
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Central banks can create any amount of domestic currency liquidity at little or no 
notice and at effectively zero marginal cost.  It would be inefficient to privatise and 
decentralise the provision of emergency liquidity when there is an abundant source of free 
liquidity readily available.   
Anne Sibert and I (Buiter and Sibert (2007a,b), see also Buiter (2007a,b,c,d)) have 
called the role of the central bank as provider of market liquidity during times when 
systemically important financial markets have become disorderly and illiquid, that of the 
market maker of last resort (MMLR). 
The central bank as market maker of last resort either buys outright (through open 
market purchases) or accepts as collateral in repos and similar secured transactions, 
systemically important financial instruments that have become illiquid.10  If no market price 
exists to value the illiquid securities, the central bank organises reverse auctions that act as 
value discovery mechanisms.  There is no need for the central bank to know more about the 
value of the securities than the sellers, or indeed for the central bank to know anything at all. 
The central bank should organise the auction because it has the liquid ‘deep pockets’.  
A reverse Dutch auction, for instance, would be likely to be particularly punitive for the 
sellers of the illiquid securities.  A second-lowest price (sealed bid) reverse auction would 
have other attractive properties.  With so many Nobel-prizes and Nobel-prize calibre 
economists specialised in mechanism design, I don’t think the expertise to design and run 
these auctions would be hard to find.  The auctions to value the illiquid securities could be 
organised jointly by the central bank and the Treasury if, as I advocate, the Treasury would 
immediately take onto its balance sheet any illiquid assets acquired in the auctions, either 
outright or as part of a repo or swap.   
                                                 
10
 The label ‘market maker of last resort’ is more appropriate than the alternative ‘buyer of last resort’, because 
so much of the MMLR’s activity turns out to be in collateralised transactions, especially repos, rather than in 
outright purchases.  A repo is, of course a sale and repurchase transaction, so the label ‘buyer of last resort’ 
would not have been descriptively correct. 
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For the MMLR to function effectively, the central bank has to clarify all of the 
following:  
1. The list of eligible instruments for outright purchase or for use in collateralised 
transactions like repos. 
2. The nature of the liquidity provided (e.g. central bank reserves or Treasury Bills). 
3. The set of eligible counterparties. 
4. The regulatory requirements imposed on the eligible counterparties. 
5. The valuation of the securities offered for outright purchase or as collateral, when 
there is no appropriate market price (when the collateral is illiquid). 
6. Any haircut (discount) applied to the valuation of the securities and any other fees or 
financial charges imposed. 
Items (4), (5) and (6) determine the effective penalty imposed by the MMLR for use 
of its facilities, and thus the severity of the moral hazard created by its existence.  Unlike 
discount window access, which is at the initiative of the borrower, MMLR finance is not 
available on demand, even if (1) through (6) above have been determined.  The policy 
authority (in practice the central bank), decides when to inject liquidity, on what scale and at 
what maturity. 
Injecting large amounts of liquidity against illiquid collateral is easy.  The key 
challenge for the central bank as market maker of last resort is the same as that faced by the 
central bank as lender of last resort.  It is to make the effective performance of the MMLR 
function during abnormal times, that is, when markets are disorderly and illiquid, compatible 
with providing the right incentives for risk taking when markets are orderly and liquid.  This 
requires liquidity to be made available only on terms that are punitive.  It is here that all three 
central banks appear to have failed so far, albeit in varying degrees. 
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II.4 The lender of last resort and market maker of last resort 
when foreign currency liquidity is the problem 
  
 So far, the argument has proceeded on the assumption that the central bank can 
provide the necessary liquidity effectively costlessly and at little or no notice.  That, however, 
is true only for domestic-currency liquidity.  For countries that have banks and other financial 
institutions that are internationally active and have significant amounts of foreign-currency-
denominated exposure, a domestic-currency LLR and MMLR may not be sufficient.  This is 
especially likely to be an issue if the country’s banks or other systemically significant 
financial businesses have large short-maturity foreign currency liabilities and illiquid foreign 
currency assets.  The example of Iceland comes to mind as do, to a lesser extent, Switzerland 
and the UK.   
 If the country in question has a domestic currency that is also a serious global reserve 
currency, the central bank is likely to be able to arrange swaps or credit lines with other 
central banks on a scale sufficient to enable it to act as a foreign-currency LLR and MMLR 
for its banking sector.  At the moment there are only two serious global reserve currencies, 
the US dollar, with 63.3 percent of estimated global official foreign exchange reserves at the 
end of 2007, and the euro, with 26.5 percent (see Table 1).   
Table 1 here 
Sterling is a minor-league legacy global reserve currency with 4.7 percent, the yen is 
fading fast at 2.9 percent and Switzerland is a minute 0.2 percent.11   
 The Fed, the ECB and the Swiss National Bank have created swap lines of US dollars 
for euro and Swiss francs respectively, since the crisis started.  These swap arrangements 
have recently been extended to cover the 2008 year-end period.  The Central Bank of Iceland 
                                                 
11
 The Switzerland-domiciled part of the Swiss banking system (as distinct from the foreign subsidiaries which 
may have access to LLR and MMLR facilities in their host countries) probably owes its competitive advantage 
less to conventional banking prowess as to the bank secrecy it provides to the global community of tax evaders 
and others interested in hiding their income and assets from their domestic authorities. 
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arranged, in May 2008, swap lines for €500mn each with the central banks of Norway, 
Denmark and Sweden.  In the case of Iceland, one can see how such currency swaps could be 
useful in the discharge of the Central Bank of Iceland’s LLR and MMLR function vis-à-vis a 
banking system with a large stock of short-maturity foreign currency liabilities and illiquid 
foreign currency assets.   
The swaps between the Fed, the ECB and the SNB are less easily rationalised.  Both 
the euro area- and the Switzerland-domiciled banks experienced a shortfall of liquidity of any 
and all kinds, not a specific shortage of US dollar liquidity.  The foreign exchange markets 
had not seized up and become illiquid.  Certainly, it was expensive for euro-area resident 
banks with maturing US dollar obligations to obtain US dollar liquidity through the swap 
markets, but that is no reason for official intervention (or ought not to be): expensive is not 
the same as illiquid.  I therefore interpret these currency swap arrangements (unlike the swap 
arrangements put in place following 9/11) either as symbolic tokens of international 
cooperation (and more motion than action) or as unwarranted subsidies to euro area- and 
Switzerland-based banks needing US dollar liquidity. 
II.5 Macroeconomic stabilisation and liquidity management: 
interdependence and institutional arrangements 
 
Macroeconomic stabilisation policy and liquidity management (including the LLR 
and MMLR arrangements and policies) cannot be logically or analytically separated or 
disentangled completely.  Changes in the official policy rate affect output, employment and 
inflation, but also have an effect on funding liquidity and market liquidity. An artificially low 
official policy rate can boost bank profitability and help banks to recapitalise themselves.  
The current level of the Federal Funds target rate certainly has this effect.  Discount window 
operations, repos, other open market purchases and indeed the whole panoply of LLR and 
MMLR arrangements and interventions strengthen the financial system, even for a given 
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contingent sequence of current and future official policy rates.  This boosts aggregate demand 
and thus influences growth and inflation.   
Nevertheless, I believe that the official policy rate has a clear comparative advantage 
as a macroeconomic stabilisation tool while liquidity management has a corresponding 
comparative advantage as a financial stabilisation tool.  Mundell’s principle of effective 
market classification (policies should be paired with the objectives on which they have the 
most influence) therefore suggests that, should we wish to assign each of these instruments to 
a particular target, the official policy rate be assigned to macroeconomic stability and 
liquidity management to financial stability (see Mundell (1962)). 
Both the ECB and the BoE advocate the view that the official policy rate be assigned 
to the macroeconomic stability objective (for both central banks this is the price stability 
objective) and that it not be used to pursue financial stability objectives.  Any impact of the 
official policy rate on financial stability will, in that view, have to be reflected in an 
appropriate adjustments in the scale and scope of liquidity management policies.  Likewise, 
liquidity management policies (that is, LLR and MMLR actions) should be targeted at 
financial stability without undue concern for the impact they may have on price stability and 
economic activity.  If these effects (which are highly uncertain) turn out to be material, there 
will have to be an appropriate response in the contingent sequence of official policy rates. 
Undoubtedly, to the unbridled dynamic stochastic optimiser, the joint pursuit of all 
objectives with all instruments has to dominate the assignment of the official policy rate to 
macroeconomic stability and of liquidity management to financial stability.  I am with 
Mundell on this issue, partly because it makes both communication with the markets and 
accountability to Parliament/Congress and the electorate easier. 
A case can even be made for taking the setting of the official policy rate out of the 
central bank completely.  Obviously, as the source of ultimate domestic-currency liquidity, 
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the central bank is the only agency that can manage liquidity.  It will also have to implement 
the official policy rate decision, through appropriate money market actions.  But it does not 
have to make the official policy rate decision.  The knowledge, skills and personal qualities 
for setting the official policy rate would seem to be sufficiently different from those required 
for effective liquidity management, that assigning both tasks to the same body or housing 
them in the same institution is not at all self-evident.   
In the UK, the institutional setting is ready-made for taking the Monetary Policy 
Committee out of the Bank of England. The Governor of the Bank of England could be a 
member, or even the chair of the MPC, but need not be either.  The existing institutional 
arrangements in the US and the euro area would have to be modified significantly if the 
official policy rate decision were to be moved outside the central bank. 
Through its liquidity management role and more generally through its LLR and 
MMLR functions, the central bank will inevitably play something of a de-facto supervisory 
and regulatory role vis-à-vis banks and other counterparties.  Regulatory capture is therefore 
a constant threat and a frequent reality, as the case of the Fed, discussed below in Section 
III.2a(xii) makes clear.  Moving the official policy rate decision out of the central bank would 
make it less likely that the official policy rate would display the kind of excess sensitivity to 
financial sector concerns displayed by the Federal Funds target rate since Chairman 
Greenspan12.  
Regardless of whether the official policy rate-setting decision is taken out of the 
central bank, I consider it desirable that all three central banks change their procedures for 
setting the overnight rate.  Chart 5 shows the spread between overnight Libor (an unsecured 
rate) and the official policy rate for the three central banks.  
Chart 5 here 
                                                 
12
 For a conflicting and very positive appraisal of the Greenspan years see Blinder and Reis (2005). 
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Similar pictures could be shown for the spread between the effective Federal Funds 
rate and the Federal Funds target rate and for spreads between the sterling and euro secured 
overnight rates and official policy rates. 
The fact that the central banks are incapable of keeping the overnight rate close to the 
official policy rate is a direct result of the operating procedures in the overnight money 
markets (see Bank of England (2008a) and Clews (2005), European Central Bank (2006) and 
Federal Reserve System (2002)).  Setting the official policy rate (like fixing any price or rate) 
ought to mean that the central bank is willing to lend reserves (against suitable collateral) on 
demand in any amount and at any time at that rate, and that it is willing to accept deposits in 
any amount and at any time at that rate.  This would effectively peg the secured overnight 
lending and borrowing rate at the official policy rate.  The overnight interbank rate could still 
depart from the official policy rate because of bank default risk on overnight unsecured loans, 
but that spread should be trivial almost always.  Ideally, there would be a 24/7 fixed rate 
tender at the official policy rate during a maintenance period, and a 24/7 unlimited deposit 
facility at the official policy rate. 
The deviations between the official policy rate and the overnight interbank rate that 
we observe for the Fed, the ECB and the Bank of England are the result of bizarre operating 
procedures – the vain pursuit by the central bank of the pipe dream of setting the price (the 
official policy rate) while imposing certain restrictions on the quantity (the reserves of the 
banking system and/or the amount of overnight liquidity provided).13   
In the case of the UK, for instance, the commercial banks and other deposit-taking 
institutions that are eligible counterparties in repos, specify their planned reserve holdings 
just prior to a new reserve maintenance period (roughly the period between two successive 
scheduled MPC meetings).  Those reserves earn the official policy rate.  If actual reserves 
                                                 
13
 In the case of the Fed, the legal restrictions on paying interest on reserves (about to be abolished) are a further 
obstacle to sensible practice. 
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(averaged over the maintenance period) exceed the planned amount, the interest rate received 
by the banks on the excess is at the standing deposit facility rate, 100 basis points below the 
official policy rate.  If banks’ estimated reserves turn out to be insufficient and the banks 
have to borrow from the BoE to meet their liquidity needs, they have to do so at the standing 
lending facility rate, 100 basis points above the official policy rate, except on the last day of 
the maintenance period, when the penalty falls to 25 basis points.  Compared to simply 
pegging the rate, the BoE’s operating procedure is an example of making complicated 
something that really is very simple: setting a rate means supplying any amount demanded at 
that rate and accepting any amount offered at that rate.  The Bank of Canada’s operating 
procedures for setting the overnight rate are closer to my ideal rate-setting mechanism (Bank 
of Canada (2008)). 
If the central banks were to fix the overnight rate in the way I suggest, this would 
probably kill off the secured overnight interbank market, although not necessarily the 
unsecured overnight interbank market (overnight Libor), and certainly not the longer-
maturity interbank markets, secured and unsecured.  The loss of the secured overnight market 
would not represent a social loss: it is redundant.  Those who used to operate in it, now can 
engage in more socially productive labour.  There is no right to life for redundant markets.  If 
the prospect of killing the secured overnight market is too frightening, central banks could 
adjust the proposed procedure by lending any amount overnight (against good collateral) at 
the official policy rate plus a small margin, and accepting overnight deposits in any amount at 
the official policy rate minus a small margin; twice the margin would just exceed the normal 
bid-ask spread in the secured private overnight interbank markets. 
It does not help communication with the markets, or the division of a labour between 
interest rate policy and liquidity policy, if the monetary authority sets an official policy rate 
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but there is no actual market rate, that is, no rate at which transactions actually take place, 
that corresponds to the official policy rate.  Fortunately, the remedy is simple. 
II.6. Central banks as quasi-fiscal agents: recapitalising insolvent 
banks 
 
Whatever its legal or de facto degree of operational and goal independence, the 
central bank is part of the state and subject to the authority of the sovereign.  Specifically, the 
state (through the Treasury) can tax the central bank, even if these taxes may have unusual 
names.  In many countries, the Treasury owns the central bank.  This is the case, for instance, 
in the UK, but not in the US or the euro area.  As an agent and agency of the state, the central 
bank can engage in quasi-fiscal actions, that is, actions that are economically equivalent to 
levying taxes, paying subsidies, or engaging in redistribution.  Examples are non-remunerated 
reserve requirements (a quasi-fiscal tax on banks), loans to the private sector at an interest 
rate that does not at least cover the central bank’s risk-adjusted cost of non-monetary 
borrowing (a quasi-fiscal subsidy), accepting overvalued collateral (a quasi-fiscal subsidy) or 
outright purchases of securities at prices above fair value (a quasi-fiscal subsidy).   
To determine how the use of the central bank as a quasi-fiscal agent of the state 
affects its ability to pursue its macroeconomic stability objectives, a little accounting is in 
order.  In what follows, I disaggregate the familiar ‘government budget constraint’ into 
separate budget constraints for the central bank and the Treasury.  I then derive the 
intertemporal budget constraints for the central bank and the Treasury, or their 
‘comprehensive balance sheets’.  I then contrast the familiar conventional balance sheet of 
the central bank with its comprehensive balance sheet. 
My stylised central bank has two financial liabilities: the non-interest-bearing and 
irredeemable monetary base 0M ≥  and its interest-bearing non-monetary liabilities (central 
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bank Bills), 0N ≥ , paying the risk-free one-period domestic nominal interest rate i .14  On 
the asset side it has the stock of international foreign exchange reserves, , earning a risk-
free nominal interest rate in terms of foreign currency, , and the stock of domestic credit, 
which consists of central bank holdings of nominal, interest-bearing Treasury bills, 0D ≥ , 
earning a risk-free domestic-currency nominal interest rate , and central bank claims on the 
private sector, 0L ≥ , with domestic-currency nominal interest rate .  The stock of 
Treasury debt (all assumed to be denominated in domestic currency) held outside the central 
bank is ; it pays the risk-free nominal interest rate ; pT  is the real value of the tax 
payments by the domestic private sector to the Treasury; it is a choice variable of the 
Treasury and can be positive or negative; bT  is the real value of taxes paid by the central 
bank to the Treasury; it is a choice variable of the Treasury and can be positive or negative; a 
negative value for bT  is a transfer from the Treasury to the central bank: the Treasury 
recapitalises the central bank; p bT T T= +  is the real value of total Treasury tax receipts; P  
is the domestic general price level;  is the value of the spot nominal exchange rate (the 
domestic currency price of foreign exchange); 0gC ≥
 
is the real value of Treasury spending 
on goods and services and 0bC ≥  the real value of central bank spending on goods and 
services. Public spending on goods and services is assumed to be for consumption only.   
 Equation (3) is the period budget identity of the Treasury and equation (4) that of the 
central bank. 
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 The solvency constraints of, respectively, the Treasury and central bank are given in 
equations (5) and (6):  
 ( )
, 1lim 0t N t N NN E I B D−→∞ + ≤  (5) 
 ( ), 1lim 0ft N t N N N N NN E I D L e R N−→∞ + + − ≥  (6) 
where 
1 0,t t
I  is the appropriate nominal stochastic discount factor between periods 0t  and 1t . 
 These solvency constraints, which rule out Ponzi finance by both the Treasury and the 
central bank, imply the following intertemporal budget constraints for the Treasury (equation 
(7)) and for the central bank (equation (8)). 
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The expression Q  in equation (9) stands for the real value of the quasi-fiscal implicit 
interest subsidies paid by the central bank.  If the rate of return on government debt exceeds 
that on loans to the private sector, there is an implicit subsidy to the private sector equal in 
period t to ( ) 1Lt t ti i L −− .  If the rate of return on foreign exchange reserves is less than what 
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would be implied by Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP), there is an implicit subsidy to the 
issuers of these reserves, given in period t by 1 1
1
1 (1 )f ftt t t t
t
ei i e R
e
− −
−
 
+ − + 
 
. 
When comparing the conventional balance sheet of the central bank to its 
comprehensive balance sheet or intertemporal budget constraint, it is helpful to rewrite (8) in 
the following equivalent form: 
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Summing (3) and (4) gives the period budget identity of the government (the 
consolidated Treasury and central bank), in equation (11); summing (5) and (6) gives the 
solvency constraint of the government in equation (12) and summing (7) and (8) gives the 
intertemporal budget constraint of the government in equation (13). 
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Consider the conventional financial balance sheet of the Central Bank in Table 2,  
Table 2 here 
 The Central Bank’s conventional financial net worth or equity, 
1
b f MW D L eR N
i
+ + − −
+
 , is the excess of the value of its financial assets (Treasury debt, 
, loans to the private sector, L and foreign exchange reserves, ) over its non-monetary 
liabilities N and its monetary liabilities / (1 )M i+ .    
D feR
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On the left-hand side of (10) we have (minus) the conventionally measured equity of 
the central bank.  On the right-hand side of (10) we can distinguish two terms.  The first is 
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− + +∑  - the present discounted value of current and future primary 
(non-interest) surpluses of the central bank.  Important for what follows, this contains both 
the present value of the sequence of current and future transfer payments made by the 
Treasury to the central bank ({ ; }bjT j t− ≥  and (with a negative sign) the present value of the 
sequence of quasi-fiscal subsidies paid by the central bank { ; }jQ j t≥ .  The second terms is 
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∑ , one of the measures of central bank ‘seigniorage’ - the present 
discounted value of the future interest payments saved by the central bank through its ability 
to issue non-interest-bearing monetary liabilities. The other conventional measure of 
seigniorage, motivated by equation (8), is the present discounted value of future base money 
issuance: 
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 Conventionally defined financial net worth or equity excludes the present value of 
anticipated or planned future non-contractual outlays and revenues (the right-hand side of 
equation (10)).  It is therefore perfectly possible for the central bank to survive and thrive 
with negative financial net worth.  If there is a seigniorage Laffer curve, however, there 
always exists a sufficient negative value for central bank conventional net worth, that would 
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require the central bank to raise so much seigniorage in real terms, { ; }j
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 through current and future nominal base money issuance, that, given 
the demand function for real base money, unacceptable rates of inflation would result (see 
Buiter (2007e, 2008a).  While the central bank can never go broke (that is, (14) will not be 
violated) as long as the financial obligations imposed on the central bank are domestic-
currency denominated and not index-linked, it could go broke if either foreign currency 
obligations or index-linked obligations were excessive.  I will ignore the possibility of central 
bank default in what follows, but not the risk of excessive inflation being necessary to secure 
solvency without recapitalisation by the Treasury, if the central bank’s conventional balance 
sheet were to take a sufficiently large hit. 
 This situation can arise, for instance, if the central bank is used as a quasi-fiscal agent 
to such an extent that the present discounted value of the quasi-fiscal subsidies it provides, 
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∑ , is so large, that its ability to achieve its inflation objectives is impaired.  In 
that case (if we rule out default of the central bank on its own non-monetary obligations, 1tN −
), the only way to reconcile central bank solvency and the achievement of the inflation 
objectives would be a recapitalisation of the central bank by the Treasury, that is, a sufficient 
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 There are therefore in my view two reasons why the Fed, or any other central bank, 
should not act as a quasi-fiscal agent of the government, other than paying to the Treasury in 
taxes, bT , the profits it makes in the pursuit of its macroeconomic stability objectives and its 
appropriate financial stability objectives.  The appropriate financial stability objectives are 
                                                 
16
 Central bank current expenses bC  can at most be cut to zero.   
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those that involve providing liquidity, at a cost covering the central bank’s opportunity cost 
of non-monetary financing, to illiquid but solvent financial institutions.   
The two reasons are, first, that acting as a quasi-fiscal agent may impair the central 
bank’s ability to fulfil its macroeconomic stability mandate and, second, that it obscures 
responsibility and impedes accountability for what are in substance fiscal transfers.  If the 
central bank allows itself to be used as an off-budget and off-balance-sheet special purpose 
vehicle of the Treasury, to hide contingent commitments and to disguise de-facto fiscal 
subsidies, it undermines its independence and legitimacy and impairs political accountability 
for the use of public funds – ‘tax payers’ money’. 
II.6a Some interesting central bank balance sheets 
What do the conventional balance sheets look like in the case of the Fed, the BoE and 
the ECB/Eurosystem?   
The data for the Fed are summarised in Table 3, those for the BoE in Table 4, for the 
ECB in Table 5 and for the Eurosystem in Table 6. 
Table 3 here 
Table 4 here 
Table 5 here 
Table 6 here 
The data for the Fed are updated weekly in the Consolidated Statement of Condition 
of All Federal Reserve Banks.  In Table 3, I have for simplicity lumped $2.1 bn worth of 
buildings and $40 bn worth of other assets together with claims on the private sector, L. The 
Federal Reserve System holds but small amounts of assets in the gold certificate account and 
SDR account as foreign exchange reserves, R.  The foreign exchange reserves of the US are 
on the balance sheet of the Treasury rather than the Fed.  As of February 2008, US Official 
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Reserve Assets stood at $73.5 bn.17 US gold reserves (8133.8 tonnes) were valued at around $ 
261.5 billion in March 2008. 
Table 3 shows that, as regards the size of its balance sheet, the Fed would be a 
medium-sized bank in the universe of internationally active US commercial banks, with 
assets of around $900bn and capital (which corresponds roughly to financial net worth or 
conventional equity) of about $40bn.  By comparison, at the time of the run on the investment 
bank Bear Stearns (March 2008), that bank’s assets were around $340bn.  Citigroup’s assets 
as of 31 December 2007 were just under $2,188bn (Citigroup is a universal bank, combining 
commercial banking and investment banking activities). With 2007 US GDP at around $14 
trillion, the assets of the Fed are about 6.4% of annual US GDP. 
At the end of January 2008, seasonally adjusted assets of domestically chartered 
commercial banks in the US stood at 9.6 trillion (more than ten times the assets of the Fed).  
Of that total, credit market assets were around 7.5 trillion.  Equity (assets minus all other 
liabilities) was reported as 1.1 trillion.18  Commercial banks exclude investment banks and 
other non-deposit taking banking institutions.  The example of Bear Stearns has demonstrated 
that all the primary dealers in the US are now considered by the Fed and the Treasury to be 
too systemically important (that is too big, and/or too interconnected) to fail.  The 1998 
rescue of LTCM - admittedly without the use of any Fed financial resources or indeed of any 
public financial resources, but with the active ‘good offices’ of the Fed - suggests that large 
hedge funds too may fall in the ‘too big or too interconnected to fail’ category. We appear to 
have arrived at the point where any highly leveraged financial institution above a certain size 
                                                 
17
 Source: IMF http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/ir/8802.pdf  
18
 A footnote in the Federal Reserve Bulletin (2008) informs us that “This balancing item is not intended as a 
measure of equity capital for use in capital adequacy analysis. On a seasonally adjusted basis, this item reflects 
any differences in the seasonal patterns estimated for total assets and total liabilities.”  That is correct as regards 
the use of this measure in regulatory capital adequacy analysis.  For economic analysis purposes it is, however, 
as close to W as we can get without a lot of detailed further work. 
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is a candidate for direct or indirect Fed financial support, should it, for whatever reason, be at 
risk of failing.19 
Like its private sector fellow-banks, the Fed is quite highly leveraged, with assets just 
under 22 times capital.  The vast majority of its liabilities are currency in circulation ($781bn 
out of a total monetary base of $812bn). Currency is not just non-interest-bearing but also 
irredeemable: having a $10 Federal Reserve note gives me a claim on the Fed for $10 worth 
of Federal Reserve notes, possibly in different denominations, but nothing else.  Leverage is 
therefore not an issue for this highly unusual inherently liquid domestic-currency borrower, 
as long as the liabilities are denominated in US dollars and not index-linked. 
The Bank of England, whose balance sheet is shown in Table 4, also has negligible 
foreign exchange reserves of its own.  The bulk of the UK’s foreign exchange reserves are 
owned directly by the Treasury.  The shareholders’ equity in the Bank of England is puny, 
just under £ 2billion.  The size of its balance sheet grew a lot between early 2007 and March 
2008, reflecting the loans made to Northern Rock as part of the government’s rescue 
programme for that bank.  The size of the balance sheet is around £100 bn, about 20 percent 
smaller than Northern Rock at its acme. Leverage is just under 50. 
The size of the equity and the size of the balance sheet appear small in comparison to 
the possible exposure of the Bank of England to credit risk through its LLR and MMLR 
operations. Its total exposure to Northern Rock was, at its peak, around £25 bn.  This 
exposure was, of course, secured against Northern Rock’s prime mortgage assets. More 
important for the solvency of the Bank of England than this credit risk mitigation through 
collateral, is the fact that the central bank’s monopoly of the issuance of irredeemable, non-
interest-bearing legal tender means that leverage is not a constraint on solvency as long as 
most of the rest of the liabilities on its balance sheet are denominated in sterling and consist 
                                                 
19
 The example of the failure of the Amaranth Advisors LLC hedge fund in September 2006, suggests that AUM 
of US$9 billion is no longer ‘large’. 
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of nominal, that is, non-index-linked, securities, as is indeed the case for the Bank of 
England. 
The balance sheet of the ECB for end-year 2006 and 2007 is given in Table 5, that for 
the consolidated Eurosystem (the ECB and the 15 national central banks (NCBs) of the 
Eurosystem) as of 29 February 2008 in Table 6.  The consolidated balance sheet of the 
Eurosystem is about 10 times the size of the balance sheet of the ECB, but the equity of the 
Eurosystem is about 17 times that of the ECB.  Gearing of the Eurosystem is therefore quite 
low by central bank standards, with total assets just over 19 times capital. 
Between the end of 2006 and end-February 2008, the Eurosystem expanded its 
balance sheet by €237bn.  On the asset side, most of this increase was accounted for by a 
€67bn increase in claims on the euro area banking sector and a €150bn increase in other 
assets. Both items no doubt reflect the actions taken by the Eurosystem to relieve financial 
stress in the interbank markets and elsewhere in the euro area banking sector. 
II.6b How will the central banks finance future LLR- and MMLR-related 
expansions of their portfolios?  
 
Both the Fed and the BoE have tiny balance sheets and minuscule equity or capital 
relative to the size of the likely financial calls that may be made on these institutions.  For 
instance, the exposure of the Fed to the Delaware SPV used to house $30bn (face value) 
worth of Bearn Stearns’ most toxic assets is $29bn.  The Fed’s total equity is around $40bn.  
Despite my earlier contention that there is nothing to prevent a central bank from living 
happily ever after with negative equity, I doubt whether the Fed would want to operate with 
its financial liabilities larger than its financial assets.  It just doesn’t look right. 
It is clear that the exercise of the LLR and MMLR functions may require a further 
rapid and large increase in L, central bank holdings of private sector securities.  The central 
bank can always finance this increase in its exposure to the private financial sector by 
increasing the stock of base money, M  (presumably through an increase in bank reserves 
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with the central bank).  If the economy is in a liquidity crunch, there is likely to be a large 
increase in liquidity preference which will cause this increase in reserves with the central 
bank to be hoarded rather than loaned out and spent.  This increase in liquidity will therefore 
not be inflationary, as long as it is reversed promptly when the liquidity squeeze comes to an 
end. 
Alternatively, the central bank could finance an expansion in its holdings of private 
securities by reducing its holdings of government securities.  Once these get down to zero, 
the only option left is for the central bank to increase its non-monetary, interest-bearing 
liabilities, that is, an issuance of Fed Bills, Bank of England Bills or ECB Bills (or even, Fed 
Bonds, Bank of England Bonds or ECB Bonds).  As long as the central bank’s claims on the 
private sector earn the central bank an appropriate risk-adjusted rate of return, issuing central 
bank bills or bonds to finance the acquisition of private securities will not weaken the 
solvency of the central bank ex-ante.  But if a significant amount of its exposure to the private 
sector were to default, the central bank would have to be recapitalised by the Treasury or 
have recourse to monetary financing.  In the conventional balance sheet of the central bank, 
the result of a recapitalisation would be an increase in D, that is, it would look like a Treasury 
Bill or Treasury Bond ‘drop’ on the central bank.  It may well come to that in the US and the 
UK.  
 
III. How did the three central banks perform since 
August 2007? 
 
III.1 Macroeconomic stability 
 
At the time the financial crisis erupted, in August 2007, all three central banks faced 
rising inflationary pressures and at least the prospect of weakening domestic activity.  The 
evidence for weakening activity was clearest in the US.  In the UK, real GDP growth in the 
third quarter of 2007 was still robust, although some of the survey data had begun to indicate 
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future weakness. In the euro area also, GDP growth was healthy.  As late as August, the ECB 
was verbally signalling an increase in the policy rate for September or soon after. 
Since then, inflationary pressures have risen in all three currency areas, and so have 
inflationary expectations.  There has been a marked slowdown in GDP growth, first in the 
US, then in UK and most recently in the euro area.  While it is not clear yet whether any of 
the three economies are in technical recession (using the arbitrary definition of two 
consecutive quarters of negative real GDP growth), there can be little doubt that all three are 
growing below capacity, with unemployment rising in the US and in the UK and, one 
expects, soon also in the euro area. 
The monetary response to rather similar circumstances has, however, been very 
different in the three economies, as is clear from the summary in Table 7  
Table 7 here 
The Fed cut its official policy rate aggressively – by 325 basis points cumulatively so 
far.  On September 18, 2007, the Fed cut the Federal Funds target by 50 basis points to 4.75 
percent, with a further reduction of 25 basis points following on October 31.  On December 
11 there was a further 25 basis points cut, on 21 January 2008 a 75 basis points cut, on 30 
January a 50 basis points cut, on 18 March a 75 basis points cut and on 30 April another 25 
basis points cut.  This brought the Federal Funds target to 2.00 percent, where it remains at 
the time of writing (10 August 2008).   The Fed also reduced the ‘discount window penalty’, 
that is, the excess of the rate charged on overnight borrowing at the primary discount window 
over the Federal Funds target rate, from 100 bps to 50 bps on August 17, 2007 and to 25 bps 
on 18 March 2008.  This cut in the discount rate penalty can be viewed as a liquidity 
management measure as well as a (second-order) macroeconomic policy measure.  Finally, 
one of the Fed’s rate cuts (the 75 basis points reduction on 21 January 2008), was at an 
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‘unscheduled’ meeting and was announced out of normal working hours, thus signalling a 
sense of urgency in one interpretation, a sense of panic in another.   
The Bank of England kept its official policy rate at 5.75 percent until December 6, 
2007, when it made a 25 basis points cut.  Further 25 bps cuts followed on February 7, 2008 
and April 10, 2008, so Bank Rate now stands at 5.00 percent.  The discount rate (standing 
lending facility) penalty over Bank Rate remained constant at 100bps. There were no 
meetings or policy announcements on unscheduled dates or at unusual times. 
The ECB kept its official policy rate unchanged at 4.00 percent until 3rd July 2008 
when it was raised to 4.25 percent, where it still stands.  There has also been no change in the 
discount rate penalty: the marginal lending facility continues to stand at 100 basis points 
above the official policy rate.  There were no meetings on unscheduled dates or 
announcements at non-standard hours.  Unlike the other two central banks, the ECB 
repeatedly, between June 2007 and July 2008, talked tough about inflation and hinted at 
possible rate increases.  This talk was matched by official policy rate action only on July 3, 
2008. 
The markedly different monetary policy actions of the Fed compared to the other two 
central banks can, in my view, not be explained satisfactorily with differences in objective 
functions (the Fed’s dual mandate versus the ECB’s and the BoE’s lexicographic price 
stability mandate) or in economic circumstances.  The slowdown in the US did come earlier 
than in the UK and in the euro area, but the inflationary pressures in the US were, if anything, 
stronger than in the UK and the euro area. 
I conclude that the Fed over-reacted to the slowdown in economic activity.  It cut the 
official policy rate too fast and too far and risked its reputation for being serious about 
inflation.  I believe that part of the reason for these policy errors is a remarkable collection of 
analytical flaws that have become embedded in the Fed’s view of the transmission 
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mechanism.  These errors are shared by many FOMC members and by senior staff.  They are 
worth outlining here, because they serve as a warning as to what can happen when the 
research and economic analysis underlying monetary policy making become too insular and 
inward-looking, and is motivated more by the excessively self-referential internal dynamics 
of academic research programmes than by the problems and challenges likely to face the 
policy-making institution in the real world.  
III.1a The macroeconomic foibles of the Fed 
There are some key flaws in the model of the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy that shapes the thinking of a number of influential members of the FOMC.  These 
relate to the application of the Precautionary Principle to monetary policy making, the wealth 
effect of a change in the price of housing, the role of core inflation as a guide to future 
underlying inflation, the possibility of achieving a sustainable external balance for the US 
economy without going through a deep and/or prolonged recession, the effect of financial 
sector deleveraging on aggregate demand and the usefulness of the monetary aggregates as a 
source of information about macroeconomic and financial stability.  
III.1a(i) Risk management and the ‘Precautionary Principle’ 
Consider the following example of optimal decision making under uncertainty.  I 
stand before an 11-foot wide ravine that is 2000 feet deep.  I have to jump across.  A safe 
jump is one foot longer than the width of the ravine.  I can jump any distance, but a longer 
jump requires more effort, something I dislike moderately.  I also am strongly averse to 
falling to my death.  Without uncertainty, I make the shortest leap that will get me safely over 
the precipice - 12 feet.  Now assume that I cannot see how wide the ravine is.  All I know is 
that its width is equally likely to be anywhere on the interval 1 foot – 21 feet.  So the 
expected width of the ravine is 11 feet.  There continues to be certainty about the depth of the 
ravine – 2000 feet, that is, certain death if I were to fall in.  It clearly would not be rational for 
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me to adopt the certainty-equivalent strategy and make a 12-foot jump.  I would be cautious 
and make much larger jump, of 23 feet.  Caution and prudence here dictate more radical 
action – a longer jump.  A dramatic departure from symmetry in the payoff function accounts 
for the difference between rational behaviour and certainty-equivalent behaviour. The Fed 
justifies its radical interest cuts in part by asserting that these large cuts minimize the risk of a 
truly catastrophic outcome.  I want to question whether the Fed’s official policy rate actions 
can indeed be justified on the grounds that the US economy was tottering at the edge of a 
precipice, and that aggressive rate cuts were necessary to stop it from tumbling in. 
Under Governor Greenspan, so-called risk-based “decision theory” approaches 
became part of the common mind-set of the FOMC (see Greenspan (2005)).  They continue 
to be influential in the Bernanke Fed.  A clear articulation can be found in Mishkin (2008b).  
At last year’s Jackson Hole Symposium, Martin Feldstein (2008) also made an appeal to a 
risk-based decision theory approach to justify looking after the real economy first, through 
aggressive interest rate cuts, despite the obvious risk this posed to inflation and moral hazard. 
Mishkin (2008b) argued that the combination of non-linearities in the economy with 
both a higher degree of uncertainty and a high probability of extreme (including extremely 
bad) outcomes (so-called “fat tails”) justified the Fed’s focus on extreme risks.  In addition, 
he asserts that the extreme risk faced by the US economy is a financial instability/collapse-led 
sharp contraction in economic activity.  This is the “precautionary principle” (PP) applied to 
monetary policy. At times of high uncertainty, policy should be timely, decisive and flexible 
and focused on the main risk.   
Even where it is applied correctly, I don’t think much of the PP.  Except under very 
restrictive conditions, unlikely to be satisfied ever in the realm of economic policy making, I 
consider the behaviour it prescribes to be pathologically risk-averse. In its purest incarnation - 
under complete Knightian uncertainty - it amounts to a minimax strategy: you focus all your 
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policy instruments on doing as well as you can in the worst possible outcome.  Despite its 
axiomatic foundations, the minimax principle has never appealed to me either as a normative 
or a positive theory of decision under uncertainty. 
But I don’t have to fight the PP, or minimax, here.  The application of the PP to the 
monetary policy choices made by the Fed in 2007 and 2008 is bogus.  The PP came to the 
social sciences from the application of decision theory to regulatory decisions involving 
environmental risk (global warming, species extinction) or technological risk (genetically 
modified crops, nanotechnology).  Its basic premise in these areas is “... that one should not 
wait for conclusive evidence of a risk before putting control measures in place designed to 
protect the environment or consumers.”(Gollier and Treich (2003)).  For instance, Principle 
15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration states “Where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation”. 
Attempts to make sense of the PP in a setting of sequential decision making under 
uncertainty lead to the conclusion that, for something like the Rio Declaration version of the 
PP to emerge as a normative guide to behaviour, all of the following must be present (see 
Collier and Treich (2003) from which the following sentence is paraphrased): a long time 
horizon, stock externalities, irreversibilities (physical and socio-economic), large 
uncertainties and the possibility of future scientific progress (learning).  Short-term policy 
should keep the option value of future learning alive.  When the long-term effects of certain 
contingencies are unknown (but may be uncovered later on), it may be optimal to be more 
cautious in the early stages of the sequential management of risk. 
I believe the analysis of Collier and Treich to be essentially correct.  The question 
then becomes: what does this imply for whether the Fed, in the circumstances of the second 
half of 2007 and the first half of 2008, did the right thing when it cut the official policy rate 
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from 5.25 percent to 2:00 percent rather than cutting it by less, keeping it constant or raising 
it?  The Fed decided to give priority to minimising the risk of a sharp contraction in real 
economic activity.  It accepted the risk of higher inflation.  How does this square with the 
PP? 
The answer is: not very well at all.  The extreme risk faced by the US economy during 
the past year has not been a sharp contraction in real economic activity caused by a financial 
collapse.  There is no irreversibility involved in a sharp contraction in economic activity.  
Mishkin’s rather vague ‘non-linearities’ are no substitute for the irreversibility required for 
the PP to apply.  This is not like a catastrophic species extinction or a sudden melting of the 
polar ice caps.  The crash of 1929 became the Great Depression of the 1930s because the 
authorities permitted the banking system to collapse and did not engage in sustained 
aggressive expansionary fiscal and monetary policy even when the unemployment rate 
reached almost 25 percent in 1933.  In addition, the international trading system collapsed.   
The Fed as LLR and MMLR has effectively underwritten the balance sheet of all 
systemically important US banks (investment banks as well as commercial banks) with the 
rescue of Bear Stearns in March 2008.  Current worries about the international trading system 
concern the absence of progress rather than the risk of a major outbreak of protectionism.  
Most of all, should economic activity fall sharply and remain depressed for longer 
than is necessary to correct the fundamental imbalances in the US economy (the external 
trade deficit, excessive household indebtedness and the low national saving rate), monetary 
and fiscal policy can be used aggressively at that point in time to remedy the problem.  There 
is no need to act now to prevent some irreversible or even just costly-to-reverse catastrophy 
from occurring.  Boosting demand through expansionary monetary and fiscal policy is not 
hard.  It is indeed far too easy.  We are also not buying time to uncover some new scientific 
fact that will allow us to improve the short-run inflation-unemployment trade off or to boost 
57 
 
the resilience of the economy to future disinflationary policies.  Cutting rates to support 
demand does not create or preserve option value.  Even when there is a zero lower bound 
constraint on the short nominal interest rate and even if there is a non-negligible probability 
that this constraint will become binding, aggregate demand management continues to be 
effective.  Indeed, it is precisely when the zero lower bound constraint on the nominal interest 
is binding that fiscal policy is at its most effective. 
If anything, the (weak) logic of the PP points to giving priority to fighting inflation 
rather than to preventing a sharp contraction of demand and output.  Output contractions can 
be reversed easily through expansionary monetary and fiscal policies.  High inflation, once it 
becomes embedded in inflationary expectations, may take a long time to squeeze out of the 
system again.  If the sacrifice ratio is at all unfriendly, the cumulative unemployment or 
output cost of achieving a sustained reduction in inflation could be large. The irreversibility 
argument (strictly, the costly reversal argument) supports erring on the side of caution by not 
letting inflation and inflationary expectations rise.20 
‘Fat tails’, the Precautionary Principle and other decision theory jargon should only be 
arbitraged into the area of monetary policy if the substantive conditions are satisfied.  Today, 
in the US, they are not.21  With existing policy tools, we can address a disastrous collapse in 
activity if, as and when it occurs.  There is no need for preventive or precautionary drastic 
action.   
I agree that dynamic stochastic optimisation based on the LQG (linear- quadratic-
Gaussian) assumptions, and the certainty-equivalent decision rules they imply are 
                                                 
20
 Levin, Onatski, Williams & Williams (2005) contains some support for this view.  They report the finding 
that the performance of the optimal policy in a ‘microfounded’ model of a New-Keynesian closed economy with 
capital formation, assumed to represent the US, is closely matched by a simple operational rule that focuses 
solely on stabilizing nominal wage inflation.  Admittedly, there is no financial sector or financial intermediation 
in the model, the model is (log-)linear and the disturbances are (I think) Gaussian.  But the optimal monetary 
policy is derived by optimising the (non-quadratic) preferences of the representative household and there is 
Brainard-type parameter uncertainty about 31 parameters. 
21
 My cats, however, do indeed have fat tails, so there may be new areas of application for the PP. 
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inappropriate for monetary policy design.  This is because (1) the objectives of most central 
banks cannot be approximated well with a quadratic functional form (especially in the case of 
the BoE and the ECB with their lexicographic preferences), (2) no relevant economic model 
is linear and (3) the random shocks perturbing the economic system are not Gaussian.22  I was 
fortunate in having Gregory Chow as a colleague during my first academic job (at Princeton 
University).  The periodic rediscoveries, in the discussion of macroeconomic policy design, 
of aspects of his work (Chow (1975, 1981, 1997)) are encouraging, but they also demonstrate 
that progress in economic science is not monotonic.  
Mishkin (2008b). admits that “Formal models of how monetary policy should 
respond to financial disruptions are unfortunately not yet available, ...”.  This, however, does 
not stop him from giving, in that same speech, confident and quite detailed prescriptions for 
the response of monetary policy to financial disruptions. “Monetary policy cannot--and 
should not--aim at minimizing valuation risk, but policy should aim at reducing 
macroeconomic risk”.   “   monetary policy needs to be timely, decisive, and flexible”.  
“...monetary policy must be at least as preemptive in responding to financial shocks as in 
responding to other types of disturbances to the economy.” Possibly, but not based on any 
rigorous analysis of a coherent, quantitative model of the US economy or any other economy.  
Emphatic statements do not amount to a new science of monetary policy.  Repeated assertion 
is not a third mode of scientific reasoning, on a par with induction and deduction. 
                                                 
22
 Non-linearities abound in even the simplest monetary model.  To name but a few: the non-negativity 
constraint on the nominal interest rate; the non-negativity constraint on gross investment; positive subsistence 
constraints on consumption; borrowing constraints; the financial accelerator (Bernanke and Gertler (1989), 
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), Bernanke (2007)); local hysteresis due to sunk costs; any model in 
which (a) prices multiply quantities and (b) asset dynamics are constrained by intertemporal budget constraints. 
Although the time series used by econometricians are short (at most a couple of centuries for most quantities; a 
bit longer for a very small number of prices), the estimated residuals often exhibit both skew and kurtosis. From 
other applications of dynamic stochastic optimisation we know that different non-linearities generated huge 
differences in the optimal decision rule.  In the theory of optimal investment under uncertainty, strictly convex 
costs of capital stock adjustment make gradual adjustment of the capital stock optimal.  Sunk costs of 
investment and disinvestment make for ‘bang-bang’ optimal investment rules and for ‘zones of inaction’.  For 
an exploration of some of the implications of uncertainty for optimal monetary policy outside the LQG 
framework, see the collection of articles in Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review (2008). 
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III.1a(ii) Housing wealth isn’t wealth 
This bold statement was put to me about ten years ago by Mervyn King, now 
Governor of the Bank of England, then Chief Economist of the Bank of England, shortly after 
I joined the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England as an External Member in 
June 1997. Like most bold statements, the assertion is not quite correct; the correct statement 
is that a decline in house prices does not make you worse off, that is, it does not create a pure 
wealth effect on consumer demand.  
The argument is elementary and applies to coconuts as well as to houses. When does a 
fall in the price of coconuts make you worse off? Answer: when you are a net exporter of 
coconuts, that is, when your endowment of coconuts exceeds your consumption of coconuts.  
A net importer of coconuts is better off when the price of coconuts falls. Someone who is just 
self-sufficient in coconuts is neither worse off nor better off.  
Houses are no different from durable coconuts in this regard.  The fundamental value 
of a house is the present discounted value of its current and future rentals, actual or imputed.  
Anyone who is ‘long’ housing, that is, anyone for whom the value of his home exceeds the 
present discounted value of the housing services he plans to consume over his remaining 
lifetime will be made worse off by a decline in house prices.  Anyone ‘short’ housing will be 
better off.  So the young and all those planning to trade up in the housing market are made 
better off by a decline in house prices.  The old and all those planning to trade down in the 
housing market will be worse off.   
Another way to put this is that landlords are worse off as a result of a decline in house 
prices, while current and future tenants are better off.  On average, the inhabitants of a 
country own the houses they live in; on average, every tenant is his own landlord and vice 
versa.  So there is no net housing wealth effect.  You have to make a distributional argument 
to get an aggregate pure net wealth effect from a change in house prices.  A formal statement 
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of the proposition that a change in house prices has no wealth effect on private consumption 
demand can be found in Buiter (2008b,c).  Informal statements abound (see e.g. Buchanan 
and Fiotakis (2004), Muellbauer (2008)). 
Most econometric or calibrated numerical models I am familiar with treat housing 
wealth like the value of stocks and shares as a determinant of household consumption. They 
forget that households consume housing services (for which they pay or impute rent) but not 
stock services. An example is the FRB/US model. It is used frequently by participants in the 
debate on the implication of developments in the US housing market for US consumer 
demand. A recent example is Frederic S. Mishkin’s (2008a) paper “Housing and the 
Monetary Transmission Mechanism”. The version of the FRB/US model Mishkin uses a-
priori constrains the wealth effects of housing wealth and other financial wealth to be the 
same. The long-run marginal propensity to consume out of non-human wealth (including 
housing wealth) is 0.038, that is, 3.8 percent. In several simulations, Mishkin increases the 
value of the long-run marginal propensity to consume out of housing wealth to 0.076, that is, 
7.6 percent, while keeping the long-run marginal propensity to consume out of non-housing 
financial wealth at 0.038.  
The argument for an effect of housing wealth on consumption other than the pure 
wealth effect, is that housing wealth is collateralisable. Households-consumers can borrow 
against the equity in their homes and use this to finance consumption. It is much more costly 
and indeed often impossible, to borrow against your expected future labour income.  If 
households are credit-constrained, a boost to housing wealth would relax the credit constraint 
and temporarily boost consumption spending.  The argument makes sense and is empirically 
supported (see e.g. Edelstein and Lum (2004), Muellbauer (2008)). Of course, the increased 
debt will have to be serviced, and eventually consumption will have to be brought down 
below the level it would have been at in the absence of the mortgage equity withdrawal.  At 
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market interest rates, the present value of current and future consumption will not be affected 
by the MEW channel. 23 
Ben Bernanke (2008a), Don Kohn (2006), Fredric Mishkin (2008a), Randall Kroszner 
(2007) and Charles Plosser (2007) all have made statements to the effect that there is a pure 
wealth effect through which changes in house prices affect consumer demand, separate from 
the credit, MEW or collateral channel.24  The total effect of a change in house prices on 
consumer demand adds the credit or collateral effect to the standard (pure) wealth effect.  
This is incorrect. The benchmark should be that the credit, MEW or collateral effect is 
instead of the normal (pure) wealth effect.  By overestimating the contractionary effect on 
                                                 
23
 In the previous statement I hold constant (independent of the individual household’s consumption vs. saving 
decision) the future expected and actual sequence of after-tax labour income, profits, interest rates and asset 
prices.  In a Keynesian, demand-constrained equilibrium, the aggregation of the individual consumption choices, 
now and in the future, will in general affect the equilibrium levels of output, employment, interest rates and 
asset prices. 
24
 At the request of Anil Kashyap, I here provide the relevant quotes.  I omitted them in the version presented at 
the Symposium because I felt there was no need to ‘rub in’ the errors.  All that matters is that this shared 
analytical error may well have led to an excessively expansionary policy by the Fed. 
Bernanke (2007): “If the financial accelerator hypothesis is correct, changes in home values may affect 
household borrowing and spending by somewhat more than suggested by the conventional wealth effect because 
changes in homeowners' net worth also affect their external finance premiums and thus their costs of credit.” 
Kohn (2006): “Between the beginning of 2001 and the end of 2005, the constant-quality price index for new 
homes rose 30 percent and the purchase-only price index of existing homes published by the Office of Federal 
Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) increased 50 percent. These increases boosted the net worth of the 
household sector, which further fueled (sic) the growth of consumer spending directly through the traditional 
"wealth effect" and possibly through the increased availability of relatively inexpensive credit secured by the 
capital gains on homes.” 
Kroszner (2005): “As some of the “froth” comes off of the housing market – thereby reducing the positive 
“wealth effect” of the strength in the housing sector -- and people fully adjust to higher energy prices, I see the 
growth in real consumer spending inching down to roughly 3 percent next year.” 
Kroszner (2008), “   falling home prices can have local and national consequences because of the erosion of 
both property tax revenue and the support for consumer spending that is provided by household wealth.” 
Mishkin (2008a, p.363): “By raising or lowering short-term interest rates, monetary policy affects the housing 
market, and in turn the overall economy, directly and indirectly through at least six channels: through the direct 
effects of interest rates on (1) the user cost of capital, (2) expectations of future house-price movements, and (3) 
housing supply; and indirectly through (4) standard wealth effects from house prices, (5) balance sheet, credit-
channel effects on consumer spending, and (6) balance sheet, credit channel effects on housing demand.” 
Mishkin (2008a, p. 378): “Although FRB/US does not include all the transmission mechanisms outlined above, 
it does incorporate direct interest rate effects on housing activity through the user cost of capital and through 
wealth (and possibly credit-channel) effects from house prices, where the effects of housing and financial wealth 
are constrained to be identical.” 
Plossser (2007): “   changes in both home prices and stock prices influence household wealth and therefore 
impact consumer spending and aggregate demand.” 
Plosser (2007):“To the extent that reductions in housing wealth do occur because of a decline in house prices, 
the negative wealth effect may largely be offset for many households by higher stock market valuations. “ 
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consumer demand of the decline in house prices, the Fed may have been induced to cut rates 
too fast and too far.   
There are channels other than private consumption through which a change in house 
prices affects aggregate demand.  One obvious and empirically important one is household 
investment, including residential construction.  A reduction in house prices that reflects the 
bursting of a bubble rather than a lower fundamental value of the property also produces a 
pure wealth effect (Buiter (2008b,c)).  My criticism of the Fed’s overestimation of the effect 
of house price changes on aggregate demand relates only to the pure wealth effect on 
consumption demand, not to the ‘Tobin’s q’ effect of house prices on residential construction. 
III.1a(iii) The will-o’-the-wisp of ‘core’ inflation  
 
The only measure of core inflation I shall discuss is the one used by the Fed, that is, 
the inflation rate of the standard headline CPI or PCE deflator excluding food and energy 
prices.  Other approaches to measuring core inflation, including the vast literature that 
attempts to extract trend inflation or some other measure of ‘underlying’ inflation using 
statistical methods in the time or frequency domains, including ‘trimmed mean’ measures and 
‘approximate band pass filters’ will not be considered (see e.g. Bryan and Cecchetti (1994), 
Quah and Vahey (1995), Baxter and King (1999), Cogley (2002), Cogley and Sargent (2001, 
2005)), Dolmas (2005), Rich and Steindel (2007), Kiley (2008)).   
I assume that the price stability leg of the Fed’s mandate refers to price stability, now 
and in the future, defined in terms of a representative basket of consumer goods and services 
that tries to approximate the cost of living of some mythical representative American.  It is 
well-known that price stability, even in terms an ideal cost of living index, cannot be derived 
as an implication of standard microeconomic efficiency arguments.  The Friedman rule gives 
you a zero pecuniary opportunity cost of holding cash balances as (one of) the optimality 
criteria, that is, Mi i= .  When cash bears a zero rate of interest, this gives us a zero risk-free 
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nominal interest rate as (part of) the optimal monetary rule.  With a positive real interest rate, 
this gives us a negative optimal rate of inflation for consumer prices, something even the 
ECB is not contemplating. 
Menu costs imply the desirability of minimising price changes for those goods and 
services for which menu costs are highest.  Presumably this would call for stabilisation of 
money wages, since the cost of wage negotiations is likely to exceed that of most other forms 
of price setting.  With positive labour productivity growth, a zero money wage inflation target 
would give us a negative optimal rate of producer price inflation. 
New-Keynesian sticky price models of the Calvo-Woodford variety yield (in their 
simplest form) two distinct optimal inflation criteria, one for consumer prices and one for 
producer prices.  Neither implies that stability of the sticky price sub-index is optimal. 
Equations (15) and (16) below show the log-linear approximation at the deterministic 
steady state of the (negative of the) social welfare function (which equals the utility function 
of the representative household) and of the New-Keynesian Phillips curve in the simple 
sticky-price Woodford-Calvo model, when the potential level of output (minus the natural 
rate of unemployment), yˆ , is efficient (see Calvo (1983), Woodford (2003) and Buiter 
(2004)). 
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 In the Calvo model of staggered overlapping price setting, in each period, a 
randomly selected constant fraction of the population of monopolistically competitive firms 
sets prices optimally.  The remainder follows a simple rule of thumb or heuristic for its price. 
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The inflation rate chosen by the constrained price setters in period t  is tpi% .  Optimality in this 
model requires 
 
M
t ti i=  (17) 
 t tpi pi= %  (18) 
Equations (17) and (18) then imply that ˆt ty y= . 
 The requirement in (17) that the pecuniary opportunity cost of holding cash be zero 
is Friedman’s misnamed Optimal Quantity of Money rule.  The second optimality condition, 
given in (18), requires that the headline producer price inflation rate, pi , be the same as the 
inflation rate of the constrained price setters, pi% .  If in any given period the inflation rate of 
the constrained price setters is predetermined, then the second optimality requirement 
becomes the requirement that overall producer price inflation accommodates the inflation rate 
set by the constrained price setters, whatever this happens to be.  Even if one identifies the 
inflation rate set by the constrained price setters with ‘core’ inflation (which would be a 
stretch), this New-Keynesian framework does not generate an optimal rate of inflation either 
for core inflation or for headline inflation.  All it prescribes is a constant relative price of core 
to non-core goods and services.   
 Without luck or additional instruments (such as indirect taxes and subsidies driving 
a wedge between consumer and producer prices) it will not in general be possible to satisfy 
both the Friedman rule and the constant relative price rule (of free and constrained price 
setters).  How then can this framework be used to rationalise (a) targeting Woodford-Calvo 
‘core’ inflation and (b) aiming for stability of the Woodford-Calvo ‘core’ producer price 
level?  Two steps are required.  First, the Friedman rule is finessed or ignored.  This requires 
either the counterfactual assumption that the interest rate on cash is not constrained to equal 
zero but can instead be set equal at all times to the interest rate on non-cash financial 
instruments (that is, (17) always holds, but i  remains free), or the assumption that the 
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technology and preferences in this economy take the rarefied form required to make the 
demand for cash independent of its opportunity cost, in which case 0φ ϕ= = .  Second, the 
Woodford-Calvo ‘core’ inflation rate, which plays the role of the target inflation rate in the 
social welfare function (15) is zero: 0pi =% .  This is the assumption Calvo made in his original 
paper (Calvo (1983)).   
 Clearly, the assumption that the constrained price setters will always keep their 
prices constant, regardless of the behaviour of prices and inflation in the rest of the economy 
is unreasonable.  It assumes the absence of any kind of learning, no matter how partial and 
unsophisticated.  It has strange implications, including the existence of a stable, exploitable 
inflation-unemployment trade-off or inflation-output gap trade-off across deterministic steady 
states. Calvo recognised the unpalatable properties of his unreasonable original price setting 
function in Calvo, Celasun and Kumhof (2007).  An attractive alternative, in the spirit of John 
Flemming’s (1976) theory of the ‘gearing’ of inflation expectations, would be to impose as a 
minimal rationality requirement the assumption that the inflation rate set by the constrained 
price setters is cointegrated with that of the unconstrained price setters or the headline 
inflation rate.   
 Because price stability cannot be rationalised as an objective of monetary policy using 
standard microeconomic efficiency arguments, I fall back on legal mandate/popular 
consensus justifications for price stability as an objective of monetary policy.  In the US, the 
euro area and UK, stable prices or price stability is a legally mandated objective of monetary 
policy.  In the UK, the Chancellor defines the price index.  It is the CPI (the harmonised 
version).  In the euro area the ECB’s Governing Council itself chooses the index used to 
measure price stability.  Again, it is the CPI.  In the US there is no such verifiable source of 
legitimacy for a particular index.  I therefore appeal to what I believe the public at large 
understands by price stability, which is a constant cost of living.    
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I take it as given that the Fed’s definition of price stability is to be operationalized 
through a representative cost of living index.  This means that the Fed does not care 
intrinsically about core inflation (in the sense of the rate of inflation of a price index that 
excludes food and energy).  Americans do eat, drink, drive cars, heat their homes and use air 
conditioning.  The proper operational target implied by the price stability leg of the Fed’s 
dual mandate is therefore headline inflation. 
Core inflation is relevant to the price stability leg of the Fed’s mandate to the extent 
that it is a superior predictor of future headline inflation, over the horizon that the Fed can 
influence headline inflation – a better predictor not only than headline inflation itself, but 
than any readily available set of predictors.  After all, the monetary authority should not 
restrict itself to univariate or bivariate predictor sets, let alone univariate or bivariate predictor 
sets consisting of the price series itself and its components.25 
Non-core prices tend to be set in auction-type markets for commodities.  They are 
flexible.  Core goods and services tend to have prices that are subject to short-run Keynesian 
nominal rigidities.  They are sticky.  The core price index and its rate of inflation tend to be 
both less volatile and more persistent than the index of non-core prices and its rate of 
inflation, and also than the headline price index and its rate of inflation.  However, the ratio 
of core to non-core prices and of the core price index to the headline price index is 
predictable, and so are the relative rates of inflation of the core and headline inflation indices.  
This is clear from Charts 6a and 6b.  The phenomenon driving the increase in the ratio of 
headline to core prices in recent years is well-understood.  Newly emerging market 
economies like China, India and Vietnam have entered the global economy as demanders of 
                                                 
25
 The technically excellent recent paper by Kiley (2008) is therefore, as regards the usefulness of core inflation 
as the focus of the price stability leg of the Fed’s dual mandate, completely beside the point.  It shows that, if 
you want to predict future headline inflation and you restrict your data set to current and past headline inflation 
and core inflation, you should definitely make use of the information contained in the core inflation data. But 
who would predict or target future inflation making use only of current and past headline and core inflation 
data? 
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non-core commodities and as suppliers of core goods and services.  This phenomenon is 
systematic, persistent and ongoing. 
Chart 6a here 
Chart 6b here 
When core goods and services are subject to nominal price rigidities but non-core 
goods prices are flexible, a relative demand or supply shock that causes a permanent increase 
(decrease) in the relative price of non-core to core goods will, for a given path of nominal 
official policy rates, cause a temporary increase in the rate of headline inflation, and possibly 
a temporary reduction in the rate of core inflation as well. 
This pattern is clear from Charts 7a, b, c and d, which plot the difference between the 
headline inflation rate and the core inflation rate on the horizontal axis against the rate of 
headline inflation on the vertical axis. This is done, in Charts 7a and 7b, for the CPI over, 
respectively, the 1957-2008 period and the 1987-2008 period. It is repeated in Charts 7c and 
7d for the PCE deflator over, respectively, the 1959-2008 and the 1987-2008 periods.  
Chart 7a here 
Chart 7b here 
Chart 7c here 
Chart 7d here 
Therefore, when there is a continuing upward movement in the relative price of non-
core goods to core goods, core inflation will be poor predictor of future headline inflation for 
two reasons. First, even if headline inflation were unchanged and independent of the factors 
that drive the change in relative prices, core inflation would, for as long as the upward 
movement in the relative price of non-core goods continued, be systematically below both 
non-core inflation and headline inflation. Second, for a given path of nominal interest rates, 
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the increase in the relative price of non-core goods will temporarily raise headline inflation 
above the level it would have been if there had been no increase in the relative price of non-
core goods to core goods and services. The implication is that for many years now (starting 
around the turn of the century), the Fed has missed the boat on the implications of the global 
increase in the relative price of non-core goods for the usefulness of core inflation as a 
predictor of future headline inflation. Medium-term inflationary pressures have been 
systematically higher than the Fed thought they were. 
I am not arguing that the Fed has focused on core rather than on headline inflation 
because this permits it to take a more relaxed view of inflationary pressures.  My argument is 
that because the Fed, for whatever reason(s), decided to focus on core rather than on headline 
inflation, and because for most of this decade there has been a persistent increase in the 
relative price of non-core goods to core goods and services, the Fed has, for most of this 
decade, underestimated the underlying inflationary pressures in the US. 
Should the recent upward trend in non-core to core prices go into reverse, the opposite 
bias would result.  With a global economic slowdown in the works, a cyclical decline in real 
commodity prices is quite likely for the next couple of years or so.  Following the end of this 
global cyclical correction, however, I expect that a full-speed resumption of commodity-
biased demand growth and of core goods and services-biased supply growth in key emerging 
markets will in all likelihood lead to a further trend increase in the relative price of non-core 
goods to core goods and services. 
The other main lesson from the core inflation debacle is that those engaged in applied 
statistics should not leave their ears and eyes at home.  Specifically, it pays to get up from the 
keyboard and monitor occasionally to open the window and look out to see whether a 
structural break might be in the works that is not foreshadowed in any of the sample data at 
the statistician’s disposal.  Two-and-a-half billion Chinese and Indian consumers and 
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producers entering the global economy might qualify as an epochal event capable of 
upsetting established historical statistical regularities. 
Finally, a brief remark on the Fed’s fondness for the PCE deflator.  Communication 
with the wider public (all those not studying index numbers for a living) is made more 
complicated when the index in terms of which inflation and price stability are measured bears 
no obvious relationship to a reasonably intuitive concept like the cost of living.  I believe the 
PCE deflator falls into this obscure category.  Furthermore, being a price deflator (current-
weighted), the PCE deflator (headline or core) will tend to produce inflation rates lower than 
the corresponding CPI index (which is base-weighted).  Since 1987/01, the difference 
between the headline CPI and PCE deflator inflation rates has been 0.44 percent at an annual 
rate.  The difference between the core CPI and PCE deflator inflation rates has been 0.45 
percent.  Over the longer period 1960/01-2008/03 the difference between the headline CPI 
and PCE inflation rates has been 0.47 percent, that between core CPI and PCE inflation rates 
0.55 percent. This further reinforces the inflationary bias of the Fed’s procedures. 
III.1a(iv) Is the external position of the US sustainable?  If not, can it be corrected 
without a recession? 
 The argument of this subsection is in two parts.  First, the external positions of the US 
and the UK are unsustainable.  Second, it is all but unavoidable that the US and the UK will 
have to go through prolonged and/or deep slowdowns in economic activity to achieve 
sustainable external balances and desirable national saving rates.  Attempts to stimulate 
demand, whether through interest rate cuts or through tax stimuli like the £100bn fiscal 
package implemented in the US during the second quarter of 2008, are therefore 
counterproductive, as they delay a necessary adjustment.  The additional employment and 
growth achieved through such monetary and fiscal stimuli are unsustainable because they 
make an already unsustainable imbalance worse.  If the Fed’s real economic activity leg of its 
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dual mandate refers to sustainable growth and sustainable employment, the interest rate cut 
stimuli provided since August 2007 are therefore in conflict with that mandate.   
 Almost the same conclusion is reached even if one is either not convinced or not 
bothered by the argument that the external position of the US economy is unsustainable.  It is 
possible to reach pretty much the same conclusion as long as one subscribes to the argument 
that the US national saving rate is dangerously low for purely domestic reasons (providing for 
the comfortable retirement of an ageing population), and needs to be raised materially.  
Policies or shocks that raise the US national saving rate are highly unlikely to produce a 
matching increase in the US domestic investment rate, given the growing array of more 
profitable investment opportunities abroad, especially in emerging markets. 
The unsustainability of the US and UK external balances 
Around the middle of 2007, when the financial crisis started, the US had an external primary 
deficit of about six percent of GDP (see Chart 8b).26  The US is also a net external debtor (see 
Chart 8a).  Its net international investment position is not easily or accurately marked to 
market, but something close to a negative 20 percent of GDP is probably a reasonable 
estimate.   
Chart 8a here 
Chart 8b here 
Let tf  be the ratio of end-of-period t  net external liabilities as a share of period t  
GDP, tr  the real rate of return paid during period t  on the beginning-of-period net foreign 
investment position, tg  the growth rate of real GDP between periods 1t −  and t  and tx  the 
external primary balance as a share of GDP.  It follows that 
                                                 
26
 A nation’s primary deficit is its current account deficit, excluding net foreign investment income or, roughly, 
the trade deficit plus net grant outflows. 
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 I assume that the long-run growth rate of the net external liabilities is less than the 
long-run rate of return on the net external liabilities or, equivalently, that the present 
discounted value of the net external liabilities is non-positive in the long run (the usual 
national solvency constraint).  The nation’s intertemporal budget constraint then becomes the 
requirement that the existing net external liabilities should not exceed the present discounted 
value of current and future primary external surpluses.  This can be written more compactly 
as follows: 
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Here ptx  is the permanent primary surplus as a share of GDP and ptr  and ptg  are the 
permanent real rate of return paid on the net external liabilities and the permanent growth rate 
of real GDP respectively.  ‘Permanent’ here is used in the sense of permanent income.  Its 
approximate meaning is ‘expected long-run average’ (see Buiter and Grafe (2004)).  All I 
need to make my point is that the US is a net external debtor and that the permanent real rate 
of return paid on US net external liabilities in the future will indeed in the future exceed the 
permanent growth rate of US real GDP.  If this second assumption is not satisfied, the US can 
engage in external Ponzi finance forever.  Possible, but not likely, especially following the 
ongoing crisis.  
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 Given p pt tr g>  and 1 0tf − > , it follows that the US will have to generate, henceforth, a 
permanent external primary surplus: 0ptx > .  Unless the US expects to be a permanent net 
recipient of foreign aid, this means that the US has to run a permanent trade surplus.  From 
the position the US was in immediately prior to the crisis, this means that a permanent 
increase in the trade balance surplus as a share of GDP of at least six percentage points is 
required.   
The UK is in a similar position, with a Net International Investment Position of 
around minus 27 percent of GDP in 2007 and a primary deficit of almost five percent of 
GDP.  This can be seen in Charts 9a and 9b.  Note that, unlike the USA and the euro area, 
where gross external assets and liabilities are just over 100 percent of annual GDP, in the UK 
both external assets and external liabilities are close to 500 percent of annual GDP.  The 
characterisation of the UK as a hedge fund is only a mild exaggeration. 
Chart 9a here 
Chart 9b here 
The euro area, like the US and the UK, has a small negative Net International 
Investment Position.  Unlike the US and the UK, its primary balance has averaged close to 
zero since the creation of the euro.  Charts 10a and 10b show the behaviour of the external 
assets, liabilities and investment income for the euro area. 
Chart 10a here 
Chart 10b here 
The mid-2007 six percent of GDP US primary deficit was probably an overstatement 
of the structural trade deficit, because the US economy was operating above capacity.  Since 
the middle of 2007, the US primary deficit has shrunk to about five percent of GDP.  With 
the economy now operating with some excess capacity, this probably understates the 
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structural external deficit.  I will assume that the US economy has to achieve at least a five 
percent of GDP permanent increase in the primary balance to achieve external solvency.  The 
corresponding figure for the UK is probably about at least four percent of GDP.  The euro 
area has been in rough structural balance for a number of years. 
To say that the US needs a permanent five percent of GDP reduction in the external 
primary deficit is to say that the US needs a five percent fall in domestic absorption (the sum 
of private consumption, private investment and government spending on goods and services, 
or ‘exhaustive’ public spending) relative to GDP.  This reduction in domestic absorption is 
also necessary to support a lasting depreciation of the US real exchange rate (an increase in 
the relative price of traded to non-traded goods).  Such a depreciation of the real exchange 
rate is an essential part of the mechanism for shifting resources from the non-traded sectors 
(construction, domestic banking and financial services) to the tradable sectors 
(manufacturing, tourism, international banking and financial services, and other tradable 
services). 
The end of Ponzi finance for the US and the UK 
 My view that the US and the UK will have to achieve a large external primary balance 
correction to maintain external solvency is based on the assumption that, in the future, 
p p
t tr g> , i.e. that permanent Ponzi finance (a growth rate of the debt permanently greater than 
the interest rate on the debt) will not be possible for the US or the UK.   
I am therefore asserting that the future will, in this regard, be quite unlike the past. In 
the past couple of decades, as is clear from Charts 8b, 9b and 10b, both the US and the UK 
have been net debtor nations that received a steady stream of net payments from their 
creditors.  As regards the net foreign asset income payments recorded in the balance of 
payments accounts, it looks therefore as through the US and the UK have not only been able, 
in the past, to engage in (temporary) Ponzi finance, they appear to have paid an effective 
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negative nominal rate of return on their net external liabilities: Net Foreign investment 
Income is positive for the US and the UK (zero for the euro area) even though the Net 
International Investment Position is negative for all three.  If this could be sustained, it would 
be a form of ‘über-Ponzi finance’.   
 The reliability of the data summarized in Charts 8a,b, 9a,b and 10a,b is much debated, 
and the interpretation of the anomaly of a net debtor getting paid by his creditors is disputed 
.(see e.g. Buiter (2006), Gourinchas and Rey. (2007) and Hausmann and Sturzenegger 
(2007)).  Part of the reason the US, the UK and (to a lesser extent) the euro area have been 
able to earn a much higher rate of return on their external assets than the rate of return earned 
by foreigners on their investments in the US and the UK, is that the US and the UK (Wall 
Street and the City of London) have, first, been acting as bankers to the world, providing 
unique liquidity and security for investments made in or channelled through these countries 
and, second, (may) have been acting as venture capitalists to the world (Gourinchas and Rey 
(2007)), earning a much higher return on US FDI abroad than foreigners earned on FDI in the 
USA.  I have my doubts about the reliability of the data on which this second mechanism is 
based, but not on the historical accuracy of the first.  It is my belief that the north Atlantic 
region financial crisis will do great and lasting damage to the ability of the US and the UK to 
borrow cheaply and invest in assets yielding superior rates of return.   
 Wall Street and the City of London have traded on the liquidity of their institutions 
and markets.  Their leading banks and other financial institutions have benefited from huge 
liquidity premia and favourable risk spreads.  These spreads reflected in part the perceived 
security of the investments that Wall Street and the City of London managed for clients or for 
their proprietary accounts.27  More fundamentally, it reflected global confidence and trust in 
                                                 
27
 In part, it may also be a peso-problem or ‘fake alpha’ phenomenon, that is, the higher expected return is a 
compensation for risk that has not (yet) materialised.  The market is aware of the risk, and prices it, but the 
econometrician has insufficient observations on the realisation of the risk in his sample. 
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the absence of malfeasance and gross incompetence.  These valuable virtues and talents could 
be found only among the professionals in the heartland of financial capitalism.   
These unique assets, including trust and confidence, have been damaged badly.  Key 
markets and institutions became illiquid and continue to be so.  Incompetence, unethical 
practices and, not infrequently, outright illegal behaviour are now associated in the minds of 
the global investing community with many of the former giants of global finance in Wall 
Street and the City of London.  That is why I have no serious reservations about assuming 
that, even for the US and the UK, we will have p pt tr g>  in the future: for the first time in a 
long time, the external intertemporal budget constraint will bite. 
The rest of the world is unlikely to continue to provide the US and UK consumer 
(private or public) with credit on the terms of the past.  The current financial crisis was made 
in the heartland of financial capitalism - on Wall Street, in the City of London, in Zurich and 
Frankfurt.  It has revealed fundamental flaws in the heart of the financial system of the north 
Atlantic region.  For many investors, the old, lingering suspicion that self-regulation meant 
no regulation has been confirmed.  Those who sold or tried to sell this defective financial 
system to the rest of the world have been exposed as frauds or fools.  The rest of the world 
will not see the US (and the US dollar) or the UK (and sterling) or even the euro area and the 
euro as uniquely safe havens and as providers of uniquely safe and secure financial 
instruments.  Risk premia for lending to the US and the UK are bound to increase 
significantly, even if there is no US dollar or sterling crisis.  The position of New York and 
London as bankers to the world, and especially to the emerging markets, will be permanently 
impaired. 
How and when to boost the external balance 
If a large permanent decline in the ratio of domestic absorption to GDP is necessary, 
why wait, even if you could?  Postponing the necessary adjustment will just raise the 
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magnitude of the permanent correction that is eventually required.  Five percentage points of 
GDP (a likely underestimate of the correction that is required) is already a very large 
permanent correction.  Escalating that number further through inaction or, worse, through 
actions aimed at boosting consumption demand in the short run, risks destroying the 
credibility of an eventual adjustment.  In addition, the terms of access to external finance can 
be expected to worsen rapidly for the US and the UK if durable adjustment measures are not 
implemented soon.   
I believe that the required permanent reduction in domestic absorption relative to 
GDP in the US ought to come mainly through a reduction in private consumption. Public 
spending on goods and services in the US is already low by international standards. 
Underfunded public services and substandard infrastructure also support the view that 
exhaustive public spending should not be cut significantly. US private investment rates are 
not particularly high, either by historical or by international standards. There is also the need 
to invest on a large scale in energy security, energy efficiency and other green ventures. 
While a cyclical weakening of energy prices can be expected, the trend is likely to be 
upwards.  The US is far less energy-efficient in production and consumption than Europe or 
Japan, and much of the US stocks of productive equipment and consumer durables (including 
housing) will have to be scrapped or adapted to make them economically viable at the new 
high real energy prices.  US investment rates, private and public, should therefore not fall.  
That leaves private consumption as the domestic spending or absorption component to 
be lowered permanently by at least five percentage points of GDP. The argument that the US 
will have to go through a protracted and/or deep slowdown to achieve a sustainable external 
balance is not dependent on whether it is private or public consumption that needs to be cut.  
The US national saving rate is astonishingly low, both by international and by 
historical standards, as is apparent from Table 8.  Of the G7 countries, only the UK comes 
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close to saving as little as the US.  The belief that saving is unnecessary because capital gains 
will provide the desired increase in real financial wealth has been undermined by the 
successive implosions of all recent asset booms/bubbles, including the tech bubble (which 
burst late 2000) and the housing bubble (which burst at the end of 2006). 
Table 8 here 
It is logically possible that a country like the US can reduce consumption as a share of 
GDP by five percentage points or more without this causing a temporary slowdown in 
economic activity.  Asset markets (including the real interest rate and the real exchange rate) 
could adjust promptly and by the right amount to provide the correct signals for a reallocation 
of resources from consumption to domestic and foreign investment and from the non-traded 
to the traded sectors.  Prices of goods and services and factor prices could respond promptly 
to re-enforce these asset market signals.  Real resource mobility between the traded and non-
traded sectors could be high enough to permit a sizable intersectoral reallocation of labour 
and capital without the need for periods of idleness or inactivity.   
Absent a supply-side miracle, however, I believe that the US economy is too 
Keynesian in the short run to produce such a seamless and painless change in the composition 
of domestic production and in source of demand for domestically produced goods and 
services unless the right enabling macroeconomic policies are implemented.  Although most 
policies and events that raise the national saving rate will result in a temporary decline in 
effective demand, in slowing or negative growth and in rising unemployment, in principle, 
the right combination of fiscal tightening and monetary loosening could boost the external 
primary deficit without changing aggregate demand for domestic output.28   
Unfortunately, instead of fiscal tightening we have had discretionary fiscal loosening 
in the US worth about $150 bn since the crisis began.  With these perverse fiscal policies in 
                                                 
28
 A boost to public spending on goods and services or measures to stimulate domestic capital formation would 
help sustain demand but would prevent the necessary correction of the external account. 
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the US (from the perspective of restoring external balance), the re-orientation of domestic 
production towards tradables and the switch of global demand towards domestic goods is 
delayed and will ultimately made more painful.   
 It is therefore ironic, and to me incomprehensible, that leading economists who have 
argued for decades that US households need to save more would, as soon as the US consumer 
is at long last showing signs of wanting to save more (that is, consume less), propose fiscal 
and monetary measures aimed at stopping the US consumer from doing what (s)he ought to 
have been doing all along.  Martin Feldstein (2008) is a notable example, Larry Summers 
(2008) is another.  This is a vivid example of St. Augustine’s: “Lord, give me chastity and 
virtue, but do not give it yet.”  The fall in private consumption growth, and indeed in private 
consumption, should be welcomed, not fought.  
The Chairman of the Fed also appears to dropped the qualifier ‘sustainable’ from the 
objectives of growth and employment.  Statements by Chairman Bernanke like the following 
abound: “..., we stand ready to take substantive additional action as needed to support 
growth and to provide additional insurance against downside risks.”(Bernanke (2008a)).  
The omission of the word ‘sustainable’ in front of growth is no accident.  The Fed has chosen 
to do all it can to maintain output and employment at the highest possible levels, with no 
regard to their sustainability. 
III.1a(v) How dangerous to the real economy is financial sector deleveraging? 
Consider the following stylized description of the financial system in the North 
Atlantic region in the 1920s and 1930s.  Banks intermediate between households and non-
financial corporations.  There is a reasonable-size stock market, a bond market and a foreign 
exchange market.  Banks are the only significant financial institutions – the financial sector is 
but one layer deep. 
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When the financial sector is but one layer deep, the collapse of the net worth of 
financial sector institutions and the contraction of the gross balance sheet of the financial 
sector can seriously impair the entire intermediation process.  The spillovers into the real 
economy – household spending and investment spending by non-financial corporates – are 
immediate and direct.  This was the picture in the Great Depression of the 1930s.  This is the 
world studied in depth by the current Fed Chairman, Ben Bernanke, but it is not the world we 
live in today. 
Today, the financial sector is many layers deep.  Most financial institutions interact 
mainly with other financial institutions rather than with households or non-financial 
enterprises.  They lend and borrow from each other and invest in each others’ contingent 
claims. Part of this financial activity is socially productive and efficiency-enhancing.  Part of 
it is privately profitable but socially wasteful churning, driven by regulatory arbitrage and tax 
efficiency considerations.  During periods of financial boom and bubble, useless financial 
products and pointless financial enterprises proliferate, often achieving enormous scale.  
Finance is, after all, trade in promises, and can be scaled almost costlessly, given optimism, 
confidence, trust and gullibility. 
Interestingly, during the most recent leverage boom, many of the non-bank financial 
businesses that accounted for much of the increase in leverage, chose to hold a non-negligible 
part of their assets as bank deposits and also borrowed from banks on a sizable scale.  So the 
growth of bank credit to non-bank financial entities and the growth of the broad monetary 
aggregates tracked the financial, credit and leverage boom quite well.  We don’t know 
whether this is a stable structural relationship or just a fragile co-movement between jointly 
endogenous variables.  Still, it suggests that central banks that take their financial stability 
role seriously should pay attention to the broad monetary aggregates and to the behaviour of 
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bank credit, even if these aggregates are useless in predicting inflation or real economic 
activity in real time (see e.g. Adalid and Detken (2007), and Greiber and Setzer (2007)). 
 The visible sign of this growth of intra-financial sector intermediation/churning is the 
growth of the gross balance sheets of the financial sector and the growth of leverage, both in 
the strict sense of, say, assets to equity ratios and in the looser sense of the ratio of gross 
financial sector assets or liabilities to GDP.  During the 5 years preceding the credit crunch, 
this financial leverage was rising steadily, without much apparent impact on actual or 
potential GDP.  If it had to be brought back to its 2002 level over, say, a five-year period, it is 
likely that no-one would notice much of an impact on real or potential GDP.  The orderly, 
gradual destruction of ‘inside’ assets and liabilities need not have a material impact on the 
value of the ‘outside’ assets and on the rest of the real economy. 
 But financial sector deleveraging and leveraging are not a symmetric processes, in the 
same way that assets price booms and busts are not symmetric.  Compared to the 
deleveraging phase, the increasing leverage phase is gradual.  Rapid deleveraging creates 
positive, dysfunctional feedback between falling funding liquidity, distress sales of assets, 
low market liquidity, falling asset prices and further tightening of funding liquidity.   
At some point, the deleveraging, even though it still involves almost exclusively the 
destruction of inside assets (and the matching inside liabilities) will impair the ability of the 
financial sector as a whole to supply finance to financial deficit units in the household sector 
and the non-financial corporate sector.  Among the outside assets whose value collapses is 
the equity of the banks and other financial intermediaries.  Given external (regulatory) and 
internal prudential lower limits on permissible or desirable capital ratios, these intermediaries 
are faced with the choice of reducing or suspending dividends, initiating rights issues or 
restricting lending to new or existing customers.  Inevitably, lending is cut back and the 
financial crunch is transmitted to households and non-financial enterprises.  The LLR and 
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MMLR roles of the central bank, backed by the Treasury, are designed to prevent excessively 
speedy, destructive deleveraging.  If it does that, there can be massive gradual deleveraging 
in the financial sector, without commensurate impact on households and non-financial 
corporates.   
Inside and outside assets 
I believe that the Fed has consistently overestimated the effect of the overdue sharp 
contraction in the size of the financial sector balance sheet on the real economy.  Much of this 
can, I believe, be attributed to a failure to distinguish carefully between inside and outside 
assets.  All financial instruments are inside assets.  If an inside asset loses value, there is a 
matching decline in an inside liability. Both should always be considered together.  This has 
not been common practice.   
Just one example.  Even before August 9, 2007, Chairman Bernanke provided 
estimates of the loss the US banking sector was likely to suffer on its holdings of subprime 
mortgages due to write downs and write-offs on the underlying mortgages.  For instance, on 
July 20, 2007 in testimony to Congress, Chairman Bernanke stated subprime-related losses 
could be up to $100bn out of a total subprime mortgage stock of around $2 trillion; there 
have been a number of higher estimates since then.  Not once have I heard a member of the 
FOMC reflect on the corresponding gain on the balance sheets of the mortgage borrowers.  
Mortgages are inside assets/liabilities.  So are securities backed by mortgages.   
Consider a household that purchases for investment purposes a second home worth 
$400,000 with $100,000 of its own money and a non-recourse mortgage of $300,000 secured 
against the property.29  Assume the price of the new home halves as soon as the purchase is 
                                                 
29
 To avoid getting hoist immediately on my own ‘housing wealth isn’t wealth’ petard, assume that the value of 
the first home equals the present value of the remaining lifetime housing services the homeowner plans to 
consume.  At the end of the exercise, the reader can decide for him or herself whether this economy contains a 
non-home-owning renter who may be better off as the result of the fall in the price of the second home.  To 
make the example work as stands, the second home should be a buy-to-let purchase aimed at the foreign tourist 
trade. 
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completed. With negative equity of $100,000 the home owner chooses to default. The 
mortgage now is worth nothing. The bank forecloses, repossesses the house and sells it for 
$200,000, spending $50,000 in the process. 
The loss of net wealth as a result of the price collapse and the subsequent default and 
repossession is $250,000: the $200,000 reduction in the value of the house and the $50,000 
repossession costs (lawyers, bailiffs etc). The homeowner loses $100,000: his original, pre-
price collapse equity in the house - the difference between what he paid for the house and the 
value of the mortgage he took out. The bank loses $150,000: the sum of the $100,000 excess 
of the value of the mortgage over the post-collapse price of the house and the $50,000 real 
foreclosure costs. The $300,000 mortgage is an inside asset - an asset to the bank and a 
liability to the homeowner-borrower. When it gets wiped out, the borrower gains (by no 
longer having to service the debt) what the lender loses. 
The legal event of default and foreclosure, however, is certainly not neutral. In this 
case it triggers a repossession procedure that uses up $50,000 of real resources. This waste of 
real resources would, however, constitute aggregate demand in a Keynesian-digging-holes-
and-filling-them-again sense, a form of private provision of pointless public works. 
Continuing the example, how does the redistribution, following the default, of 
$100,000 from the bank to the defaulting borrower - the write-off of the excess of the face 
value of the mortgage over the new low value of the house - affect aggregate demand?  There 
is one transmission channel that suggests it is likely that demand would have been weaker if, 
following the default, the lender had continued recourse to the borrower (say, through a lien 
on the borrower’s future income or assets). The homeowner-borrower is likely to have a 
higher marginal propensity to spend out of current resources than the owners of the bank - 
residential mortgage borrowers are more likely to be liquidity-constrained than the 
83 
 
shareholders of the mortgage lender.  This transmission channel has, as far as I can 
determine, never been mentioned by any FOMC member. 
Finally, we have to allow for the effect of the mortgage default on the willingness and 
ability of the bank to make new loans and to roll over existing loans. Clearly, the write-off or 
write-down of the mortgage will put pressure on the bank’s capital. The bank can respond by 
reducing its dividends, by issuing additional equity or by curtailing lending. The greatest 
threat to economic activity undoubtedly comes from curtailing new lending and the refusal to 
renew maturing loans. 
The magnitude of the effect on demand of a cut in bank lending depends on whom the 
banks are lending to and what the borrower uses the funds for. If the banks are lending to 
other financial intermediaries, that are, directly or indirectly, lending back to our banks, then 
there can be a graceful contraction of the credit pyramid, a multi-layered de-leveraging 
without much effect on the real economy. If bank A lends $1 trillion to bank B, which then 
uses that $1 trillion to buy bonds issued by bank A, there could be a lot of gross de-
leveraging without any substantive impact on anything that matters.  With a few more near-
bank or non-bank intermediaries interposed between banks A and B, such intra-financial 
sector lending and borrowing (often involving complex structured products) has represented a 
growing share of bank and financial sector business this past decade. 
In our non-Modigliani-Miller world, financial structure matters.  We cannot just ‘net 
out’ inside financial assets and liabilities – they are an essential part of the transmission 
mechanism.  But there also is no excuse for ignoring half of the distributional effects inherent 
in changing valuations of inside assets and liabilities.  If their public statements are anything 
to go by, the Fed and the FOMC may have systematically overestimated the effects of 
declining inside financial asset valuations on aggregate demand. 
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III.1a(vi) Disdain for the monetary aggregates 
Monetary targeting for macroeconomic stability died because the velocity of 
circulation of any monetary aggregate turned out to be unpredictable and unstable.  Even so, 
the decision to cease publishing M3 statistics effective 23 March 2006 was extraordinary.  
The reason given was: "M3 does not appear to convey any additional information about 
economic activity that is not already embodied in the M2 aggregate. The role of M3 in the 
policy process has diminished greatly over time. Consequently, the costs of collecting the 
data and publishing M3 now appear to outweigh the benefits." 
Information is probably the purest of all pure public goods.  The cost-benefit analysis 
argument against its continued publication, free of charge to the ultimate user, by a public 
entity like the Fed, is completely unconvincing.  Broad monetary aggregates, including M3 
and their counterparts on the asset side of the banking sector’s balance sheet are in any case 
informative for those interested in banking sector leverage and other financial stability issues, 
including asset market booms and bubbles (see e.g. Ferguson (2005), Adalid and Detken 
(2007) and Greiber and Setzer (2007)).  The decision to discontinue the collection and 
publication of M3 data supports the view that the Fed took its eye off the credit boom ball 
just as it was assuming epic proportions.   
The decision to discontinue publication of the M3 series also smacks of intellectual 
hubris; effectively, the Fed is saying: we don’t find these data useful.  Therefore you shall not 
have them free of charge any longer. 
III.1b The world imports inflation 
 All three central banks have tried to absolve themselves of blame for the recent bouts 
of inflation in their jurisdictions by attributing much or most of it to factors beyond their 
control – global relative price shocks, global supply shocks, global inflation or global 
commodity price inflation.  A prominent use of this fig-leaf can be found in the open letter to 
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the Chancellor of the Exchequer by Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, in May 
2008.30.The gist of the Governor's analysis was: it's all global commodity prices - something 
beyond our control. 
I will quote him at length, so there is no risk of distortion: 
"Inflation has risen sharply this year, from 2.1% in December to 3.3% in May. That rise can 
be accounted for by large and, until recently, unanticipated increases in the prices of food, 
fuel, gas and electricity. These components alone account for 1.1 percentage points of the 1.2 
percentage points increase in the CPI inflation rate since last December. Those sharp price 
changes reflect developments in the global balance of demand and supply for foods and 
energy. In the year to May:  
• world agricultural prices increased by 60% and UK retail food prices by 8%. 
• oil prices rose by more than 80% to average $123 a barrel and UK retail fuel prices 
increased by 20% 
• wholesale gas prices increased by 160% and UK household electricity and gas bills 
by around 10% 
The global nature of these price changes in evident in inflation rates not only in the UK but 
also overseas, although the timing of their impact on consumer prices differs across 
countries. In May, HICP inflation in the euro area was 3.7% and US CPI inflation was 
4.2%." 
Later on in the open letter the Governor amplifies the argument that this increase in 
inflation has nothing to do with the Bank of England: 
"There are good reasons to expect the period of above-target inflation we are experiencing 
now to be temporary. We are seeing a change in commodity, energy and import prices 
relative to the prices of other goods and services. Although this clearly raises the price level, 
it is not the same as continuing inflation. There is not a generalised rise in prices and wages 
caused by rapid growth in the amount of money spent in the economy. In contrast to past 
episodes of rising inflation, money spending is increasing at a normal rate. In the year to 
2008 Q1, it rose by 5½%, in line with the average rate of increase since 1997 - a period in 
which inflation has been low and stable. Moreover, in recent months the growth rate of the 
broad money supply has eased and credit conditions have tightened. This will restrain the 
growth of money spending in the future." (emphasis in the original). 
                                                 
30
 The open letter procedure is a useful part of the communication and accountability framework of the Bank of 
England. It requires the Governor to write an open letter to the Chancellor whenever the inflation rate departs by 
more than 1 percent from its target (in either direction). In that open letter, the Governor, on behalf of the 
Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) gives the reasons for the undershoot or overshoot of the inflation target, 
what the MPC plans to do about it, how long it is expected to take until inflation is back on target and how all 
this is consistent with the Bank's official mandate. The current inflation target is an annual inflation rate of 2 
percent for the Consumer Price Index (CPI). With actual year-on-year inflation at 3.3 percent in May 2008, an 
open letter (the second since the creation of the MPC in 1997) was due. 
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 Very similar statements have been made by President Jean-Claude Trichet of the ECB 
and Chairman Ben Bernanke.  Here is a quote from the August 7, 2008 Introductory 
statement before the press conference by President Trichet: 
“...annual HICP inflation has remained considerably above the level consistent with price 
stability since last autumn, reaching 4.0% in June 2008 and, according to Eurostat’s flash 
estimate, 4.1% in July. This worrying level of inflation rates results largely from both direct 
and indirect effects of past sharp increases in energy and food prices at the global level.” 
(Trichet (2008)). 
 Ditto for Chairman Bernanke (2008),  
“Inflation has remained high, largely reflecting sharp increases in the prices of globally 
traded commodities.” and, in the same speech, 
“Rapidly rising prices for globally traded commodities have been the major source of the 
relatively high rates of inflation we have experienced in recent years, underscoring the 
importance for policy of both forecasting commodity price changes and understanding the 
factors that drive those changes.” 
 This analysis makes no sense.  Except at high frequencies, headline inflation can be 
effectively targeted and controlled by the monetary authority and is therefore the 
responsibility of the monetary authority.  Supply shocks or demand shocks make the 
volatility of actual headline inflation around the target higher, but should not create a bias.  
The only obvious caveat is that the economy in question have a floating effective exchange 
rate.  This is the case for the UK and the euro area.  The US is hampered somewhat in its 
monetary autonomy by the fact that the Gulf Cooperation Council members and some other 
countries continue to peg to the US dollar, and by the fact that the exchange rate with the US 
dollar of the Chinese Yuan continues to be managed in a rather unhelpful manner by the 
Chinese authorities.  Although the Yuan appreciated vis-à-vis the US dollar by more than 10 
percent in 2007 and by more than 7 per cent so far this year, it is clearly not a market-
determined exchange rate.   
If we add together the statements by the world’s central bank heads (from the 
industrial countries, from the commodity-importing emerging markets and from the 
87 
 
commodity exporting emerging markets) on the origins of their countries’ inflation during the 
past couple of years, we must conclude that interplanetary trade is now a fact: the world is 
importing inflation from somewhere else (Wolf (2008)).  
 Consider the following stylised view of the inflation process in an open economy.  
The consumer price level, as measured by the CPI, say, is a weighted average of a price index 
for core goods and services and a price index for non-core goods. Core goods and services 
have sticky prices - these are the prices that account for Keynesian nominal rigidities (money 
wages and prices that are inflexible in the short run) and make monetary policy interesting. 
Non-core goods are commodities traded in technically efficient auction markets. It includes 
oil, gas and coal, metals and agricultural commodities, both those that are used for food 
production and those that provide raw materials for industrial processing, including bio fuels. 
The prices of non-core goods are flexible.  
I will treat the long-run equilibrium relative price of core and non-core goods and 
services as determined by the rest of the world.  In the short run, nominal rigidities can, 
however, drive the domestic relative price away from the global relative price.   
I also make domestic potential output of core goods and services a decreasing 
function of the relative price of non-core goods to that of core goods and services.  The effect 
of an increase in real commodity prices on productive potential in the industrial countries is 
empirically well-established.  A recent study by the OECD (2008) suggests that the steady-
state effect of a $120 per barrel oil price could be to lower the steady-state path of US 
potential output by about 4 percentage points, and that of the euro area by about half that 
(reflecting the lower euro area energy-intensity of GDP).31  The short-and medium-term 
effect on the growth rate of potential output in the US of the real energy price increase would 
be about 0.2 percent per annum, and half that in the euro area.  Negative effects on potential 
                                                 
31
 $120 per barrel would be a 240% increases in the 20-year average real price of oil for the US and a 170% 
increase for the euro area. 
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output of the higher cost of capital since the summer of 2007 could magnify the negative 
potential growth rate effects, according to the OECD study, to minus 0.3 percent per annum 
for both the US and the euro area. 
I also treat the world (foreign currency) price of non-core goods as exogenous.  It 
simplifies the analysis, but is not necessary for the conclusions, if we assume that the country 
produces only core goods and services and imports all non-core goods.  Non-core goods are 
both consumed directly and used as imported raw materials and intermediate inputs in the 
production of core goods and services. The weight of non-core goods in the CPI, which I will 
denote µ, represents both the direct weight of non-core goods in the consumption basket and 
the indirect influence of core goods prices as a variable cost component in the production of 
core goods and services. I haven't seen any up-to-date input-output matrices for the US, the 
euro area and the UK, so I will have to punt on µ. For illustrative purposes, assume that µ = 
0.25 for the UK, 0.10 for the US and 0.15 for the euro area.   
The inflation rate is the proportional rate of change of the CPI. If pi  is the CPI 
inflation rate, cpi  the core inflation rate and npi  the non-core inflation rate, then: 
 (1 ) c npi µ pi µpi= − +  (21) 
The inflation rate of non-core goods measured in domestic currency prices is the sum 
of the world rate of inflation of non-core goods fpi  and the proportional rate of depreciation 
of the currency’s nominal exchange rate,ε . That is, 
 
n fpi pi ε= +  (22) 
By assumption, the central bank has no influence on the world rate of inflation of non-
core goods, fpi  .  The same cannot be said, however, for the value of the nominal exchange 
rate. High global inflation need not be imported if the currency is permitted to appreciate.  In 
the UK, between end of the summer of 2007 and the time of Governor King’s open letter in 
May 2008, sterling’s effective exchange rate depreciated by 12 percent, reinforcing rather 
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than offsetting the domestic inflationary effect of global price increases.  The heads of our 
three central banks appear to treat the nominal exchange rate as exogenous – independent of 
monetary policy.32   
The values of µ  are probably quite reasonable, but the one-for-one instantaneous 
structural pass-through assumed in equation (22) for exchange rate depreciation on the 
domestic currency prices of non-core goods is somewhat over the top, at any rate in the short 
run. But it is a reasonable benchmark for medium- and long-term analysis.  In the short run, 
one can, for descriptive realism, add a little distributed lag or error-correction mechanism to 
(22), reflecting pricing-to-market behaviour etc. 
Core inflation, which can be identified with domestically generated inflation in the 
simplest version of this approach, depends on such things as the inflation rate of unit labour 
costs and of unit rental costs plus the growth rate of the mark-up. For simplicity, I will 
assume that core inflation depends on the domestic output gap, ˆy y− , on expected future 
headline inflation, 1t tE pi +  and on past core inflation, so core inflation is driven by the 
following process: 
 
1 1ˆ( ) (1 )
0, 0 1
c c
t t t t t ty y Epi γ β pi β pi
γ β
+ −= − + + −
> < ≤
 (23) 
Monetary policy influences core inflation through two channels: by raising interest 
rates and expectations of future policy rates, it can lower output and thus the output gap.  And 
if past, current and anticipated future actions influence expectations of future CPI inflation, 
that too will reduce inflation today, through the (headline) expectations channel. 
It is true that an increase in the relative price of non-core goods to core goods and 
services means, given a sticky nominal price of core goods and services, an increase in the 
general price level but not, in and of itself, ongoing inflation. That is arithmetic.  With the 
                                                 
32
 Perhaps the Treasury sets it?  See footnote 4. 
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domestic currency price of core goods and services given in the short run, the only way to 
have an increase in the relative price of non-core goods is to have an increase in the domestic 
currency price of non-core goods. The level of the CPI therefore increases. This one-off 
increase in the general price level will show up in real time as a temporary increase in CPI 
inflation. If there is a sequence of such relative price increases, there will be a sequence of 
such temporary increases in CPI inflation, which will rather look like, but is not, ongoing 
inflation.   
Of course, as time passes even sticky Keynesian prices become unstuck.  The nominal 
price of core goods and services can and does adjust.  It can even adjust in a downward 
direction, as the spectacular declines in IT-related product prices illustrate on a daily basis.  
Whether the medium-term and longer-term increase in the relative price of non-core goods 
and services will continue to be reflected in a higher future path for the CPI, an unchanged 
CPI path or even an ultimately lower CPI path, is determined by domestic monetary policy. 
Furthermore, an increase in the relative price of non-core goods to core goods and 
services does more than cause a one-off increase in the price level. As argued above, and as 
supported by many empirical studies, including the recent OECD (2008) study cited above, it 
reduces potential output or productive capacity by making an input that is complementary 
with labour and capital more expensive. 33 Letting 
n
c
P
P
 denote the relative price of non-core 
and core goods, I write this as:  
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 (24) 
In addition, if labour supply is responsive to the real consumption wage, then the 
adverse change in the terms of trade that is the other side of the increase in the relative price 
                                                 
33
 Complementary in the sense that an increase in the energy input raises the marginal products of labour and 
capital. 
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of non-core goods to core goods and services will reduce the full-employment supply of 
labour, and this too will reduce productive capacity. Thus, unless actual output (aggregate 
demand) falls by more than potential output as a result of the adverse terms of trade change, 
the output gap will increase and the increase in the relative price of non-core goods will raise 
domestic inflationary pressures for core goods and services. 
Clearly, the adverse terms of trade change will lower the real value of consumption 
demand, measured in terms of the consumption basket, if claims on domestic GDP (capital 
and labour income) are owned mainly by domestic consumers.  It lowers the purchasing 
power of domestic output over the domestic consumption bundle. Real income measured in 
consumer goods falls, so real consumption measured in consumer goods should fall. But even 
if the increase in the relative price of non-core goods is expected to be permanent, real 
consumption measured in terms of the consumption bundle is unlikely to fall by a greater 
percentage than the decline in the real consumption value of domestic production. With 
homothetic preferences, a permanent deterioration in the terms of trade will not change 
consumption measured in terms of GDP units. If the period utility function is Cobb-Douglas 
between domestic output and imports, the adverse terms of trade shock lowers potential 
output but does not reduce domestic consumption demand for domestic output.  
Unless the sum of investment demand for domestic output, public spending on 
domestic output and export demand falls in terms of domestic output, aggregate demand 
(actual GDP) will not fall. The output gap therefore increases as a result of an increase in the 
relative price of non-core goods to goods and services. Domestic inflationary pressures rise. 
Interest rates have to rise to achieve the same inflation trajectory. This inflationary impact of 
the increase in the relative price of commodities appears to be ignored by the Governor, the 
President and the Chairman. 
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III.1c False comfort from limited ‘pass-through’ of inflation expectations 
into earnings growth? 
  
Both the Fed and the BoE (less so the ECB) take comfort from the fact that earnings 
growth has remained moderate despite the increase in inflation expectations, based on both 
break-even inflation calculations (or the inflation swap markets) and on survey-based 
expectations.  For instance, in the exchange of letters between the Governor of the BoE and 
the Chancellor in May 2008, it was noted by the Chancellor that, although median inflation 
expectations for the coming year had risen to 4.3% in the Bank’s own survey, earnings 
growth (including bonuses) is running at only 3.9 percent.  
However, this observation does not mean that inflation expectations are not translated, 
ceteris paribus, one-for-one into higher wage settlements or into higher actual inflation. Time 
series analysis (earning growth is not rising) is not the same as counterfactual analysis 
(earnings growth would have been the same if inflation expectations had not risen). 
It is certainly possible that the global processes that have depressed the share of 
labour income in GDP in most industrial countries during the past 10 years (labour-saving 
technical change, China and India entering the global markets as producers of goods and 
services that are frequently competitive with those produced by the labour force in the 
advanced industrial countries, increased cross-border labour mobility, legal constraints 
weakening labour unions etc.) have not yet run their course and that labour’s share will 
continue to decline. Arithmetically, a decrease in labour’s share in GDP is an increase in the 
mark-up of the GDP deflator on unit labour costs. So if an increase in the expected rate of 
(consumer price) inflation coincided with a reduction in labour’s share of GDP because of 
structural factors (and if no other determinant of earnings growth changed), unit labour cost 
growth could well rise (in a time-series sense) by less than the increase in expected inflation 
or might even decline.  The price inflation process (on the GDP deflator definition) would, 
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however, include the growth rate of the mark-up on unit labour costs, and would show the 
full impact of the increase in expected inflation (even in a time-series sense). 
Clearly, the GDP deflator is not quite the same as the core price index, but 
qualitatively, the point remains valid, that a declining equilibrium share of labour will be 
offset, in the price inflation process, by a rising equilibrium mark-up on unit labour cost and 
that this can distort the interpretation of simple correlations between inflation expectations 
and earnings growth. 
III.2 Financial Stability: LLR, MMLR and Quasi-fiscal actions 
III.2a The Fed 
The Fed, as soon as the crisis hit, injected liquidity into the markets at maturities from 
overnight to 3-months.  The amounts injected were somewhere between those of the Bank of 
England (allowing for differences in the size of the US and UK economies) and those of the 
ECB. 
III.2a(i) Extending the maturity of discount window loans 
On August 17, 2007 the Fed extended the maturity of loans at the discount window 
from overnight to up to one month. On March 16, 2008, it further extended the maximum 
term for discount window lending to 90 days.  These were helpful measures, permitting the 
provision of liquidity at the maturities it was actually needed 
III.2a(ii) The TAF 
On December 12, 2007, the Fed announced the creation of a temporary term auction 
facility (TAF).  This allows a depository institution to place a bid for a one-month advance 
from its local Federal Reserve Bank at an interest rate that is determined as the result of an 
auction. The TAF allows the Fed to inject term funds through a broader range of 
counterparties and against a broader range of collateral than open market operations.  When 
the normal open market operations counterparties are hoarding funds, and the unsecured 
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interbank market is not disseminating liquidity provisions efficiently throughout the banking 
sector, this facility is clearly helpful.  
III.2a(iii) International currency swaps 
Also on December 12, the Fed announced swap lines with the European Central Bank 
and the Swiss National Bank of $20 billion and $4 billion, respectively.  On March 11, 2008, 
these swap lines were increased to $30 billion and $6 billion, respectively.  This, I have 
suggested earlier, represents the either the confusion of motion with action or an unwarranted 
subsidy to the private banks able to gain access to this foreign exchange rather than having to 
acquire it more expensively through the private swap markets.  Banks in the euro area and 
Switzerland were not liquid in euros/Swiss francs but short of US dollars because the foreign 
exchange markets had become illiquid.  These banks were short of liquidity – full stop – that 
is, short of liquidity in any currency.   
This is unlike the case of Iceland, where the Central Bank on 16th May 2008 arranged 
swaps for euros with the three Scandinavian central banks.  Since the Icelandic banking 
system is very large relative to the size of the economy and has much of its balance sheet 
(including a large amount of short-term liabilities) denominated in foreign currencies rather 
than in Icelandic kroner, the effective performance of the LLR and MMLR functions requires 
the central bank to have access to foreign currency liquidity.  With no-one interested in being 
long Icelandic kroner, the swap facilities are an essential line of defence for the Icelandic 
LLR/MMLR  
III.2a(iv) The TSLF 
On March 11, 2008 the Fed announced that it would expand its existing overnight 
securities lending program for primary dealers by creating a Term Securities Lending Facility 
(TSLF). Under the TSLF, the Fed will lend up to $200 billion of Treasury securities held by 
the System Open Market Account to primary dealers secured for a term of 28 days by a 
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pledge of other collateral. The Facility was extended beyond the 2008 year-end in July 2008, 
and the maturity of the loans was increased to three months.  The first TSLF auction took 
place on March 27, with $75 billion offered for a term of 28 days, too late to be helpful to 
Bear Stearns, for which the Fed had to provide extraordinary LLR support on March 14.  The 
price is set through a single-price auction.34   
The range of collateral is quite wide: all Schedule 2 collateral plus agency 
collateralized-mortgage obligations (CMOs) and AAA/Aaa-rated commercial mortgage-
backed securities (CMBS), in addition to the AAA/Aaa-rated private-label residential 
mortgage backed securities (RMBS) and OMO-eligible collateral.35  Until the creation of the 
Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF, see below) the Fed could not lend cash directly to 
primary dealers.  Instead it lends highly liquid Treasury bills which the primary dealers then 
can convert into cash. This facility extends both the term of the loans from the Fed to primary 
dealers and the range of eligible collateral.  In principle this is a useful arrangement for 
addressing a liquidity crisis.  The design, however, has one huge flaw. 
 An extraordinary feature of the arrangement is that the collateral offered by a primary 
dealer is valued by the clearing bank acting as agent for the primary dealer.36 Apparently this 
is a standard feature of the dealings between the Fed and the primary dealers.  Primary 
dealers cannot access the Fed directly, but do so through a clearing bank – their dealer. As 
long as the clearing bank which acts as agent for the primary dealer in the transaction is 
willing to price the security (say, by using an internal model), the Fed will accept it as 
collateral at that price.  The usual haircuts etc. will, of course, be applied to these valuations. 
                                                 
34
 The TSLF is a single-price auction, where accepted dealer bids will be awarded at the same fee rate, which is 
equal to the lowest fee rate at which any bid was accepted. Dealers may submit two bids for the basket of 
eligible general Treasury collateral at each auction. 
35
 Schedule 1 collateral is all collateral eligible for tri-party repurchase agreements arranged by the Open Market 
Trading Desk (that is, all collateral acceptable in regular Fed open market operations).  Schedule 2 collateral is 
all Schedule 1 collateral plus AAA/Aaa-rated Private-Label Residential MBS, AAA/Aaa-rated Commercial 
MBS, Agency CMOs and other AAA/Aaa-rated ABS. 
36
 It is revalued daily to ensure that, should the value of the collateral have declined, the primary dealer puts up 
the additional collateral required to restore the required level of collateralisation.  With a well-designed 
revaluation mechanism, such ‘margin calls’ do, of course, make sense. 
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 This arrangement is far too cosy for the primary dealer and its clearer. The incentive 
for collusion between the primary dealer and the clearer, to offer pig’s ear collateral but value 
it as silk purse collateral, will be hard to resist.  This invites adverse selection: the Fed is 
likely to find itself with overpriced, substandard collateral.  Offering access to this adverse 
selection mechanism today creates moral hazard in the future.  It does so by creating 
incentives for future reckless lending and investment by primary dealers aware of these future 
opportunities for dumping bad investments on the Fed as good collateral through the TSLF.  
More recently, the Fed extended the TSLF through the addition of a Term Securities Lending 
Facility Options Program (TOP).  This rather looks to me like gilding the lily. 
III.2a(v) The PDCF 
On March 16, 2008, the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) was established, for a 
minimum period of six months.  This again was too late to be helpful in addressing the Bear 
Stearns crisis.  Primary dealers of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York are eligible to 
participate in the PDCF via their clearing banks. It is an overnight loan facility that provides 
funding to primary dealers in exchange for a specified range of eligible collateral, including 
all collateral eligible for tri-party repurchase agreements arranged by the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York (that is, all collateral eligible for pledge in open market operations), as 
well as all investment-grade corporate securities, municipal securities, mortgage-backed 
securities and asset-backed securities for which a price is available from the primary dealer’s 
clearing bank.  The rate charged is the one at the primary discount window to depositary 
institutions for overnight liquidity, currently 25 bps over the Federal Funds target rate. 
This facility effectively extends overnight borrowing at the Fed’s primary discount 
window to primary dealers, at the standard primary discount window rate. Note again the 
extraordinary valuation mechanism put in place for securities offered as collateral: “The 
pledged collateral will be valued by the clearing banks based on a range of pricing 
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services.”37 This is the same ‘adverse-selection-today-leading-to-moral-hazard-tomorrow-
machine’ created by the Fed with the TSLF.   
III.2a(vi) Bear Stearns  
On 14 March 2008, the Fed agreed to lend US$29 billion to Bear Stearns through 
JPMorgan Chase (on a non-recourse basis).  Bear Stearns is an investment bank and a 
primary dealer.  It was not regulated by the Fed (which only regulates depositary institutions) 
but by the SEC.  Bear Stearns was deemed too systemically important (probably by being too 
interconnected rather than too big) to fail.   
It is not clear why Bear Stearns could not have borrowed at the regular Fed primary 
discount window.  It is true that investment banks had not done so since the Great 
Depression, but it would have been quite consistent with the Fed’s legislative mandate. The 
Federal Reserve Act (1913) allows the Federal Reserve to lend, in a crisis, to just about any 
institution, organisation or individual, and against any collateral the Fed deems fit (see also 
Small and Clouse (2004)).  
Specifically, if the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System determine that 
there are “unusual and exigent circumstances” and at least five (out of seven) governors vote 
to authorize lending under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, the Federal Reserve can 
discount for individuals, partnerships and corporations (IPCs) “notes, drafts and bills of 
exchange indorsed or otherwise secured to the satisfaction of the Federal Reserve bank…”.  
The combination of the restriction of “unusual and exigent circumstances” and the 
further restriction that the Federal Reserve can discount only to IPCs “unable to secure 
adequate credit accommodations from other banking institutions”, fits the description of a 
credit crunch/liquidity crisis like a glove.  So why did the Fed not determine before March 14 
                                                 
37
 http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/pdcf_terms.html. 
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that there were “unusual and exigent circumstances” that would have allowed Bear Stearns 
direct access to the discount window? 
It is also a mystery why a special resolution regime analogous to that administered by 
the FDIC for insured depositary institutions (discussed in Section II.3a) did not exist for Bear 
Stearns.  The experience of LTCM in 1998 should have made it clear to the Fed that there 
were institutions other than deposit-taking banks that might be too systemically significant to 
fail, precisely because, like Bear Stearns, their death throes might, through last-throw-of-the-
dice asset liquidations, cause illiquid asset prices to collapse and set in motion a dangerous 
chain reaction of cumulative market illiquidity and funding illiquidity.  An SRR could have 
ring-fenced the balance sheet of Bear Stearns and permitted the analogue of Prompt 
Corrective Action to be implemented.  The entire top management could have been fired 
without any golden handshakes. If necessary, regulatory insolvency could have been declared 
for Bear Stearns.  The shareholders would have lost their voting power and would have had 
to take their place in line, behind all other claimants. Outright nationalisation of Bear Stearns 
could have created a better alignment of incentives that was actually achieved, although a 
drawback of nationalisation would have been that all creditors of Bear Stearns would have 
been made whole. 
Instead we have a $10 per share payment for the shareholders, what looks like a 
sweetheart deal for JPMorgan Chase, and a $29 billion exposure for the US tax payer to an 
SPV in Delaware, which has $30 bn of Bear Stearns’ most toxic assets on its balance sheet.  
Only $1bn of JPMorgan Chase money stands between losses on the assets and the $29 billion 
‘loan with equity upside’ provided by the Fed.   
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III.2a(vii) Bear Stearns’ bail-out as an example of confusing the LLR and MMLR 
functions 
The rescue of Bear Stearns represents the confusion of the lender-of-last-resort role of 
the traditional central bank and the market-maker-of-last-resort role of the modern central 
bank.  Bear Stearns was an investment bank.  No investment bank is systemically important 
in the sense that no investment bank performs tasks that cannot be performed readily and 
with comparable effectiveness by other institutions.  Even the primary dealer and broker roles 
of Bear Stearns could have been taken over promptly by the other primary dealers and 
brokers.   
Bear Stearns was rescued because it was ‘too interconnected to fail’.  It was feared 
that, in a last desperate attempt to stave off insolvency, Bear Stearns would have unloaded 
large quantities of illiquid securities in dysfunctional, illiquid securities markets.  This would 
have caused a further dramatic decline in the market prices of these securities.  With mark-to-
market accounting and through margin calls linked to these valuations, further sales of 
illiquid securities by distressed financial institutions would have been triggered.  The losses 
associated with these ‘panic sales’ would have reduced the capital of other financial 
institutions, requiring them to cut or eliminate dividends, raise new capital, cut new lending 
or reduce their investments.  A vicious cycle could have been triggered of forced sales into 
illiquid markets triggering funding liquidity problems elsewhere, necessitating further 
liquidations of illiquid asset holdings.   
This chain of events is possible and may even have been plausible at the time.  The 
solution, however, is to truncate the vicious downward spiral of market illiquidity and 
funding illiquidity right at the point where Bear Stearns was distress-selling its illiquid assets.  
By acting as MMLR - either by buying these securities outright or by accepting them as 
collateral at facilities like the TAF (extended to include investment banks as eligible 
100 
 
counterparties), the TSLF or the PDCF - the central bank could have put a floor under the 
prices of these securities and would thus have prevented a vicious downward spiral of market 
and funding illiquidity.  Whether Bear Stearns would have been able to survive with the 
valuations of their assets realised at these TAF- TSLF- or PDCF-type facilities, would no 
longer have been systemically relevant.   
The arrangements for acting as MMLR for investment banks did not, unfortunately, 
exist when Bearn Stearns collapsed. Now that they do, they should be kept alive, on a stand-
by or as-needed basis.  They may have to be expanded to include other highly leveraged 
financial institutions that are too interconnected to fail.  As quid pro quo, all institutions 
eligible for MMLR (and/or LLR) support should be subject to common regulatory 
requirements, including a common special resolution regime.  Combined with a proper 
punitive pricing of securities offered for outright purchase or as collateral, moral hazard will 
be minimized.    
III.2a(viii) Fannie and Freddie 
On Sunday, July 13 2008 the Fed, in a coordinated action with the Treasury, 
announced that it would provide the two GSEs, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, with access to 
the discount window on same terms as commercial banks. The announcement was not very 
informative as regards the exact conditions of access:  
"The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System announced Sunday that it 
has granted the Federal Reserve Bank of New York the authority to lend to Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac should such lending prove necessary. Any lending would be at the primary 
credit rate and collateralized by U.S. government and federal agency securities. ...." 
 
It isn’t clear from this whether the two GSEs have access only to overnight collateral 
(at a rate 25 basis points over the Federal Funds target rate) or are able to obtain loans of up 
to 3-month maturity, as commercial banks can.   
As long as the collateral the Fed accepts from Fannie and Freddie consists of US 
government and federal agency securities only, the expansion of the set of eligible discount 
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window counterparties to include Fannie and Freddie does not represent a material quasi-
fiscal abuse of the Fed.  If at some future date the maturity of the loans extended to Fannie 
and Freddie at the discount window were to be longer than overnight, and if lower quality 
collateral were to be accepted and not priced appropriately, Fannie’s and Freddie’s access to 
the discount window could become a conduit for quasi-fiscal subsidies.   
This is not, I believe, an idle concern.  The Fed’s opening of the discount window to 
the two GSEs was announced at the same time as some potentially very large-scale 
contingent quasi-fiscal commitments by the Treasury to these organisations, including debt 
guarantees and the possibility of additional equity injections.  There also is the worrying 
matter that, even though Fannie and Freddie now have access to the discount window, there 
is no special resolution regime for the two GSEs to constrain the incentives for excessive risk 
taking created by access to the discount window.  
III.2a(ix) Lowering the discount window penalty 
In Section III.1, I listed the lowering (in two steps) of the discount rate penalty from 
100 to 25 basis points as a stabilisation policy measure, although it is unlikely to have had 
more than a negligible effect, except possibly as ‘mood music’: it represents the marginal 
cost of external finance only for a negligible set of financial institutions.   
The discount rate penalty reductions should, however, be included in the financial 
stability section as an essentially quasi-fiscal measure.  On August 17, 2007, there were no 
US financial institutions for whom the difference between able to borrow at the discount rate 
at 5.75 percent rather than at 6.25 percent represented the difference between survival and 
insolvency; neither would it make a material difference to banks considering retrenchment in 
their lending activity to the real economy or to other financial institutions.  This reduction in 
the discount window penalty margin was of interest only to institutions already willing and 
able to borrow at the discount window (because they had the kind of collateral normally 
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expected there).  It was an infra-marginal subsidy to such banks – a straight transfer to their 
shareholders from the US tax payers.  It also will have boosted moral hazard to a limited 
degree by lowering the penalty for future illiquidity. 
III.2a(x) Interest on reserves 
Reserves held by commercial banks with the Fed are currently non-remunerated.  As I 
pointed out in Section II.5, this hampers the Fed in keeping the effective Federal Funds rate 
close to the Federal Funds target. Commercial banks have little incentive to hold excess 
reserves with the central bank.  If there is excess liquidity in the overnight interbank market, 
banks will try to lend it out overnight at any positive rate rather than holding it at a zero 
overnight rate as excess reserves with the Fed.  Clearly it makes sense for interest to be paid 
on excess reserves at an overnight rate equal to the Federal Funds target rate.  Under existing 
legislation, the Fed will have the authority to pay interest on reserves starting in October 
2011.  The Fed has asked Congress for this date to be brought forward.   
The proposal clearly makes sense, but if interest at the Federal Funds target rate is 
paid on both required and excess reserves, the proposed policy change represents a quasi 
fiscal tax cut benefiting the shareholders of the banks.  In a first-best world, the Fed would 
not collect quasi-fiscal taxes through unremunerated reserves.  However, to correct this 
problem now, as a one-off, would look like a further reward to the banks for past imprudent 
behaviour and would also be distributionally unfair.  The Fed should insist that interest be 
paid only on excess reserves held by the commercial banks, with zero interest on required 
reserves.  Once the dust has settled, the question of the appropriate way to tax the commercial 
banks and fund the Fed can be addressed at leisure. 
III.2a(xi) Limiting the damage of the current crisis versus worsening the prospects for 
the next crisis 
 
There can be little doubt that the Fed has done many things right as regards dealing 
with the immediate liquidity crisis.  First, it used its existing facilities to accommodate the 
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increased demand for liquidity. It extended the maturity of its discount window loans.  It 
widened the range of collateral it would accept in repos and at the discount window.  It 
created additional term facilities for existing counterparties through the TAF. It increased the 
range of eligible counterparties by creating the TSLF and the PDCF and it extended discount 
window access to Fannie and Freddie.  It also stopped a run on investment banks by bailing 
out Bear Stearns. 
However, the way in which some of these ‘putting-out-fires-manoeuvres’ were 
executed seems to have been designed to maximise bad incentives for future reckless lending 
and borrowing by the institutions affected by them.  Between the TAF, the TSLF, the PDCF, 
the rescue of Bear Stearns and the opening of the discount window to the two GSEs, the Fed 
and the US tax payer have effectively underwritten directly all of the ‘household name’ US 
banking system – commercial banks and investment banks – and probably also, indirectly, 
most of the other large highly leveraged institutions.   
This was done without the extraction of any significant quid-pro-quo and without 
proportional and appropriate pain for shareholders, directors, top managers and creditors of 
the institutions that benefited.  The privilege of access to Fed resources was extended without 
a matching expansion of the regulatory constraints traditionally put on counterparties 
enjoying this access.  Specifically, the new beneficiaries have not been made subject to a 
Special Resolution Regime analogous to that managed by the FDIC for federally insured 
commercial banks. 
The valuation of the collateral for the TSLF and the PDCF by the clearer acting for 
the borrowing primary dealer seems designed to maximise adverse selection.  The discount 
rate penalty cuts were infra-marginal transfer payments from the tax payers to the 
shareholders of banks already using or planning to use the discount window facilities.  
Asking for the decision to pay interest on bank reserves to be brought forward without 
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insisting that required reserved remain non-remunerated likewise represents an unnecessary 
boon for the banking sector. 
III.2a(xii) Cognitive regulatory capture of the Fed by vested interests 
In each of the instances where the Fed maximised moral hazard and adverse selection, 
obviously superior alternatives were available – and not just with the benefit of hindsight.  
Why did the Fed not choose these alternatives?  I believe a key reason is that the Fed listens 
to Wall Street and believes what it hears; at any rate, the Fed acts as if it believes what Wall 
Street tells it.  Wall Street tells the Fed about its pain, what its pain means for the economy at 
large and what the Fed ought to do about it.  Wall Street’s pain was great indeed – deservedly 
so in many cases.  Wall Street engaged in special pleading by exaggerating the impact on the 
wider economy of the rapid deleveraging (contraction of the size of the balance sheets) that 
was taking place.  Wall Street wanted large rate cuts fast to assist it in its solvency repairs, 
not just to improve its liquidity, and Wall Street wanted the provision of ample liquidity 
against overvalued collateral.  Why did Wall Street get what it wanted?  
Throughout the 12 months of the crisis, it is difficult to avoid the impression that the 
Fed is too close to the financial markets and leading financial institutions, and too responsive 
to their special pleadings, to make the right decisions for the economy as a whole.  
Historically, the same behaviour has characterised the Greenspan Fed.  It came as something 
of a surprise to me that the Bernanke Fed, if not quite a clone of the Greenspan Fed, displays 
the same excess sensitivity to Wall Street concerns.   
 The main recent evidence of Fed excess sensitivity to Wall Street concerns are, in 
addition to the list of quasi-fiscal features of the liquidity-enhancing measures listed in 
Section III.2a(xi), the excessive cumulative magnitude of cuts in the official policy rate since 
August 2007 (325 basis points), and especially the 75 basis points cut on January 21/22 2008. 
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As regards the ‘panic cut’, the only ‘news’ that could have prompted the decision on 
21 January, 2008 to implement a Federal Funds target rate cut of 75 bps, at an unscheduled 
meeting, and to announce that cut out of normal working hours the next day was the high-
frequency movement in stock prices and the palpable fear in the financial sector that the stock 
market rout in Europe on Monday 21st January 2008 (a US stock market holiday) and at the 
end of the previous week, would spill over into the US markets.38 
To me, both the cumulative magnitude of the official policy rate cuts and their timing 
provide support for what used to be called the ‘Greenspan put’ hypothesis, but should now be 
called the ‘Greenspan-Bernanke put’ or ‘Fed put’ hypothesis.39  A complete definition of the 
‘Greenspan-Bernanke put’ is as follows: it is the aggressive response of the official policy 
rate to a sharp decline in asset prices (especially stock prices) and other manifestations of 
financial sector distress, even when the asset price falls and financial distress (a) are unlikely 
to cause future economic activity to weaken by more than required to meet the Fed’s mandate 
and (b) do not convey new information about future economic activity or inflation that would 
warrant an interest rate cut of the magnitude actually implemented. 
 Mr Greenspan and many other ‘put deniers’ are correct in drawing attention to the 
identification problems associated with establishing the occurrence of a ‘Greenspan-
Bernanke put’. The mere fact that a cut in the policy rate supports the stock market does not 
mean that the value of the stock market is of any inherent concern to the policy maker. This is 
because of the causal and predictive roles of asset price changes.  Falling stock market prices 
reduce wealth and weaken corporate investment; falling house prices reduce the collateral 
value of residential property and weaken housing investment.  Forward-looking stock prices 
can anticipate future fundamental developments and thus be a source of news. 
                                                 
38
 Apparently the French central bank President had not bothered to inform his US counterpart, that a possible 
reason behind the stock market rout in Europe could be the manifestation of the stock sales prompted by the 
discovery at the Société Générale of Mr. Kerviel’s exploits.  If true it is extraordinary. 
39
 The term was coined as a characterisation of the interest rate cuts in October and November 1998 following 
the collapse of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM). 
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Nevertheless, looking at the available data as a historian, and constructing plausible 
counterfactuals as a ‘laboratory economist’, it seems pretty evident to me, that the Fed under 
both Greenspan and Bernanke has cut rates more vigorously in response to sharp falls in 
stock prices than can be rationalised with the causal effects of stock prices on household 
spending and on private investment, or with the predictive content of unexpected changes in 
stock prices. 
Both the1998 LTCM and the January 21/22, 2008 episodes suggest that the Fed has 
been co-opted by Wall Street - that the Fed has effectively internalised the objectives, 
concerns, world view and fears of the financial community. This socialisation into a partial 
and often distorted perception of reality is unhealthy and dangerous. 
It can be called cognitive regulatory capture (or cognitive state capture), because it is 
not achieved by special interests buying, blackmailing or bribing their way towards control of 
the legislature, the executive, the legislature or some important regulator or agency, like the 
Fed, but instead through those in charge of the relevant state entity internalising, as if by 
osmosis, the objectives, interests and perception of reality of the vested interest they are 
meant to regulate and supervise in the public interest. 
The literature on regulatory capture, and its big brother, state capture, is vast (see e.g. 
Stigler (1971), Levine and Forrence (1990), Laffont and Tirole (1991), Hellman et. al. (2000) 
and Hanson and Yosifon (2003)).  Capture occurs when bureaucrats, regulators, judges or 
politicians instead of serving the public interest as they are mandated to do, end up acting 
systematically to favour specific vested interests – often the very interests they were 
supposed to control or restrain in the public interest. The phenomenon is theoretically 
plausible and empirically well documented.  Its application to the Fed is also not new.  There 
is a long-standing debate as to whether the behaviour of the Fed during the 1930s can be 
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explained as the result of regulatory capture (see e.g. Epstein and Ferguson (1984) and Philip 
et. al. (1991)). 
 The conventional choice-theoretic public choice approach to regulatory capture 
stresses the importance of collective action and free rider considerations in explaining 
regulatory capture (see Olsen (1965)).  Vested interests have a concentrated financial stake in 
the outcomes of the decisions of the regulator. The general public individually have less at 
stake and are harder to organise.  I prefer a more social-psychological, small group 
behaviour-based explanation of the phenomenon.  Whatever the mechanism, few regulators 
have succeeded in escaping in a lasting manner their capture by the regulated industry.  I 
consider the hypothesis that there has been regulatory capture of the Fed by Wall Street 
during the Greenspan years, and that this is continuing into the present, to be consistent with 
the observed facts. 
There is little room for doubt, in my view, that the Fed under Greenspan treated the 
stability, well-being and profitability of the financial sector as an objective in its own right, 
regardless of whether this contributed to the Fed’s legal macroeconomic mandate of 
maximum employment and stable prices or to its financial stability mandate.  Although the 
Bernanke Fed has but a short track record, its too often rather panicky and exaggerated 
reactions and actions since August 2007 suggest that it also may have a distorted and 
exaggerated view of the importance of financial sector comfort for macroeconomic stability.   
III.2b The ECB 
The ECB immediately injected liquidity both overnight and at longer maturities on a 
very large scale indeed, but, at least as regards interbank spreads, with limited success (see 
Chart 4), and also with no greater degree of success than the Fed or the BoE (but see Section 
II3b for a caution about the interpretation of the similarity in Libor-OIS spreads). The ECB’s 
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injection of € 95 billion into the Eurosystem’s money markets on August 9, 2007, is viewed 
by many as marking the start of the crisis.40   
 As regards the effectiveness of its liquidity-enhancing open market interventions on 
the immediate crisis (as opposed to the likelihood and severity of future crises) the ECB has 
been both lucky and smart.  It was lucky because, as part of the compromise that created the 
supranational European Central Bank, the set of eligible collateral for open market operations 
and at the discount window and the set of eligible counterparties, were defined as the union 
rather than the intersection of the previous national sets of eligible collateral and eligible 
counterparties.41   
As a result, the ECB could accept as collateral in its repos and at the discount window 
a very large set of securities, including private securities (even equity) and asset-backed 
securities like residential mortgage-backed securities.  The ratings requirements were also 
very loose compared to those of the Bank of England and even those of the Fed: eligible 
securities had to be rated at least in the single A category by one or more of the recognised 
rating agencies.  The only dimension in which the ECB’s eligible collateral was more 
restricted than the Bank of England’s was that the ECB only accepts euro-denominated 
securities.  Currently around 1700 banks are eligible counterparties of the Eurosystem for 
open market operations.  The Fed has 20 (the primary dealers) and the BoE 40 (reserve 
scheme participants); around 2100 banks have access to the ECB’s discount window, as 
against 7500 for the Fed and 60 for the BoE. 
The ECB was smart in using the available liquidity instruments quite aggressively, 
injecting above-normal amounts of liquidity against a wide range of collateral at longer 
maturities (and mopping most of it up again in the overnight market).  It is important to note 
                                                 
40
 Short-term credit markets froze up after the French bank BNP Paribas suspended withdrawals from three 
investment funds/hedge funds it owned, citing problems in the US sub-prime mortgage sector. BNP said it could 
not value the assets in the funds, because the markets for pricing the assets had disappeared.  
41
 Eleven countries joined together to form the Eurosystem on January 1, 1999.  There are 15 euro area members 
now and 16 on January 1, 2009 when Slovakia joins. 
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that injecting X amount of liquidity at the 3-month maturity and taking X amount of liquidity 
out at the overnight maturity is not neutral if the intensity of the liquidity crunch is not 
uniform across maturities.  The liquidity crunch that started in August 2007 clearly was not.  
Maturities of around 1 month were crucial for end-of-year reasons and maturities from 3 
months to a year were crucial because that was where the markets had seized up completely.  
The ECB consciously tried to influence Euribor-OIS spreads to the extent that it interpreted 
these as reflecting illiquidity and liquidity risk rather than credit risk. 
No major Euro Area bank has failed so far.  Some small German banks fell victim to 
unwise investments in the ABS markets, and some fairly small hedge funds failed, but no 
institution of systemic importance was jolted to the point that a special-purpose LLR rescue 
mission had to be organised. 
I have one concern about the nature of the ECB’s liquidity-oriented open market 
operations and about its collateral policy at the discount window.  This concerns the pricing 
of illiquid collateral offered by banks.  We know the interest rates and fees charged for these 
operations, and the haircuts applied to the valuations.  But we don’t know the valuations 
themselves.  The ECB uses market prices when a functioning market exists.  For some of the 
assets it accepts as collateral there is no market benchmark. 
The ECB does not make the mistake the Fed makes in its pricing of the collateral 
offered at the PDCF and TSLF.  The ECB itself determines the price/valuation of the 
collateral when there is no market price.  But the ECB does not tell us what these prices are, 
nor does it put in the public domain the models or methodologies it uses to price the illiquid 
securities.  Requests to ECB Governing Council members and to ECB and NCB officials to 
publish the models used to price illiquid securities and to publish, with an appropriate delay 
to deal with commercial sensitivity, the actual valuations of specific, individual items of 
collateral have fallen on deaf ears.  
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 There is therefore a risk that banks use the ECB as lender of first resort rather than 
last resort, if the banks can dump low-grade collateral on the Eurosystem and have it valued 
as high-grade collateral.42  Since at least the beginning of 2008, persistent market talk has it 
that Spanish, Irish and Dutch banks may be in that game, getting an effective subsidy from 
the Eurosystem and becoming overly dependent on the Eurosystem as the funding source of 
first choice.   
 Late May 2008, Fitch Ratings reported that Spanish banks had, during recent months, 
created ABS, structured to be eligible for use as collateral with the ECB (strictly, with the 
NCBs that make up the Eurosystem), that were riskier than the ABS structures they put 
together before the crisis.  Accepting higher-credit risk collateral need not imply a subsidy 
from the Eurosystem to the banks, as long as the valuation or pricing of these securities for 
collateral purposes reflects the higher degree of credit risk attached to them.  One wonders 
whether such risk-sensitive pricing is actually taking place, especially when ECB officials 
publicly worry about the creditworthiness of securities accepted as collateral by the ECB 
when it provides liquidity to the markets or at the discount window.   
Although RMBS backed by mortgages originated by the borrowing bank itself are not 
eligible as collateral with the Eurosystem, RMBS issued by parties with whom the borrowing 
back has quite a close relationship (through currency hedges with the issuer or guarantor of 
the RMBS or by providing liquidity support for the RMBS. 
In principle, the higher credit risk attached to securities for which the borrower and 
the issuer/guarantor are close (compared the credit risk attached to similar securities issued or 
guaranteed by a bank that is independent of the borrowing bank) could be priced so as to 
reflect their higher credit risk.  We have no hard information on whether such credit-risk-
                                                 
42
 The probability of default on a collateralised loan like a repo is the joint probability of both the borrowing 
bank defaulting and the issuer of the security used as collateral defaulting.  The probability of such a double 
default will be low but not zero under current circumstances.  It may be quite high, when RMBS are offered as 
collateral, if the borrowing bank is also the bank that originated the mortgages backing the RMBS. 
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sensitive pricing actually takes place.  I fear that if it were, we would have been told, and that 
the lack of information is supportive of the view that implicit subsidisation is taking place.   
As long as the risk-adjusted rate of return the ECB gets on its loans is appropriate, 
there is nothing inherently wrong with the ECB taking credit risk onto its balance sheet.  But 
if it routinely values the mortgage-backed securities offered by the Spanish banks as if the 
mortgages backing the securities were virtually free of default risk, then the ECB is bound to 
be overvaluing the collateral it is offered.  In the first half of 2008, Spanish commercial 
banks, heavily exposed to the Spanish construction and real estate sectors, are reported to 
have repoed at least € 46 bn worth of their assets in exchange for ECB liquidity. Participants 
in these repo transactions have told me that no mortgages offered to the Eurosystem as 
collateral have been priced at less than 95 cents on the euro.  This seems generous given the 
dire straits the Spanish economy, and especially the construction and real estate sectors, now 
are in.  Of course, haircuts are (as always) applied to these valuations.43 
 It is essential that all the information required to verify whether the pricing of 
collateral accepted by the Eurosystem is subsidy-free be in the public domain.  That 
information is not available today. 
 Because part of the collateral offered the Eurosystem is subject to default risk, there 
could be a case for concern even if, ex-ante, the default risk is appropriately priced.  In the 
event a default occurs (that is, if both the counterparty borrowing from the Eurosystem 
defaults and at the same time the issuer of the collateral defaults), the Eurosystem will suffer 
                                                 
43
 Between August 2007 and July 2008, the share of Spanish banks in the Eurosystem’s allocation of main 
refinancing operations and longer-term refinancing operations went up from about 4 percent to over 10.5 
percent.  The share of Irish banks went up from around 4.5 percent to 9.5 percent.  It cannot be a coincidence 
that Spain and Ireland are the euro area member states with the most vulnerable construction and real estate 
sectors.  Another measure of the increase in the scale of the Eurosystem’s lending to the Spanish banks since the 
beginning of the crisis in August 2007, is the value of the monthly loans extended to Spanish banks by the 
Banco de España.  This went from a low of about €23 billion in August 2007 to a high of more than €75bn in 
December 2007 (for those worried about seasonality, the December 2006 figure was just under €30 billion). 
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a capital loss.  In practice, it would be one of the NCBs of the euro area that would suffer the 
loss rather than the ECB, as repos are conducted by the NCBs.   
Although the ECB’s balance sheet is small and its capital tiny, the consolidated 
Eurosystem has a huge balance sheet and a large amount of capital (see Table 6).  The 
balance sheet could probably stand a fair-sized capital loss.  But there always is a capital loss 
so large that it would threaten the ability of the Eurosystem to remain solvent while adhering 
to its price stability mandate.  The ECB/Eurosystem would need to be recapitalised, but by 
which national fiscal authorities and in which proportions?  Unlike the Fed and the Bank of 
England, where it is clear which fiscal authority stands behind the central bank, that is, stands 
ready to recapitalise the central bank should the need arise, the fiscal vacuum within which 
the ECB, and to some degree the rest of the Eurosystem also, operate, leaves a question mark 
behind the question: who would bail out the ECB?   
This question may not yet be urgent now, because even euro-area banks with large 
cross-border activities still tend to have fairly clear national identities.  But this is changing.  
Banca Antonveneta, the fourth largest Italian bank, was owned by ABN-AMRO, a Dutch 
bank which is now in turn owned by Royal Bank of Scotland (UK), Fortis (Belgium) and 
Santander (Spain).44  Would the Italian Treasury bail out Banca Antonveneta?  Soon there 
will be banks incorporated not under national banking statutes but under European Law, as 
Societas Europaea. One large German financial group with banking interests, Allianz, has 
already done so.  Given this uncertainty, it may be understandable that ECB officials are 
more concerned than Fed and Bank of England officials about carrying credit risk on the 
Eurosystem’s balance sheet. 
                                                 
44
 On 30 May 2008, Banco Santander sold Antonveneta to Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena, an Italian bank, so 
the fiscal backing question mark raised by the takeovers highlighted in the main text has been erased again.  
This does not affect the relevance of the point that with foreign-owned banks, operating in many jurisdictions, it 
is not obvious which national fiscal authorities will foot the fiscal cost of a bail out.  The point applies across the 
world, but is especially pressing for the euro area, where a supranational central bank operates alongside fifteen 
national fiscal authorities and no supranational fiscal authority. 
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 Although the ECB has done well in its MMLR function, albeit with the major caveat 
as regards the pricing of illiquid collateral, its LLR ability has not yet been tested.  This is 
perhaps just as well.  The ECB has no formal supervisory or regulatory role vis-à-vis euro 
area banks.  The Treaty neither rules out such a role nor does it require one.  In practice, no 
regulatory and supervisory role for the ECB has as yet evolved.  Banking sector regulation 
and supervision in the euro area is a mess.  In some countries the central bank is regulator and 
supervisor.  Spain, France, Ireland and the Netherlands are examples.  In others the central 
bank shares these roles with another agency.  Germany is an example with the Bundesbank 
and BaFin (the German Financial Supervisory Authority) sharing supervisory 
responsibilities.45  In yet other countries the central bank has no regulatory and supervisory 
role at all.  Austria and Belgium are examples.   
 Since the crisis started, the ECB has complained regularly, and at times even publicly, 
about the lack of information it has at its disposal about potentially systemically important 
individual institutions.  In the case of some euro area national regulators, there even exist 
legal obstacles to sharing information with the ECB.  Compared to the Fed and the Bank of 
England, the ECB is therefore very close to the Bank of England which, when the crisis 
started, had essentially no individual institution-specific information at its disposal.  The Fed, 
with its (shared) regulatory and supervisory role, has better information. 
 On the other hand, the ECB appears much less moved by the special pleading 
emanating from the euro area financial sector than the Fed appears to be by Wall Street.  This 
is not surprising.  Without a supervisory or regulatory role over euro area financial 
institutions and markets, regulatory capture is less likely. 
 
 
                                                 
45
 BaFin is short for Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungaufsicht. 
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III.2c The Bank of England 
 As regards the fulfilment of its LLR and MMLR functions, the Bank of England 
missed the boat completely at the beginning of the crisis.  This state of affairs lasted till about 
November 2007.  Indeed, the Governor of the BoE did not, as far as I have been able to 
ascertain, use in public the words ‘credit crunch’, ‘liquidity crisis’ or equivalent words until 
March 26, 2008 (King (2008)). 
 The UK turned out, when the run on Northern Rock started on September 15, 2007, to 
have no effective deposit insurance scheme.  The amounts insured were rather low (up to 
£30,000) and had a 10 percent deductible after the first £2000.  Worse, it could take up to six 
months to get your money out, even if it was insured.  This is supposed to be corrected by 
new legislation and institutional reform. 
 The Bank of England also turned out to be hopelessly (and quite unnecessarily) 
confused about what its legal powers and constraints were in the exercise of its LLR role.  
The Governor, for instance, argued on September 20, 2007, before the House of Commons 
Treasury Committee, that legislation introduced under an EU directive (the Market Abuse 
Directive) prevented covert support to individual institutions (the BoE had received legal 
advice to this effect).  Since then what always was apparent to most has become apparent to 
all: neither the MAD nor the UK’s transposition of that Directive into domestic law prevented 
the kind of covert support the BoE would have liked to offer to Northern Rock.  Finally, there 
was no Special Resolution Regime for banks in the UK.  There was therefore just the choice 
between the regular corporate insolvency regime and nationalisation.  On February 18, 2008, 
the Chancellor announced the nationalisation of Northern Rock. 
 The BoE’s performance as lender of last resort, including its covert role in 
orchestrating private sector support for individual troubled institutions, was much more 
effective when Bradford & Bingley (a British mortgage lender whose exposure to the 
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wholesale markets was second only to that of Northern Rock) got into heavy weather with a 
rights issue in May and June 2008.46  Neither Northern Rock nor Bradford & Bingley were in 
any sense systemically important institutions, but when HBOS, the 4th largest UK banking 
group by market capitalisation experienced trouble with its £4billion rights issue (announced 
in April 2008), during June and July 2008, systemic stability was clearly at stake.  The Bank 
of England and the banking and financial sector regulator, the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA), helped keep the underwriters on board. 
 As noted earlier, both at its discount window (the standing lending facility) and in 
repos, the BoE only accepted (and accepts) the narrowest possible kind of collateral (UK 
sovereign debt or better).  This made it impossible for the BoE to offer effective liquidity 
support when markets froze.  
 For a long time, the Bank of England spoke in public as if it believed that what the 
banks were facing was essentially a solvency problem, with no material contribution to the 
financial distress coming from illiquid markets and from illiquid but solvent institutions (see 
e.g. the paper submitted to the Treasury Committee by Mervyn King on 12 September 2007, 
the day before the Northern Rock crisis blew up (King (2007)).   
When the crisis started, the Bank of England injected liquidity on a modest scale, at 
first only in the overnight interbank market.  Rather late in the day, on September 19, 2007, it 
reversed this policy and offered to repo at 3-month maturity, and against a wider than usual 
range of eligible collateral, including prime mortgages, but subject to an interest rate floor 
100 basis points above Bank Rate, that is, effectively at a penalty rate, regardless of the 
quality of the collateral.  No one came forward to take advantage of this facility; fear of being 
stigmatised may have been as important a deterrent as the penalty rate charged.   
                                                 
46
 Bradford & Bingley's £400m cash call closed on Friday, August 15, 2008.  The six high street banks that, at 
the prompting of the BoE and the FSA had agreed to underwrite the rights issue, are likely to be left with 
sizeable unplanned stakes in B&B. 
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The Bank was extremely reluctant to try to influence, let alone target, interest rates at 
maturities longer than the overnight rate.  It is true that, when markets are orderly and liquid, 
the authorities cannot independently set more than one rate on the yield curve.  When the 
BoE sets the overnight rate, this leaves rates at all longer maturities to be market-determined, 
that is, driven by fundamentals such as market expectations of future official policy rates and 
default risk premia.  When markets are disorderly and illiquid, however, there is a term 
structure of liquidity risk premia in addition to a term structure of default-risk-free interest 
rates and a term structure of default risk premia.  It is the responsibility of the central bank, as 
MMLR, to provide the public good of liquidity in the amounts required to eliminate (most of) 
the liquidity risk premia at the maturities that matter (anything between overnight and one 
year).   
Early in the crisis, the Bank of England’s public statements suggested that it 
interpreted most the spread between Libor and the OIS rate at various maturities as default 
risk spreads rather than, at least in part, as liquidity risk spreads.  Later during the crisis, in 
February 2008, the BoE published, in the February Inflation Report (Bank of England 
(2008)), a decomposition of the 1-year Libor-OIS spread between a default risk measure 
(extracted from CDS spreads) and a liquidity premium (the residual).  It concluded that 
although early in the crisis most of the Libor-OIS spread was due to liquidity premia, towards 
the end of the sample period the importance of default risk premia had increased 
significantly.   
The decomposition is, unfortunately, flawed because the CDS market throughout the 
crisis has itself been affected significantly by illiquidity.  The paper is, however, of interest as 
evidence of the evolving and changing views of the BoE as to the empirical relevance of 
liquidity crises.  This changing view was also reflected in an evolving policy response.  The 
Bank of England gradually began to act as a MMLR. 
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At the end of 2007, the Bank initiated a number of special auctions at one-month and 
three-month maturities against a wider range of collateral, including prime mortgages and 
securities backed by mortgages.   
On April 21, 2008 the Bank announced the creation of the Special Liquidity Scheme 
(SLS), in the first instance for £100bn, which would lend Treasury bills for one year to banks 
against collateral that included RMBS, covered bonds (that is, collateralised bonds) and ABS 
based on credit card receivables.  Technically, the arrangement was described as a swap, 
although it can fairly be described as a one-year collateralised loan of Treasury bills to the 
banks.  It is similar to the TSLF created for primary dealers in the US, although the maturity 
of the loans is longer (one year as against one month in the US).   
The Bank of England has made much of the fact that the SLS will only accept as 
collateral securities backed by ‘old’ mortgages, that is, mortgages issued before the end of 
2007.  The facility is meant to solve the ‘stock overhang’ problem but not to encourage the 
banks to engage in new mortgage lending using the same kind of RMBS that have become 
illiquid.  It is, however, not obvious that without the government (not necessarily the Bank of 
England) lending a hand, securitisation of new mortgages will get off the ground any time 
soon.   
Accepting new mortgage-backed securities as collateral in repos might help revive 
sensible forms of securitisation, if the mortgages backing the securities satisfy certain 
verifiable criteria (loan to value limits, income and financial health verification for borrowers, 
no track record of loan default etc.).  It is true that in the UK, and a-fortiori in the US, there 
was, prior to the summer of 2007, securitisation of home loans that ought never to have been 
made, including many of the US subprime loans. But the fact that, during the year since 
August 2007, there have been just two new residential mortgage-backed issues in the markets 
in the UK, suggests that the securitisation baby has been thrown out with the subprime 
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bathwater.  These securities should, of course, be valued aggressively if offered as collateral 
in repos, to avoid subsidies to home lenders or home borrowers. 
The Bank of England itself determines the valuation of any illiquid assets offered as 
collateral in the SLF.  This should help it avoid the adverse selection problem created by the 
Fed with its PDCF and TSLF.  The haircuts and other terms of the SLS were also quite 
punitive, judging from the howls of anguish emanating from the banking community, who 
nevertheless make ample use of the Facility.  As with the Fed and the ECB, the Bank of 
England does not make public any information about the actual pricing of specific collateral 
or about the models used to set these prices.  Without that information, we cannot be sure 
there is no subsidy to the banks involved in the arrangement.  There can also be no proper 
accountability of the Bank to Parliament or to the public for the management of public funds 
involved. 
It is clear that the so-called Tripartite Arrangement between the Treasury, the Bank of 
England and the FSA did not work.  It is also clear, however, that these are the three parties 
that must be involved and must cooperate to achieve financial stability.  The central bank has 
the short-term liquid deep pockets and the market knowledge.  The Treasury, backed by the 
tax payer, has the long-term deep non-inflationary pockets.  The FSA has the individual 
institution-specific knowledge.  The problems in the UK had more to do with failures in the 
legal framework (deposit insurance, lender of last resort immunities, the insolvency regime 
and SRR for banks) than with poor communication and cooperation between the central bank, 
the regulator and the Treasury. 
IV Conclusion 
Following a 15 year vacation in inflation targeting land with hardly a hint of systemic 
financial instability, the central banks in the north Atlantic region were, in the middle of 2007 
faced with the unpleasing combination of a systemic financial crisis, rising inflation and 
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weakening economic activity.  Fighting three wars at the same time was not something the 
central banking community was prepared for.  The performance of the central banks 
considered in this paper, the Fed, the ECB and the Bank of England, ranged, not surprisingly, 
from not too bad (the ECB) to not very good at all (the Fed).  
As regards macroeconomic stability, the interest rate decisions of the Fed are hard to 
rationalise in terms of its official mandate (sustainable growth/employment and price 
stability).  This is not the case for the ECB and the Bank of England, with their lexicographic 
price stability mandates.  The excessively aggressive interest rate cuts of the Fed reflect 
political pressures (the Fed is the least operationally independent of the three central bank), 
excess sensitivity to financial sector concerns (reflecting cognitive regulatory capture) and 
flaws in the understanding of the transmission mechanism by key members of the FOMC. 
As regards financial stability, an ideal central bank would have combined the concern 
about moral hazard of the Bank of England with the broad sets of eligible counterparties and 
eligible instruments that enabled the ECB, right from the start of the crisis, to be an effective 
market maker of last resort, and the institution-specific knowledge that made the Fed an 
effective lender of last resort.  The reality has been that the Bank of England mismanaged 
liquidity provision as market maker of last resort and as lender of last resort early in the 
crisis, and that the Fed has created moral hazard in an unprecedented way.   
Until the public is informed in detail about the way the three central banks price the 
illiquid collateral they are offered (at the discount window, in repos and at any of the many 
facilities and schemes that have been created), there has to be a concern that all three central 
banks (and therefore indirectly the tax payers and beneficiaries of other public spending) may 
be subsidising the banks through these LLR and MMLR facilities.  This concern is most 
acute as regards the Fed, whose valuation procedures at the TSLF and PDCF are an open 
invitation to adverse selection. 
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As regards the desirability of institutionally combining or separating the roles of the 
central bank (as lender of last resort and market maker of last resort) and that of regulator and 
supervisor for the financial sector, we are between a rock and a hard place.  A regulator and 
supervisor (like the Fed) is more likely to have the institution-specific information necessary 
for the effective performance of the LLR role.  However, regulatory capture of the 
regulator/supervisor is likely.   
Central banks without regulatory or supervisory responsibilities like the Bank of 
England (for the time being) and the ECB are less likely to be captured by vested financial 
sector interests.  But they are also less likely to be well-informed about possible liquidity or 
solvency problems in systemically important financial institutions.  There is unlikely to be a 
fully satisfactory solution to the problem of providing central banks with the information 
necessary for effective discharge of their LLR responsibility without at the same time 
exposing them to the risk of regulatory capture.  The best safeguards against capture are 
openness and accountability.  It is therefore most disturbing that all three central banks are 
pathologically secretive about the terms on which financial support is made available to 
struggling institutions and counterparties. 
 Taking the official policy rate-setting decision away the central bank may reduce the 
damage caused by regulatory capture of the central bank by financial sector interests.  
Moving the rate setting authority out of the central bank could therefore be especially 
desirable if the central bank is given supervisory and regulatory powers. 
The market maker of last resort has the same position in relation to market liquidity 
for a transactions-oriented system of financial intermediation, as is held by the lender of last 
resort in relation to funding liquidity for a relationships-oriented system of financial 
intermediation.  The central bank is the natural entity to fulfil both the LLR and MMLR 
functions. 
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There is an efficiency-based case for government intervention to support illiquid 
markets or instruments and to support illiquid but solvent financial institutions that are 
deemed systemically important.  As the source of ultimate domestic-currency liquidity, the 
central bank is the natural agency for performing both the market maker of last resort and the 
lender of last resort function.  Liquidity is a public good that can be provided privately, but 
only inefficiently. 
 There is also an efficiency-based case for government intervention to support 
insolvent financial institutions that are deemed systemically important.  This, however, 
should not be the responsibility of the central bank. 
 The central bank should not be required to provide subsidies, either through liquidity 
support or any other way, to institutions known to be insolvent.  If institutions deemed to be 
solvent turn out to be insolvent, and if the central bank as a result of financial exposure to 
such institutions suffers a loss, this should be compensated forthwith by the Treasury, 
whenever such a loss would impair the ability of the central bank to pursue its 
macroeconomic stability objectives.  
It would be even better if any securities purchased outright by the central bank or 
accepted as collateral in repos and other secured transactions that are not completely free of 
default risk, were to be transferred immediately to the balance sheet of the Treasury (say 
through a swap for Treasury Bills, at the valuation put on these risky securities when they 
were acquired by the central bank).  That way, the division of labour and responsibilities 
between liquidity management and insolvency management (or bail outs) is clear.  Each 
institution can be held accountable to Parliament/Congress for its mandate.  If the central 
bank plays a quasi-fiscal role, that clarity, transparency and accountability becomes impaired.  
 Central banks can effectively perform their market maker of last resort function by 
expanding traditional open market operations and repos.  This means increasing the volumes 
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of their outright purchases or loans and extending their maturity, at least up to a year in the 
case of repos.  It means extending the range of eligible counterparties to include all 
institutions deemed systemically important (too large or too interconnected to fail). It also 
means extending the range of securities eligible for outright purchase or for use as collateral 
to include illiquid private securities. 
 Regulatory instruments should be used to address financial asset market bubbles and 
credit booms.  Specifically, supplementary capital requirements and liquidity requirements 
should be imposed on all systemically important highly leveraged institutions – commercial 
banks, investment banks, hedge funds, private equity funds or whatever else they are called 
or will be called.  These supplementary capital and liquidity requirements could either be 
managed by the central bank in counter-cyclical fashion or be structured as automatic 
financial stabilisers, say by making them increasing functions of the recent historical growth 
rates of the value of each firm’s assets. 
 To minimise moral hazard (incentives for excessive risk-taking in the future) all 
institutions that are eligible counterparties in MMLR operations and/or users of LLR facilities 
should be regulated according to common principles and should be subject to a common 
Special Resolution Regime allowing for Prompt Corrective Action, including the condition of 
regulatory insolvency and the possibility of nationalisation. 
 All securities purchased outright or accepted as collateral should be priced punitively 
to minimize moral hazard.  If necessary, the central bank should organise reverse auctions to 
price securities for which there is no market benchmark. 
 The creation and proliferation of obscure and opaque financial instruments can be 
discouraged through the creation of a positive list (regularly updated) of securities that will be 
accepted by the central bank as collateral at its MMLR and LLR facilities.  Securities that 
don’t appear on the list can be expected to trade at a discount relative to those that do.  
123 
 
 Finally, for those whose attention span is the reciprocal of the length of this paper, 
some dos and don’ts for central banks. 
Assign specific tools to specific tasks or objectives 
1. Assign the official policy rate to the macroeconomic stability objective(s). 
o Do not use the official policy rate as a liquidity management tool or as a quasi-
fiscal tool to recapitalise banks and other highly leveraged entities. 
2. Assign regulatory instruments to the damping of asset price bubbles. 
o Do not use the official policy rate to target asset price bubbles in their own right. 
3. Assign liquidity management tools, including the lender-of-last-resort and market-maker-
of-last-resort instruments, to the pursuit of financial stability for counterparties believed 
to be solvent. 
4. Use explicit fiscal tools (taxes and subsidies) and on-budget and on-balance sheet fiscal 
resources for strengthening the capital adequacy of systemically important institutions. 
o Do not use the central bank as a quasi-fiscal agent of the Treasury.   
5. Use regulatory instruments and the punitive pricing of liquidity to mitigate moral hazard. 
 This past year has been the first since I left the Monetary Policy Committee of the 
Bank of England that I really would have liked to be a central banker. 
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Chart 2b 
 
Sources. USA: The University of Michigan 5-10 Yr Expectations: Annual Chg in Prices: Median Increase (%). 
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Chart 3b 
 
Source: UK and euro area: Eurostat 
 US: Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Notes: quarter on same quarter one year earlier; * for euro area, data end in 2008Q1. 
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Chart 5 
 
 
Chart 6a 
 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics 
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Chart 6b 
 
 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis 
 
Chart 7a 
 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics 
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Chart 7b 
 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics 
 
Table 7c 
 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis 
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Table 7d 
 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis 
 
Chart 8a 
 
 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis 
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Chart 8b 
 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis 
 
Chart 9a 
 
Source: Office of National Statistics 
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Chart 9b
 
Source: Office of National Statistics 
 
Chart 10a 
 
Source: Eurostat and ECB 
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Table 1 
Currency composition of official foreign exchange reserves 
   '95   '96   '97   '98   '99   '00   '01   '02   '03   '04   '05   '06   '07   
US dollar 
59.00% 62.10% 65.20% 69.30% 70.90% 70.50% 70.70% 66.50% 65.80% 65.90% 66.40% 65.70% 63.30%
Euro         
17.90% 18.80% 19.80% 24.20% 25.30% 24.90% 24.30% 25.20% 26.50%
German mark 
15.80% 14.70% 14.50% 13.80%
                  
Pound sterling 
2.10% 2.70% 2.60% 2.70% 2.90% 2.80% 2.70% 2.90% 2.60% 3.30% 3.60% 4.20% 4.70%
Japanese yen 
6.80% 6.70% 5.80% 6.20% 6.40% 6.30% 5.20% 4.50% 4.10% 3.90% 3.70% 3.20% 2.90%
French franc 
2.40% 1.80% 1.40% 1.60%
                  
Swiss franc 
0.30% 0.20% 0.40% 0.30% 0.20% 0.30% 0.30% 0.40% 0.20% 0.20% 0.10% 0.20% 0.20%
Other 
13.60% 11.70% 10.20% 6.10% 1.60% 1.40% 1.20% 1.40% 1.90% 1.80% 1.90% 1.50% 1.80%
 Sources:1995-1999, 2006-2007 IMF: Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves 
                :1999-2005, ECB: The Accumulation of Foreign Reserves 
Source: Wikipedia 
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Table 2 
Central Bank Conventional Financial Balance Sheet 
Assets Liabilities 
 
1
M
i+  
 
 
 
N 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
 
Conventional Financial Balance Sheet of the Federal Reserve System 
12 March 2008, US$ bn 
Assets Liabilities  
D: 703.4 M: 811.9 
L: 182.2 N:   47.4 
R:  13.0  
 W:   39.7 
 
  
D
L
feR
bW
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Table 4 
Conventional Balance sheet of the Bank of England (£ billion) 
    June 1, 2006 24-Dec-07 12-Mar-08 
  Liabilities 82 102 97 
M: 
Notes in circulation 38 45 41 
Reserves balances  22 26 21 
N: Other  20 30 33 
W
b
:                Equity  2  2  2 
 
 Assets 82 102 97 
D: 
Advances to HM 
Government 
13 13 7 
L&D: 
Securities acquired 
via market 
transactions 
8 7 9 
L: 
Short-term market 
operations & reverse 
repos with BoE 
Counterparties 
12 44 43 
Other assets  33 38 38 
            Source: Financial Statistics 
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Table 5 
Conventional Balance sheet of the European Central Bank (€ billion) 
    
31 December  
2006 
31 December 
2007 
  Liabilities 106 126 
M: 
Notes in circulation 50 54 
   
N: Other  56 72 
W
b
:                Equity 4 4 
     
 Assets 106 126 
D:  54 71 
L 
Other Assets 10 11 
Claims on euro area 
residents in forex 
3 4 
R: Gold and forex 
reserves 
40 39 
         Source: European Central Bank (2008a),  
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Table 6 
Conventional Balance sheet of the Eurosystem (€ billion) 
    22 December 2006 29 February  2008 
  Liabilities 1142 1379 
M: 
 805 887 
   
N: Other  273 421 
W
b
:                Equity 64 71 
     
 Assets 1142 1379 
D: 
Euro-denominated 
government debt 
40 39 
L 
Euro-denominated 
claims on Euro Area 
credit institutions 
452 519 
Other Assets 330 480 
R: Gold and forex 
reserves 
321 340 
 Source: European Central Bank (2008b),  
  
 Monetary policy actions 
• Official policy rate 
– Fed: -325 bps (current level: 2.00%)
– ECB: +25 bps  (current level: 4.25%) 
– BoE: -75 bps (current level: 5.00%)
–  
• Unscheduled meetings, out
– Fed: one for OPR (21/22 Jan.)
– ECB: none 
– BoE: none 
–  
• Discount rate penalty
– Fed:  -75 bps (current level: 25 bps)
– ECB: ±0 bps  (current
– BoE: ±0 bps  (current level: 100bps)
–  
• Open mouth operations
– ECB: repeated hints at/threats of OPR increases that did not materialise until July 2008 
(‘talk loudly & carry a little stick’)
–  
   
 
1990   2000   
Canada 17.3  23.6  
France 20.8  21.6  
Germany 25.3  20.2  
Italy 20.8  20.6  
Japan 33.2  27.5  
United 
Kingdom 16.5  15.4  
United States 15.3  17.7  
    
Note:  Based on SNA93 or ESA95 except Turkey that reports on SNA68 basis.            
Source: OECD 
National accounts of OECD countries database.     
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Table 7 
since August 2007 by the Fed, ECB and BoE
 
 
 
-of-hours announcements 
 
 
 
 level: 100bps) 
 
 
 
Table 8 
Gross national saving rates for the G7 
Percent of nominal GDP 
     
2001   2002   2003   2004   2005   
22.2  21.2  21.4  22.8  23.7  
21.3  19.8  19.1  19.0  18.5  
19.5  19.4  19.5  21.5  21.8  
20.9  20.8  19.8  20.3  19.6  
25.8  25.2  25.4  25.8  26.8  
15.6  15.8  15.7  15.9  15.1  
16.1  13.9  12.9  13.4  13.5  
     
   
 
 
  
2006   2007   
24.3   ..   
19.1  19.3  
23.0  25.2  
19.6  19.7  
26.6   ..   
14.9   ..   
13.7   ..   
  
  
